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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how and why many modern Twelver 
Shi’a, Sunni, and Western scholars have structured political and religious conflict during 
the formative era of Islam (610-945 C.E.) around a partisan Sunni-Shi’a divide that did 
not truly exist, at least as we know it today, until the sixteenth century.  By analyzing the 
socio-political and economic developments from the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
(570-632) to the Abbasid Revolution (750), I intend to show that there was no clear line 
that divided Sunni and Shi’a Muslims during the formative era of Islam, and that the 
concepts of Sunnism and Twelver Shi’ism took centuries to develop into the theological, 
legal, and spiritual characteristics that we associate with the two main sects of Islam 
today.  In other words, I intend to show that Twelver Shi’ism and Sunnism were the 
products of several centuries of theological and legal speculation.  During the first two 
centuries of Islam, a diversity of religious and political movements clouded the line 
between Sunnism and Shi’ism.  Moreover, many of the life stories of important “Twelver 
Shi’ite” and “Sunni” historical figures of the formative era also blurred the line between 
what we know today as Sunnism and Shi’ism.    
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Introduction: Modern Sunna and Shi’a Interpretations of Islamic History 
The world of Islam divides into two main sects with different theological 
approaches to God that vary at key points in doctrine.  The American experience in Iraq 
since 2003 has spotlighted these key differences, yet few understand their origins.  Most 
works, even those by specialists, construe the division as reaching back to the early 
formative years of Islam—which it does in some respects—but many do not realize how 
long it took for the important differences between what became known as Sunni and Shi’i 
Islam to become solid and fixed as they now seem to be.  In other words, in the first few 
centuries of Islamic history, the term Shi’ism can only be applied retrospectively to a 
diversity of political sects and religious movements, many of which had little in 
common.1  Here, a closer analysis of Islamic history from the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad (570 to 632 C.E.) to the Abbasid Revolution (750 C.E.) will show that there 
was a diversity of Shi’ite movements throughout early Islamic history and no clear line 
that divided Sunna and Shi’a in early Islam. 
Historians who generalize about the nature of theological rifts and political 
conflict during the early Islamic era tend to structure the historical narrative within a 
strict Sunna-Shi’a structure.2  The following passage from Yitzhak Nakash’s recent book, 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this thesis, the term Shi’ism is a noun referring to all the religious, political, 
intellectual, and social ideas and sects associated with the concept.  The term Shi’ite is an adjective that 
describes a person or a movement that reflects qualities relating to Shi’ism.  The term Shi’i is a noun 
referring to a single individual, and the term Shi’a is a noun referring to multiple individuals.  Further, the 
term Shi’ite-minded will refer to individuals or groups who have high regard for ‘Ali and his descendants 
but are not necessarily a Shi’a. 
2
 Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai, Shi’ite Islam, Translated from Persian and edited with an introduction and 
notes by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1975): 3-28.  In the introduction, Seyyed 
2 
 
Reaching for Power, is a frequently used, albeit weak, generalization to describe the 
nature of Shi’ism during the early Islamic era: 
“When Muhammad died in A.D. 632, one group asserted that legitimate succession 
belonged to ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, and after him to the 
Prophet’s descendants.  But ‘Ali was passed over for succession three times in a row 
before he became caliph.  In 661’Ali was assassinated in a mosque in Kufa in southern 
Iraq, and the caliphate subsequently shifted from Iraq to Syria whence the Umayyad 
dynasty ruled for the best part of a century.  Some twenty years after ‘Ali’s death, his 
partisans in Kufa, known as the Shi’at ‘Ali, or simply the Shi’a, encouraged his son 
Hussein to challenge the Syrian claim to the caliphate.  Hussein raised the banner of 
revolt in 680, but the people of Kufa broke their promise to rally to his side, leaving him 
to meet his death at the battle of Karbala…Shi’ism was born of Hussein’s defeat…It 
developed as the minority sect while Sunnism grew to be the majority sect in Islam.”3 
 
Many Western and Islamic historians—especially those who are not as familiar with the 
early Islamic era—tend to understand Shi’ism within a simplistic “orthodox vs. 
unorthodox” structure, or as a minority political sect fighting against the main stream 
orthodox community.  In the West, it may be true that this trend began in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century among early European historians such as Phillip Hitti or Carl 
Brockelmann.4 Although scholarship has improved on the subject since the 1960s, there 
are still many weak generalizations made in introductory works on Islam and Shi’ism. 
Malise Ruthven’s The World of Islam (2006), Caesar E. Farah’s Islam (1994), Vali 
Nasr’s The Shi’a Revival (2006), and Mahmoud M. Ayoub’s Islam: Faith and History 
(2004) are some of many examples of general introductions to Islam that slight the 
importance of Shi’ism within the historical narrative.5  Further, even good general 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hossein Nasr states that Western twentieth-century historians have failed to create a sympathetic analysis 
of Shi’ism.  Further, he also claims that Shi’ism has been too commonly described as a heresy.   
3
 Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2006): 5.  Nakash’s work analyses Sunni-Shi’i conflicts from approximately the 
sixteenth century to the present day.  This passage begins a brief introduction to Shi’ism in the modern 
world.   
4
 Phillip Hitti, The History of the Arabs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1937) and Carl 
Brockelmann, The History of Islamic Peoples (New York: Capricorn Books, 1939.) 
5
 Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.) Vali Nasr, The Shia 
Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (Washington D.C.: W.W. Norton, 2006), 
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introductions to Shi’ism such as Heinz Halm’s Shi’a Islam: from Religion to Revolution 
(1997) or Moojan Momen’s An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (1985) place too much 
emphasis on a Sunni-Shi’a divide during the early Islamic era.6   
It is probable that a fixed Sunni-Shi’a theological divide only began to develop in 
the tenth century and only became a full-fledged political divide by the sixteenth century.  
Marshall Hodgson’s three-volume series The Venture of Islam (1974), Ira M. Lapdius’ 
The History of Islamic Societies (2002), or Farhard Daftary’s A Short History of the 
Ismailis (1998) are examples of works that define Shi’ism as a complex form of piety that 
inspired a variety of theological, philosophical, cultural, and political ideas during the 
formative years of Islam.7  It is from many of the ideas proposed in these works that I 
have constructed this thesis.  
It is thus unfortunate that many Western and Islamic historians have mistakenly 
viewed early Islamic political history—from approximately the early seventh to the early 
tenth century—as containing a clear divide between Sunni, Shi’a, and Khariji Muslims.  
The stereotypical misconception is that a majority of Muslims, the Sunni, accepted the 
legitimacy of a ruler as long they brought unity to the Islamic community and respected 
Islamic dogma and traditions; that a significant minority, the Shi’a (“partisans”), yearned 
                                                                                                                                                 
Caesar E. Farah, Islam (United States: Barron’s Educational Series, 1994), and Mahmoud M. Ayoub, 
Islam: Faith and History (Oxford: One World Publications, 2004). 
6
 Heinz Halm, Shi’a Islam: From Religion to Revolution (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), and 
Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: the History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
7
 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), Ira Lapidus, 
A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002,) and Farhad Daftary, A 
Short History of the Ismailis (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1998).  For the purposes of this thesis, 
the term “formative era” refers to the time period in Islam from the early seventh century to the middle of 
the tenth century.  More specifically, it covers the early Islamic community led by Muhammad in Mecca 
than Medina from 610 to 632, the rightly-guided caliphs from 632 to 661, the Umayyad caliphs from 661 to 
750, and the height of the Abbasid caliphs from 750 to 950.  During this time period, Islam expanded 
across the Middle East and its legal, theological, philosophical, and mystical doctrines began to develop.  
By the end of this period, Islamic intellectual currents formed into orthodox schools of law and theology.   
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for an imam (“spiritual leader”) from among the family of the Prophet Muhammad—
more specifically the descendants of his cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib—who 
would rule the Islamic community based on a true understanding of Islamic law.  
Sometimes, the Khariji (literally “those who went out” i.e. a rebellious sect), a small 
minority, were also considered part of the early Islamic picture; in their doctrines, 
Kharijites would accept the most qualified Muslim, whether or not he was related to the 
Prophet, to rule over the Islamic community as caliph (“successor to the Prophet”).  
Islamic history has often been resolved to these three, or really two, distinctions: Shi’ite 
and Sunni.8   
While it may be true that those with Shi’ite sympathies—and especially those 
with Kharajite sympathies—were more likely to engage in political rebellion or formulate 
abstract interpretations of Islamic doctrine, the early Islamic community cannot be 
broken into such divisions so easily.  Two main problems emerge with structuring 
Islamic history in these clear-cut terms.  First, in the early centuries of Islam, what has 
come to be labeled as Sunni, Shi’ite, or Kharijite varied geographically, socially, 
economically, politically, and intellectually, and emanated from hundreds of political 
sects and intellectual perceptions.9  In other words, a variety of early movements later 
identified as Shi’ite have in reality very little in common.  In fact, it is appropriate to use 
                                                 
8
 John Esposito, The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 16-18.  The 
religious scholar Esposito overtly generalizes religious and political conflict from 661 to 750 on the basis 
of Sunni, Shi’ite, and a Kharajite divide.  More specifically, he labels politically passive groups such as the 
Muri’jiyya as Sunni and politically outspoken groups such as the Qadariyya as Shi’ite.  Although Esposito 
is correct in that there were tensions between these two groups in various Arab garrison towns, the 
Qadariyya were not always Shi’a.  Many Qadariyya, such as Hasan al-Basri, were passive.  Lastly, the 
Muri’jiyya-Qadariyya quarrel in the early eighth century was over questions of free will—not the nature of 
the caliphate.   
9
 Momen, 23-60.  Momen lists and describes the vast amount of religious and political Shi’ite groups 
during the formative Islamic period.  However, Momen too frequently uses the term sect for many groups 
that are really reflective of religious schools.  This misconception may be due to the use of the term faraqa 
(group) by tenth and eleventh century Muslim historians such as ibn-Hazm and Shahrastani.  This term was 
frequently used to describe both partisan sects and religious schools. 
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the phrase proto-Shi’ite for early Muslim political and religious movements that are 
related to Shi’ism but were not yet defined as such.  Second, a more significant problem 
is that many early political sects and theological interpretations that came to be labeled as 
Shi’ite could also have been labeled as Sunni or vice-versa.  Many early Islamic scholars 
who are now renowned for playing a significant role in the development of Sunni fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) actually had what can be seen as Shi’ite sympathies.10  In other 
words, much of early Islamic history has been understood through the accumulation of 
orthodox perceptions, which were developed only after the formative years of Islam.  
This thesis seeks to clarify the reality behind these perceptions. 
 
General Overview of Shi’ism in Islamic History 
Today, most Muslims adhere to schools of law that are dictated by the two 
orthodox perceptions: Sunnism and the form of Shi’ism known commonly as Twelver or 
Imami Shi’ism.  These contemporary dogmatic conceptions of Islam developed over a 
1400-year period out of a much wider variety of political sects and theological 
interpretations.   
During the middle of the seventh century, as the Arabs conquered the Sassanian 
Empire of Iran and the Byzantine lands of Syria and Egypt, Islam became the religion of 
the military and political elites, and it quickly spread among the merchant classes in cities 
from Central Asia and North Africa, competing with older Christian, Jewish, and 
Zoroastrian traditions.  Shari’ah, the body of sacred Muslim law, ethics, and etiquette, 
                                                 
10
 Marshall Hodgson, Volumes I, II, and III.  Throughout this massive three volume work, Hodgson 
refrains from using the term Sunna until his analysis of Islam in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries since 
he feels that the term Sunna carries with it many misconceptions.  Further, Shi’ism is shown as a diverse 
movement, and many individuals—especially in the formative period—are shown to cloud the line between 
Sunna and Shi’a.   
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played an important part in shaping Muslim culture in the urban centers of the Middle 
East.  During this early formative era, most people in the Middle East had yet to convert 
to the new religion and most Islamic legal, theological, and philosophical doctrines were 
in their early phases of development.  However, as Islamic history unfolded from the 
seventh to the tenth century, the Islamic world broadened and became more complex as 
trade increased and empires became more powerful. 11  Islamic intellectual currents 
became more pronounced and distinct schools of thought emerged.   Places like Baghdad 
under the Abbasid Empire (at their height of power from 750 to 945)—whose domains 
stretched from Eastern Iran to North Africa—became cauldrons of philosophical, 
scientific, and spiritual thought and intellectual speculation.   During this early formative 
era in Islamic history, pious ulama (Islamic clergy) in the urban centers spent their time 
elaborating on Shar’iah law by engaging in legal speculation through the discipline of 
Islamic fiqh to adapt Islam to a more complex world.   Further, many Muslims engaged 
in the study of kalam (Islamic theology) to defend their doctrines against Christians, 
Jews, and philosophers. These pious ulama were interested in replicating Muhammad’s 
original Islamic community of the early seventh century.  
We can label this type of piety as kerygmatic, which implies looking back on a 
past community or event as a motivation for social change.12  In his famous work, The 
Venture of Islam, Hodgson described the development of the ideal of the “pristine 
Medinan community.”  During the formative era, many pious Muslims looked back on 
the first Islamic community in Medina as an inspiration for legal speculation, various 
forms of piety, and social protest.  In order to describe this social phenomenon, Hodgson 
                                                 
11
 Lapidus, 183-193. 
12
 Hodgson, Volume I, 315-392.  
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frequently uses the term kerygmatic, which he defines—in relation to Islam—as “the 
positivist commitment to moral challenges revealed in datable events.”13 Muhammad’s 
revelations and the ideal of the Shari’ah-minded Medinan community are the “datable 
events” of which Hodgson speaks.  The “positivist commitment” refers to the creation of 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence and their engagement in social protest against the 
caliphs to bring about the enforcement of Shari’ah law. 
In contrast to the Shari’ah ideal was the court culture of the Umayyad (661-750) 
and Abbasid (750-1258) caliphates, who represented a secular court culture usually more 
concerned with establishing political absolutism than with following the egalitarian ideals 
of the Shar’iah-minded ulama.14  The court culture of the Umayyad and Abbasid 
caliphates reflected older Byzantine, Sassanian (Persian), and pre-Islamic Arabian norms 
more than Shari’ah norms.  This created a cultural rift between the ruling and religious 
classes.  Shi’ism—and to a lesser extent Kharijism—developed as a broad range of 
diverse political and religious responses to this cultural divide between the Shari’ah-
minded ulama and the caliphate.15   
By the end of this classical or formative period in Islamic history, Abbasid 
political unity was subdivided into various Arab and Persian factions across the Middle 
East.16  The process of decentralization culminated in a series of Turkish-nomadic 
invasions of the Middle East from Central Asia from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, 
beginning with the Seljuks in the middle of the eleventh century.  The most destructive of 
                                                 
13
 ibid, 364. 
14
 Lapidus, 45.  
15
 For this thesis, “Shari’ah-minded ulama” refers to pious Muslims who spent much of their life engaging 
in the study of fiqh (Islamic law) and in certain cases kalam (Islamic theology) for the purposes of 
emulating Muhammad’s Medinan community.  This class of Muslims was mainly urban-based and they 
were frequently associated with merchant guilds and other urban organizations. 
16
 Esposito, 32-49. 
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these invasions were those of the Mongols (1200s) and Timurids (1400s).17  However, 
the tendencies of decentralization and Turkic military rule did not stifle trade or the 
spread of Islam.  To the contrary, while the Middle East was becoming politically 
fragmented, Islamic beliefs and practices hardened slowly into five major schools of 
law—of which one was Twelver Shi’ism and the other four were Sunni schools—as a 
result of increased trade and contacts among urban centers.18  By the middle periods (945 
C.E. to 1500 C.E.) of Islamic history, Islamic legal, theological, and philosophical 
traditions had matured to the point where speculation gave way to established schools of 
thought.19  Therefore, the concept of Sunnism was not the foundation for Islamic thought 
but the product of many centuries of legal, theological, and philosophical speculation 
There are various reasons why this phenomenon took place.  One could argue that 
the conversion of most of the peoples of today’s Middle East to Islam by the tenth 
century allowed the ulama to be more aggressive in asserting their version of Islamic 
orthodoxy.   It can also be argued that the lack of Islamic intellectual developments in the 
first few centuries gave the early ulama a greater degree of flexibility.  Once schools of 
law and theology became established, tendencies toward conformity became much 
stronger. By the thirteenth century, the concept of Sunnism became associated with the 
acceptance of four schools of law.  Further, Shi’ism became associated mainly with the 
Twelver, or Jafari, school of law.20 
                                                 
17
 Ann K.S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia (Columbia, New York: Persian Heritage 
Foundation, 1988): 3-27.  Lambton discusses the various social, political, and economic continuities and 
discontinuities during the wave of Turkish nomadic invaders into Persia. 
18
 Hodgson, Volume II, 152-154. 
19
 Esposito, 114-115. 
20
 In Twelver Shi’ite dogma, ‘Ali and eleven of his descendants are considered the true spiritual successors 
to the prophet Muhammad.  The accumulation of their writings forms the basis for the Jafari school of law.  
The last Twelver Shi’ite imam is believed to have gone into hiding during the late ninth century and will 
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As a result of the tendency towards conformity, a Muslim quest for a more 
intimate experience with God had to look increasingly inward instead of outward.  For 
this reason, in the middle period, religious diversity and speculation became increasingly 
confined to Sufism, a general term used to describe the search for esoteric knowledge and 
inner purification.  Sufism stands in sharp contrast to kerygmatic piety.21  Theological 
and philosophical speculation was to be a private matter between a student and a Sufi pir 
(master), not for public discourse.  The student was to keep the hidden knowledge to 
himself and could only teach that knowledge to a pupil when given permission by his 
own mentor.   The emergence of tariqah orders, or Sufi brotherhoods, alongside the 
Islamic madrasa (“school”) throughout the middle periods shows how Sufism replaced 
kerygmatic piety as the most important form of pious expression in the world of Islam.22  
With the growth of importance in Sufism, a Muslim was able to become more personally 
intimate with God without upsetting older Islamic orthodox traditions.  Even though 
kerygmatic forms of piety still prevailed among politically radical sects such as the 
Shi’ite Nizari Ismaili (more infamously known as the hashiyya or the “assassins”), most 
Shi’ite Muslims—especially Twelver—began turning toward Sufism and away from 
kerygmatic piety. 23 
Much later, by the end of the era of political decentralization in the early sixteenth 
century, three large political entities often known as the “gun-powder” empires 
                                                                                                                                                 
return at the end of time as the savior of mankind.  All twelve imams are believed to have been martyred, 
and their tombs are the centers of pilgrimage and spiritual devotion. 
21
 Lapidus, 137-141. 
22
 Hodgson, Vol. II, 201-254. 
23
 Lapidus, 134.  Lapidus discusses the reasons why Sufism became a popular form of piety during the 
middle periods.  Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London, Great Britain: Clays Ltd., 
1967).   Lewis discusses the history of the Nizari Ismaili. 
10 
 
emerged.24  The most geographically Western of these, the Ottoman Empire—whose 
domains came to extend over the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and 
Western Arabia—patronized ulama who adhered to one of the four Sunni schools of law: 
Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Hanafi.  In the East, the Mughal Empire, based in Delhi, 
also became patrons of the Sunni schools.  However, the Saffavid Empire, whose power 
base was on the Iranian highlands, became patrons of the Twelver Shi’i School of law, 
otherwise known as the Jafari School.  The majority of the Iranian population, which was 
mainly Sunni before the sixteenth century, was then eventually converted to Twelver 
Shi’ism.  From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, philosophic and religious currents 
among the Shi’i ulama in Iran became more restrictive and Twelver Shi’ism evolved into 
a religious sect based on strict-dogmatic orthodoxy.25  Sufism and philosophical 
speculation were marginalized.  Further, conflict between the Saffavid shahs (“kings” in 
Persian) and the Ottoman sultans over control of Iraq also led to a war of words between 
Sunni and Shi’i ulama, creating a political and religious quarrel between what were 
increasingly seen as the two “orthodox” sects.26  It is from this political divide that the 
modern historical conception of a strict Sunni-Shi’i divide originated. 
In other words, we can say that since the 1700s, at least, Shi’ism has become a 
concept used by both Muslims and Westerners to describe what is in reality a distillation 
of hundreds of abstract sects and ideas conceived during the formative Islamic period into 
what is now commonly come to describe only the Twelver Shi’i ulama of Iran, Iraq, 
                                                 
24
 Hodgson, Volume III, 16-161.  Hodgson analyses the political, economic, and social developments of the 
Ottoman, Mughal, and Saffavid empires. 
25
 William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004): 
51-6. 
26
 Selim Deringil, “The Struggle against Shi’ism in Hamdian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-
Propaganda,” Die Welt des Islams 30, no. 1 (1990): 45-62. 
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Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Pakistan.  Although there are other Shi’i sects in 
existence today, they are confined generally to isolated regions and are small minorities 
compared to Twelvers.27  The spread of Islam and Christianity to all major regions of the 
globe over the past millennium is also a factor in the homogenization of belief systems.  
The slow yet uneven absorption of smaller or politically weaker structures into larger 
frameworks seems to be a general trend in Islamic history throughout the last 1,000 
years—or at least until now.  Today, those who are Sunna follow one of four schools of 
law and the Shi’a follow the Jafari school of law.  Very small minorities of Shi’a follow 
the various interpretations of the Zaydi and Ismaili Schools of law in Yemen and India 
most notably, and a few Khariji located in the interior of Oman, the Algerian Mzab, and 
the Island of Djerba (off the coast of Tunisia) follow the Ibadi school of law.  Contrary to 
contemporary perceptions of Islam, the various madhahib (schools of jurisprudence) did 
not become fixed until the 10th century, and the basis of the Twelver Shi’ism-Sunnism 
divide did not fully develop until the 16th century.28  There may have been cultural, 
political, and, economic trends toward religious orthodoxy during the early Islamic era, 
but not in the dichotomous terms that we place on Islam today—Shi’a and Sunna.   
This thesis explores how Shi’ism developed as a diverse range of political and 
religious responses during the formative era of Islam.  It attempts to show that Shi’ism, as 
                                                 
27
 Daftary, A Short History of the Ismaili.  Today, the Ismaili consists of several small sects.  The Khoja are 
located in parts of north-west and western Indian and they are led by the Aga Khan, their living Imam.   
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such, simply was not a known and firm quantity in the first several hundred years of 
Islam.  Until a certain period in history—perhaps with the belief in the occultation of the 
Twelfth Imam in the late ninth and early tenth century—what we know as Shi’ism was 
merely an association of similar beliefs, a pattern forming eventually to what it has 
become today.  A closer analysis of the early Islamic era shows a diversity of Shi’ite 
movements in the formative period of Islam, not a simplistic divide between Sunna and 
Shi’a Muslims.  
 
Twelver Shi’ite Dogma and the Distortion of the Historical Narrative 
It may be true that Twelver Shi’ism and Sunnism have become the two significant 
dogmatic boundaries for theological experimentation and historical interpretation.  This 
trend toward the consolidation of belief structures has drastically altered our historical 
perceptions of the formative years of Islam.  However, the distortion of the formative era 
of Islam is not exclusively due to Western or modern Sunni biases against Shi’ism.29  
Twelver Shi’a historians have also distorted the historical narrative, giving the 
unassuming reader the perception of an orthodox divide between Sunna and Shi’a 
Muslims since the assassination of ‘Ali in 661 C.E.  Further, the political and scientific 
achievements of early Shi’a figures have been overtly exaggerated by Shi’ite ulama since 
the Saffavid era.  This is, perhaps, reflective of the influence of Sufi mysticism during the 
middle periods and the cultural “Persianification” of Shi’ism during the “gun-powder” 
era.30  On the other hand, Sunni and Western historians tend to underemphasize the  
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Chart 1: The Twelve Imams31 
 
 
The Prophet Muhammad (died 632)——Khadija (died 619) 
                                                            l 
                                                            l 
                     Fatima (died 661) ——1. ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib (died 661) 
l 
———————— 
                                                        l                               l 
                                                        l                               l                    
                        2. Hasan (died c. 669-680)        3. Husayn (died 680) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                                             4. ‘Ali Zayn al-Abidin (died c. 713)                
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                                                5. Muhammad al-Baqir (died c. 733) 
                                                                                        l 
                                                                                        l 
                                                  6. Ja’far al-Sadiq (died 765) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                                  7.Musa al-Kazim (died 799) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                            8. ‘Ali al-Rida (died 818) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                                          9. Muhammad al-Taqi (died 835) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                           10. ‘Ali al-Hadi (died 865) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                                  11. Hasan al-Askari (died 874) 
                                 l 
                                 l 
                                                                  12. Muhammad al-Mahdi (hidden imam) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
a connection between the rise of Sufism in the world of Islam and the religious developments in Shi’ite 
theology.  The Sufi brotherhoods tended to focus their pious devotion on saints, attributing them with 
miracles.  During the Saffavid era, many comparisons were made between the imams and the conception of 
the Shah as a shadow of God on earth.   
31
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achievements of many of these same figures.32  The modern dichotomy in Islam is 
worked into the historical interpretations of the formative era. 
In Twelver Shi’ite dogma, early Shi’ite sympathizers are grouped into a single 
partisan religious community that was led by a succession of twelve imams from 661 to 
941, all of whom were related to the Prophet through the bloodline of ‘Ali (See Chart 
1).33   The line of imams begins with ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-
law. The eleven imams who followed were direct descendants of ‘Ali and his wife 
Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter from his first wife Khadija.  The line of succession ends 
with the twelfth Imam Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn Hasan, who is believed by Twelver 
Shi’a to have gone into “lesser ghayba (hiding)” on earth in 874 and “greater ghayba” in 
heaven in 941 and will return at the end of time as the mahdi (“savior of mankind”).34  
The concept of the return is known as raj’a.  Twelver Shi’a believe these imams were the 
spiritual and political successors to the Prophet Muhammad.  Further, the twelve imams, 
along with Muhammad and Fatima, are attributed with the ability to perform miracles and 
to make esoteric interpretations of the Qur’an.35  Each imam is believed to have passed 
down ‘ilm (divine knowledge) from one generation to the next and their hadith (a report 
of a saying or action of the Prophet, his companions, and his family) form much of the 
basis for the Jafari school of law.36  Further, the imams and their followers are pictured as 
a small minority pitted against the rest of the Islamic community—the Sunna.  They 
believe these pious imams were harassed by both the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs, who 
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saw the imams as a political threat.  Twelver ulama blame the Umayyad and Abbasid 
caliphs for the deaths of most of these religious leaders and they mourn their martyrdom 
through acts of self-flagellation and pilgrimage to their tombs.37  Moreover, they believe 
that most of the pious Islamic community betrayed these imams by not fighting on their 
behalf against the impious caliphs.  Therefore, the early Shi’a community is mistakenly 
seen by the modern Shi’a as a partisan community that followed this line of imams from 
generation to generation.  
  In the late ninth and tenth century, the belief in the ghayba of the Twelfth Imam 
grew in popularity among many ulama in Iraq and Syria.38  Among Twelver ulama, the 
historical narrative of the twelve imams as outlined above eventually became the 
accepted version of early Shi’ite or “Imami” history.  During this time period, Shi’ite 
theologians of the early middle period such as al-Kulayni started articulating and 
propagating Twelver Shi’ite dogma and theology.  Even among tenth and eleventh-
century Islamic historians such as ibn-Hazm, Shahrastani, and Baghdadi, what comes to 
be known as imami Shi’ism is described as a single Shi’ite sect from the death of ‘Ali 
until the occultation of the Twelfth imam.39  Other diverse political and religious 
movements were also neatly categorized into clear-cut schools such as Zaydiyya, Khariji, 
Ismaili, or ghulat (“theological extremists”).  Historians such as ibn-Hazm were known as 
heresiographers since their historical analysis focused on categorizing various political 
movements into “heretical” Islamic sects.40  Unfortunately, both Twelver Shi’ite ulama 
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and heresiographers have distorted the nature of Shi’ism and its role in religious 
developments during the formative years of Islam.  Twelver Shi’ism, like Sunnism, was a 
product of several centuries of legal, theological, and philosophical speculation; not an 
heretical sect that split from the rest of the Islamic community in 661. 
Moreover, the historical narratives of the twelve imams as well as those who 
learned from them have also been distorted to create a simplistic conception of early 
Shi’ism and imamism.  Today, anti-Shi’a sentiment from many Sunni Muslims has only 
reinforced the conception of partisan Shi’a minority community divided from the 
majority Sunni community during the formative era.  Too often, imamism is narrowly 
defined as a partisan religious community whose beliefs are rooted in a line of twelve 
imams.41 In reality, following the teachings of a local imam—ideally a Shar’iah-minded 
Muslim—was a popular form of kerygmatic piety for all Muslims during the formative 
era.  Further, even though a given imam’s genealogy was sometimes of spiritual 
importance, not all of the imams were descendants of ‘Ali and Fatima.  To reiterate, the 
conception of early imamism as a single partisan community that followed a line of 
Twelve Imams is a retrospective concept that does not fully represent the complexities of 
early Shi’ism.   
 
Conclusion 
It may be true that many forms of religious piety and historical interpretation in 
Twelver Shi’ism are found among early Muslims who can retrospectively be labeled as 
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“proto-Shi’a.”  Further, many Shi’a sympathizers were commonly associated with 
partisan political sects, and at least four of the Twelver Shi’ite imams were murdered by 
the caliphs.  However, a closer analysis of Shi’ism in the formative era shows a broad 
diversity in the nature of the imams, their followers and movements, and a lack of clarity 
between those who can be labeled Sunni and those who can be labeled Shi’i.  The twelve 
imams and their students were not the exclusive Shi’a community during the formative 
era of Islam.  Further, it is doubtful that all of the important Shi’ite historical figures 
claimed the retrospective Shi’ite conception of the imamate, or were leaders of a partisan 
community, or were martyred.  Many of the writings attributed to Muhammad al-Baqir 
and Jafar al-Sadiq, the fifth and sixth imams, contradict contemporary Twelver Shi’ite 
and Sunna conceptions of many early Shi’ite figures.42 
A productive way of analyzing the socio-political climate of the early Islamic era 
and of illustrating the less dogmatic nature of Islam before the tenth century can be found 
in a direct analysis of the lives of the first six imams: ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib, Hasan, Husayn, 
Zayn al-Abidin, Muhammad al-Baqir, and Jafar al-Sadiq.  Their reputations indeed 
embody Twelver Shi’ite mythology, yet their life stories cloud the dividing lines between 
Sunnism and Shi’ism.  Their achievements in Islamic law and their places within the 
historical narrative have become distorted because of their near-total association with 
Twelver Shi’ism in today’s Islam.  As a consequence, many of the intellectual 
achievements of these imams in the development of Islamic law are less known and even 
ignored by many Islamic and Western scholars today.  Twelver Shi’i scholars are 
exceptions to this rule, but they exaggerate the imams’ achievements in the fields of 
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Islamic law and the natural sciences because they hold them as such important spiritual 
and intellectual Shi’ite figures.43  For example, the sixth Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq’s name is 
eponymous with Twelver Shi’i jurisprudence, otherwise known as the Jafari School of 
Law, and so, his scholarly achievements have been over-exaggerated by contemporary 
Shi’ite ulama.  Like others whose names have become synonymous with religious, 
political, economic, and social movements, Jafar al-Sadiq may be larger than the sum of 
his parts.  However, on the other hand, his achievements in Islamic law did have a 
profound effect on future developments in Islamic jurisprudence as he was one of Abu 
Hanifa’s teachers.44  Many Sunni and Western scholars have slighted the intellectual 
achievements of these imams.  Again, because early Islamic history has been structured 
around the conception of a strict Sunni-Shi’i divide, the legacy of these imams reflects 
many significant historical misconceptions.   
Key differences between the reputation of the first six imams among Sunna and 
Shi’a scholars and the narrative of their lives within the formative era of Islam are of 
interest here.  The slighting of their narratives by non-Shi’a scholars is part of a larger 
problem within Islamic studies, namely the defining and understanding the nature of 
Shi’ism within the first few centuries of Islam. The topic is complex and requires an 
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understanding of the political, economic, and social movements during the formative 
years of Islam.  Modern scholars such as Marshall Hodgson, Farhad Daftary, and Ira M. 
Lapidus have already placed Shi’ism within a more balanced historical context.  
However, there are many misconceptions regarding the place of Shi’ism within the 
narrative of the early Islamic period; historians who don’t specialize in the subject 
continue to make weak generalizations, particularly in the development of the Sunni-
Shi’a divide, leading to confusion over the Islamic historical narrative.  This thesis 
elucidates some of the misconceptions regarding the nature of Shi’ism in the early 
Islamic period from the Prophet Muhammad to the Abbasid revolution.   
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Chapter Two: Shari’ah-Minded Opposition and the Roots of Shi’ite Piety 
 
Introduction: The Roots of Shi’ite Piety 
A discussion on the nature of Shi’ism during the formative period of Islam should 
begin with the Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’anic revelation, and shari’ah law.  With the 
exception of a few radical doctrines, most Shi’ite-influenced beliefs and practices are 
within the acceptable framework of Islamic orthodoxy, which is embodied in Shari’ah 
ethics.45  The Arabic term, Islam, which means “submission (to the will of God)”, and the 
term, Muslim, which means “he who has surrendered (to the will of God),” emphasize a 
shared belief in one Supreme Being.46  Among all Muslims, this is known as tawhid (one-
ness).  This concept is stated in the shahadah, or the testimony of faith: the saying, in 
Arabic, that “there is no other god but God and Muhammad is His Prophet.”  The 
shahadah is repeated from every mosque five times a day to notify the Islamic 
community when it is time to pray, and it reinforces the most important belief in Islamic 
dogma, tawhid.  Further, perceptions and interpretations of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
revelations (the Qur’an), customs (the Sunna), his written and uttered traditions (hadith), 
and his family and companions form the basis for Shar’iah, which can be described as a 
universalistic system to guide Muslims through rules on law, ethics, and etiquette at 
home and in the marketplace.47  Shar’iah does not guide all aspects of life for Muslims.  
However, it does give the Islamic community a basis for universal solidarity and religious 
orthopraxy, even if there are many cultural, political, economic, and ethnic differences 
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among Muslims over time and space.  Westerners understand the basic beliefs and 
practices of Muslims as the “five pillars of Islam,” which are briefly summarized as 
follows: shahada, prayer, charity, fasting, and pilgrimage.48  Although there are other 
universal beliefs and practices that are common among all Muslims, the five pillars are a 
good summary of the basic aspects of Shari’ah.  These orthodox beliefs and practices 
have given the Islamic community, Sunni and Shi’a alike, a sense of international 
solidarity throughout history, even during times of political duress.    
However, there are important differences that distinguish various Shi’ite forms of 
piety and historical interpretation from those of the Sunni; these are over the question of 
succession to the Prophet Muhammad after his death 632 and the dispute over the nature 
of the caliphate. 49  These differences came into being during the formative years of Islam 
as reactions to historical events, many of which involved the martyrdom of important 
spiritual and political figures of the family of the Prophet.  The two most important 
Shi’ite figures were ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, and ‘Ali’s 
son Husayn, the latter of whom is the third imam in Twelver Shi’ite dogma.50  After 
‘Ali’s death, there were many interpretations of his life, inspiring debates over the nature 
of the Prophet’s family.  His status as a close companion of the Prophet, a pious leader, 
and as a martyr made him a popular symbol for many pious Muslims, including ulama, 
mystics, and the politically discontented.51  His legacy was used to justify future 
rebellions, doctrinal interpretations, theological speculations, and different forms of pious 
expression.  Further, he was married to Muhammad’s daughter Fatima, and he fathered 
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Muhammad’s only male grandchildren, Hasan and Husayn.  The martyrdom of his 
grandson Husayn by the Umayyad Caliph Yazid, as well as the martyrdom of other 
Muslims throughout Islamic history, has produced similar forms of religious piety.  Many 
felt that these Shi’a, or “partisan” figures, were the recipients of a divine knowledge, 
giving them special abilities to interpret the Qur’an and understand the workings of the 
natural world.  Therefore, those with “Shi’ite sympathy” felt that the Prophet’s 
descendants were better qualified to fill the position of caliph not only as a political 
leader but as the imam or “spiritual leader.”52   
Shi’ite sympathy manifested itself in a variety of political and social movements, 
leading to different interpretations of the imamate and its role within Islamic dogma.  
Some felt that the true role of the imam was to engage in political protest: such is Zayd, 
the half-brother of the fifth imam, Muhammad al-Baqir, who led a rebellion in 740 
against the Umayyad caliph Hashim.53  Further, although imams from the line of ‘Ali and 
Fatima were the most popular, there were other Shi’ite imams of different backgrounds.  
For example, the Kaysaniyya rebellion in the 680s—arguably a Shi’ite rebellion—was 
not led by a descendant of ‘Ali and Fatima, but by Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, the 
illegitimate son of ‘Ali and a slave girl of Hanafi descent. 54  In addition, the Abbasid 
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rebellion from 740 to 750 was led by a descendant of the Prophet’s uncle, Abbas.55 Some 
rebellions took place in the name of a concealed imam who was to return at the end of 
time as the Mahdi.  For example, followers of the Qaramati movement of the late ninth 
century propagated the occultation of Jafar al-Sadiq’s grandson, Muhammad ibn Ismail.56  
The imamate, for many Muslims who took a stance against the caliphate, was the center 
of hope for immediate political change.  Further, these rebellions reflect a diversity of 
imamate-related doctrines. 
On the other hand, some of the imams were mere school teachers who taught their 
own interpretations of Qur’an, Sunna, and fiqh—such are ‘Ali Zayn al-Abidin, 
Muhammad al-Baqir, and Jafar al-Sadiq.57  Even though many believed the purpose of 
the imam or “spiritual leader” was to restore justice through political means, Muslims 
such as Jafar al-Sadiq believed an imam and the pious Muslim community should avoid 
the greed and violence associated with politics and focus on the Shari’ah ethic: faith in 
one God, charity, religious study, and prayer.  An imam was to set a pious example for 
the Muslim community and spend his life engaging in the study of Qur’an and hadith to 
gain a greater understanding of God and Shari’ah.58   
The concept of taqiyya (dissimulation)—a broadly interpreted religious concept 
that was probably articulated by Jafar al-Sadiq—allowed for the hiding of one’s beliefs 
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under political persecution and the use of reason for the purpose of esoteric interpretation 
of Qur’anic text.59  Some imami Muslims—either the imam himself or scholarly Muslims 
who believed in an imamate—used esoteric interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith in 
proving their conception of the imamate within an Islamic framework.  This could 
involve a reinterpretation of an historical event to prove the religious legitimacy of a line 
of imams or explaining the spiritual role of the imams within the Islamic community.  
The movements and doctrines associated with taqiyya were diverse throughout Islamic 
history: 
The concealment of one’s true beliefs in times of adversity is an ancient phenomenon 
recurring in diverse religions.  In Islam this practice, commonly known as taqiyya 
(precautionary dissimulation), is most often associated with Imami, or Twelver, Shi’ism.  
Indeed, the generally held view, both among non-Imami Muslims and among modern 
scholars, is that belief in taqiyya is a central tenet of Imami doctrine and that taqiyya was 
regularly and continuously practiced and encouraged by the Imamis throughout the ages.  
In the following lines an attempt will be made to show that the picture is more complex 
than might at first appear, and that Imami views on this subject underwent significant 
modifications and changes.60 
 
During the formative era, there was a vast variety of Shi’ite-influenced doctrines that 
incorporated the imamate within metaphysics, cosmology, fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), 
and other religious subjects that were propagated by Shi’ite ulama in a peaceful manner.61 
Religious doctrines and political movements associated with Shi’ism were diverse and 
should be understood within their complexity. 
Despite the diversity of these political and religious movements, there was 
commonality between moderate and radical forms of Shi’ite sympathy in the formative 
era.  The motivation behind most Shi’ite movements during this time period—as well as 
many other kerygmatic Islamic religious movements—was to recreate the Shari’ah-
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minded society that existed during the time of the Prophet.62  Shi’ism, in its various 
forms, demanded a hierarchal society that should be led by a divinely guided imam.  The 
imam would serve as an intermediary between Muslims and God, ensuring that the 
Muslim community would continue to be guided by a true understanding of Shari’ah law.  
In most Shi’ite movements, it was ‘Ali and his descendants who were objects of pious 
devotion and it was the caliphs who loomed as obstacles towards establishing a Shari’ah-
minded society.  Moderate Shi’ite sympathizers during the formative era used imami 
hadith in legal speculation, followed the teachings of a living imam, mourned on the 
anniversary of a saint’s death, avoided excessive luxuries, and made pilgrimages to an 
imam’s tomb.63  For passive Shi’a, following the religious teachings of an imam, alive or 
deceased, was not necessarily political partisanship, whereas politically radical Shi’a used 
rebellion as a means to establish a Shari’ah-minded imam to power.  Either way, the 
purpose of most of these diverse political movements was to encourage the establishment 
of Shari’ah law, not to break away from orthodox Islam.64  
 
Shi’ism and the limits of Shari’ah 
During the formative era, Shi’ite sympathy can be described as a means toward 
recreating Muhammad’s ideal community.  This ideal emphasized a greater role for 
Shari’ah within Islamic society, including the house of the caliphate.  For many, only a 
member of the family of the Prophet could achieve the task of enforcing Shari’ah.  
However, the political realities following the Muslim conquests of the Middle East and 
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North Africa led to rise of the wealthier Umayyad family to power.  The Prophet’s 
family, the Hashemite, was less affluent.  The early caliphs and the Umayyads 
incorporated Byzantine and Sassanian legal and economic traditions since Shari’ah law 
was not comprehensive enough to establish a law code for a complex empire.65  Many of 
the pre-Islamic law codes contradicted the Shari’ah egalitarian ethic.  Early Shi’ite 
sympathies may thus have been born out of the political limits of Shari’ah—they objected 
to the incorporation of other traditions undertaken by the Umayyads.   
As a consequence of the religious and political limits of Shari’ah ethics there 
would be much political and social continuity between pre-Islamic and Islamic 
civilizations in the Middle East following the Muslim conquests which began after 634 
C.E.  The Arab conquerors had to adapt older Greco-Roman and Irano-Semitic traditions 
to rule over an empire that stretched from Egypt to Central Asia.66  Muhammad, who 
lived his life as a camel caravan guide in the Hejaz Mountain range of Western Arabia 
from 570 to 632, instituted monotheist and egalitarian reforms from 610 to 632 to solve 
the socio-political and economic ills of his community.  These reforms served the 
Bedouin and merchants of Meccan and Medinan society.  However, after the Prophet’s 
death, the expansion of Islam into the more complex civilizations of the Middle East 
presented challenges for Muslims to adapt their doctrines to drastically different 
environments.  This new world presented theological and philosophical challenges from 
Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Manicheans, Sabians, and Greek-influenced philosophers.  
Further, this society was mainly agrarian, and the pre-Islamic Roman and Sassanid 
empires were ruled through an absolute monarch’s court and bureaucracy that connected 
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the villages, towns, and cities into complex multi-ethnic empires.   In the early seventh 
century, Arabs in the Hejaz had little knowledge of agrarian traditions, taxes, armies, 
philosophical inquiries, advanced sciences, court cultures, or absolute rulers. The 
Qur’anic revelation, the Sunna, and Muhammad’s hadith fail to elaborate on these 
subjects.  For this reason, within decades after the initial conquests, the political and 
economic policies of the caliphate reflected Roman and Sassanid norms more than the 
egalitarian ideals of the shari’ah-minded.  Further, following the conquests, most of the 
conquered populations were to remain non-Muslim until the tenth century.  Therefore, 
shari’ah ethic was only one of several competing cultural forces shaping the Islamic 
world during the formative years.  This created a cultural divide between the caliph’s 
court and the ulama in the urban centers.   
The caliphs were never able to create a true political absolutism in the Middle 
East or a permanent, peaceful balance with the ulama.  The tension with the shari’ah-
minded was commonly a cause for conflict—which was sometimes reflected in rebellions 
of Shi’ite or Kharajite-based dissidence.  The rulers of the first Arab empire, the 
Umayyads, which stretched from Egypt to Eastern Iran, had difficulties balancing 
shari’ah ideals with the socio-political and economic realities of ruling a complex empire.  
Further, the caliphs had to deal with others forms of domestic and foreign opposition.   
In cities across the Middle East many pious Muslims dedicated their lives to 
shari’ah, fiqh, and religious education.  These ulama ideally wanted the important leaders 
of the Islamic community to elect a caliph based on his piety and his ability to uphold 
Shari’ah law.  Further, those with Shi’ite-influenced sympathies would have preferred a 
member of the Prophet’s family to take this position.  However, other political, 
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economic, and cultural values took expediency over Shari’ah norms in the court culture 
of the caliphate.  The Qur’an and the Sunna fail to mention the role of an absolute ruler 
(the caliph), the military, or a bureaucracy within an Islamic empire, and despite much 
later Shi’ite claims of the validity of a hadith in which Muhammad declares ‘Ali as his 
successor before his death, the Qur’an and the Sunna are vague in regards to the spiritual 
or political place of Muhammad’s family within the Islamic community.67  The reaction 
of the early Islamic leaders was to base much of their political and economic policies on 
Byzantine and Sassanid laws.  Further, the basis of succession to the caliphate became 
separated from the ideals of the Shari’ah-minded ulama.   
Initially, the first four caliphs (632-661) were chosen or accepted by the Medinan 
community as legitimate rulers.  These archetype figures are known as the Rashidun 
(“rightly guided”) caliphs who are respected for their Shari’ah-mindedness and their 
leadership during the political expansion of Islam across the entire Middle East.68  Their 
legitimacy was based on Islamic, tribal, and military factors.  However, the caliphate fell 
into the full control of the Umayyad family from their seat of power in Damascus after 
two civil wars from 657 to 661 and 684 to 692.69  From this point on during the formative 
years of Islam, the caliphate and the Shari’ah-minded ulama developed two spheres of 
influence that usually kept separate boundaries.  
The Umayyads legitimized their rule on political, tribal, and economic bases, and 
they had to physically suppress the opposition, much of which came from Shari’ah-
minded Muslims.70  The caliphate became a dynastic position and the court culture was 
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dominated by a combination of pre-Islamic Arabian and Byzantine/Sassanian cultural 
norms—shari’ah ethic played a lesser role.  However, even during the height of their 
power, the Umayyads never formed anything close to a political absolutism since the 
caliphs still, in large part, were arbitrators between the various Arab tribes in the cities of 
the Middle East as opposed to the Sassanid or Byzantine ideal of an absolute ruler.71  
Moreover, the Shari’ah-minded ulama—along with their base of support from the 
merchant classes in the urban centers—formed a separate sphere of society toward whom 
the “agrarian-based” caliphate had to show a measure of respect.72  At times, inter-tribal 
tensions and conflict between the Shari’ah-minded and the Umayyad caliphs would 
commonly lead to political quarrels.  For example, from 684 to 692, the Umayyads 
almost lost control of the caliphate as the Middle East was briefly torn apart by several 
warring factions—many of which can be labeled proto-Shi’ite and Kharajite groups. 
During the formative era of Islam, the most important Shi’ite-influenced rebellion 
was arguably the Abbasid revolution from 744 to 750, which placed a descendant of 
Muhammad’s uncle Abbas in power at the expense of the Umayyad family, most of 
whom were massacred in the process.73  From the Abbasid seat of power in Baghdad, 
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built from 762-764 as an administrative center, they established a much stronger political 
absolutism that focused on the domination of Arab tribes and avoidance of tribal 
conflicts.  Unlike the Umayyads, the Abbasids gave equal status to Persian Muslims, 
creating a political entity that was based on the nature of a multi-ethnic empire as 
opposed to that of an Arab tribal confederation. In certain respects, this was in line with 
Shari’ah egalitarian ideals.  Further, the court culture of the Abbasids was more isolated 
and prestigious, in the vein of the Sassanid shahs of Iran before them.  However, to the 
disappointment of many of the Shari’ah-minded ulama—especially those with Shi’ite 
sympathies—the Abbasids purged the more radical Shi’ite elements after their revolution 
and attempted to unite their agrarian-based caliphate with the urban ulama and 
merchants, forces that found their source in the ideals of a Persian absolutism.  At times, 
they were able to influence intellectual trends among the Shari’ah-minded by patronizing 
specific ulama while oppressing other viewpoints.  Further, they commonly placed ulama 
of their liking as qadi (Shari’ah judges) in the urban centers.   
However, the attempts by many Abbasid caliphs at controlling the intellectual 
climate among the ulama eventually failed.  The fourth major Islamic civil war from 813 
to 822 reflected the discontent of many of the Shari’ah-minded Muslims in society—
especially those with Shi’ite and Kharajite sympathies—toward the caliphs.74  The 
Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun became so desperate to quell the violence that he initially 
made ‘Ali al-Rida—the eighth Imam in Twelver Shi’ism—his political successor before 
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changing his mind shortly afterwards.  Although the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mun was able 
to reunify the Abbasid Empire by 822, they never regained the political prestige of the 
early Abbasid period.  By the late ninth century, the agrarian-based caliphate began a 
process of decentralization for a variety of environmental, socio-political, ethnic, and 
economic reasons, ending any attempt to unite the Islamic community under one political 
and spiritual leader.  Although the Abbasids came the closest to realizing a universal rule, 
they were never able achieve their goals because of the economic, political, and cultural 
trends that were moving away from agrarian absolutism toward a more open society 
based on cosmopolitanism, political decentralization, and military rule ensured by 
horsemen from Central Asia, the Turks.   
From the seventh to the tenth century, few attempts were made by Shari’ah-
minded ulama to incorporate either the Umayyad or Abbasid ideals of absolutism with 
their Shari’ah norms—although there were several exceptions to this rule.  While the 
culture of the court and of the Shari’ah-minded ulama would occasionally intertwine, the 
two sides generally kept separate spheres of influence throughout these formative years 
of Islam.  Indeed, the caliphs’ failure to create a true absolutism by uniting their agrarian 
interests with the interests of the shari’ah-minded Muslims of the city proved to be a 
constant source of unrest and conflict.  Shi’ism was born out of this tension between the 
piety-minded and the political elites. 
 
The Piety-Minded Opposition 
The Islamic legal adaptations of early ulama were not enough to create a system 
of fiqh that embodied all socio-political and economic aspects of everyday life for most 
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Muslims.75  During the height of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, most pious 
Muslims—including Shi’ite sympathizers—had to accept the caliphate as a political 
necessity by which the Islamic community could be governed.  Some legal aspects of 
family life and the marketplace fell within the sphere of the ulama in the urban centers.  
However, in the spheres of the military, the bureaucracy, the caliph’s court, and the 
agrarian gentry, other cultural and political norms tended to dominate during the 
formative years of Islam.  All Muslims, even the caliphs, were expected to adhere to 
shari’ah ethics, but socio-political and economic expediency, pre-Islamic cultural norms, 
and the socio-political and economic limits of shari’ah meant that there was much 
continuity between pre-Islamic and Islamic communities in the Middle East.  During 
times of stability in the formative years of Islam, most Muslims—even those with Shi’ite 
sympathies—accepted the necessity of the caliphs for the sake of Islamic unity.  The 
umma (Islamic community) superseded all. 
Many pious Muslims had to look for spiritual fulfillment outside the sphere of 
politics.  For many looking for a greater spiritual connection with God, following the 
leadership of an imam was one way to recreate the Prophet’s egalitarian community.  For 
Shi’a-minded, this was a living descendant of ‘Ali.  In most cases, this meant following 
the teachings of an imam at a local school and abstaining from a luxurious lifestyle that 
reflected Umayyad and Abbasid norms.  These students would study Prophetic history, 
the Arabic language, the Qur’an, and hadith.  The purpose of these studies was to look 
back on the Prophet’s pious community as a legal guide to construct schools of fiqh.  
Shi’ite-minded Muslims would favor hadith from the Prophet’s family and certain lines 
of his descendants, usually of ‘Ali.  Over time, complex schools of fiqh were constructed.   
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Further, most shari’ah-minded Muslims saw the court culture of the caliphs, the 
traditions of Christians and Manicheans, and the doctrines of philosophers as challenges 
to their cultural ideals.76  During the formative period, Shari’ah-minded Muslims would 
engage in legal and theological speculation to create more complex schools of law and to 
prove the validity of their doctrines.  As a result, Muslims would incorporate older 
literary, philosophical, and spiritual ideas of the Irano-Semitic and Greek peoples with 
Shari’ah norms, leading to the formation of schools of theology.  By the end of the 
formative era of Islam, Mutazalite theology (school of free will, rationalism and absolute 
sin), Asharite theology (school of divine omnipotence and traditionalism), and Muturidi 
theology (an intermediate stance between the above schools) would become the accepted 
schools of kalam (theology), each becoming generally associated with an Islamic school 
of fiqh.77  The purpose of these studies in fiqh and kalam was to more thoroughly apply 
Shari’ah law to society and to defend Muslim doctrines against non-believers.   
Even though the Shi’a ulama had a greater tendency to engage in radical 
theological speculation, most Shi’ite legal and theological doctrines are part of the same 
milieu as those created by other ulama.  The works of eighth-century Shi’a scholars, such 
as the fifth imam Muhammad al-Baqir and the sixth imam Jafar al-Sadiq, actually had a 
great influence on the future Sunni schools of law.78  For example, the famous Sunni 
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legalist Abu Hanifah was actually a student of Jafar al-Sadiq.  Contrary to Twelver 
Shi’ite perceptions, many of the retrospective Twelver imams and their followers or 
students were not part of a partisan religious community.  The students of Muhammad al-
Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq were part of the same Shari’ah-minded opposition to the court 
culture of the Caliphate.  
 
Conclusion 
Historians such as Malise Ruthven and Caesar Farah, as well as many Twelver 
Shi’ite and Sunni ulama, have overtly structured the nature of political and religious 
conflict between the caliphate and rebellious Muslims around a strict Sunna-Shi’a divide 
running backward to the formative years of Islam.79  Many western and Islamic historians 
have referred to Muslims who accepted the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs as a political 
necessity as Sunni and the minority who rejected the caliphate as Shi’a.  Further, 
Mutazalite theorists are too frequently generalized as being Shi’a and Asharite theorists 
are too frequently generalized as being Sunni.  In other words, Shi’ism and Sunnism are 
used as retrospective and vague concepts to describe the nature of political and religious 
conflict throughout the formative years of Islam.  In reality, there were many Shi’ite 
sympathizers who were politically passive and there were many non-Shi’ite sympathizers 
who took arms against the caliphate for tribal, political, economic, or other spiritual 
reasons.  It may be true that Shi’ism was born as a kerygmatic and chiliastic (fulfillment 
of messianic prophecy) response to a changing Muslim community during the Arab 
conquests.  Further, many rebellions, civil wars, and theological rifts were commonly 
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intertwined with Shi’ite ideas.  However, Shi’a sympathies could be expressed peacefully 
through mystical, legal, and theological speculation. Therefore, Shi’ism cannot simply be 
described as a partisan sect.   
Moreover, the basis for conflict against the caliphate cannot be placed on a strict 
Sunna-Shi’a divide.  During the formative era, very few pious Muslims worked on 
developing a system of fiqh that would justify the rule of the caliphs on a Shari’ah basis.  
Most pious Muslims—including those with proto-Shi’ite sympathies—accepted the 
caliphs only as a political necessity.  Further, conflict during the formative era was 
caused by a complexity of economic, social, and political reasons. Although what we 
today called Shi’ism was commonly a factor in rebellion against the caliphate, it is 
incorrect to structure the politics of the early formative era around a Sunna-Shi’a divide.   
 The roots of Shi’ism as a political and a religious ideal did in fact begin with the 
expansion of Islam and the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate.  By 692, the 
Prophet Muhammad, his cousin ‘Ali, and their descendants would become symbolic 
personages, or larger-than-life characters.  The narrative and the deeper significance of 
their lives, along with the lives and events associated with the various Rashidun and 
Umayyad Caliphs of the early Islamic era, were inspirations for historical debate and 
theological speculation.  Entire schools of fiqh were based on the hadith of Muhammad, 
his family, and his companions.  Further, many political sects, legal interpretations, 
theological inquiries, and cosmological doctrines that developed during the formative 
years of Islam had Shi’ite characteristics but these varied drastically.  Here, Ismaili 
historian Farhad Daftary elegantly summarizes this dynamic period: 
Modern scholarship has indeed shown that the early Muslims lived, at least during the 
first three centuries of their history, in an intellectually dynamic and fluid milieu.  The 
formative period of Islam was essentially characterized by a multiplicity of communities 
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of interpretation and schools of thought, and a diversity of views on the major religio-
political issues faced by the early Muslims.  At the time, the Muslims were confronted by 
many gaps in their religious knowledge and understanding of Islam, revolving around 
issues such as the attributes of God, nature of authority, and definitions of true believers 
and sinners.  It was under such circumstances that different religious communities and 
schools of thought formulated their doctrines in stages and gradually acquired their 
names and distinctive identities. 80 
 
Too frequently, Shi’ism is described as a heterodox sect that derived from a Sunni 
orthodoxy. In reality, Shi’ism is part of larger movement among Muslims during the 
formative era to more clearly define the legal, theological, and mystical components of 
their religion, and it was also an attempt to regain the qualities of the early Muslim 
community in Mecca and Medina.  This they could do, at least in part, by clinging to the 
blood line of the Prophet.  Sunnism and Twelver Shi’ism were the products of this 
dynamic period—Sunnism was not the foundation of “orthodox” Islam but the product of 
centuries of legal and theological speculation with a culminating tendency towards 
conformity.   Shi’ism—as a retrospective movement—did have its foundations in the late 
seventh century.  However, the legal, theological, and mystic doctrines associated with 
Twelver Shi’ism were only beginning to develop.  Moreover, there was a diversity of 
Shi’ite ideas and movements and they should be understood within their complexity.  A 
closer analysis of the narrative the early formative era will show that complexity more 
clearly. 
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Chapter Three: The Foundations of Islam, 570-632 
 
Introduction 
Shi’i Muslims adhere to a basic Shari’ah ethic, and so an understanding of the 
origins of Shi’ism leads to the Prophet Muhammad, Qur’anic revelation, and the 
expansion of Islam into what became, so rapidly, a geography reaching from the Indus to 
Iberia.  If there is one unifying aspect among those who could be called Shi’a 
sympathizers throughout history, it is their strong belief in the divine qualities of the 
Prophet’s family.81  Although a variety of political, social, and economic implications are 
related to this sympathy, this one feeling describes the sole universal characteristic for 
being a Shi’i.  It does not necessarily mean an adherence to one of scores of Shi’ite 
political sects or schools of thought, but it implies holding a conceptualized idea about 
the political and spiritual importance of the Prophet’s blood line; a sympathy that has lead 
to a variety of political, legal, theological, and philosophical responses.   
While political, social, and economic patterns throughout early Islamic history led 
to political conflicts and the formation of retrospectively-labeled Shi’a sects, no clear 
Sunni-Shi’a divide developed during this time period.   It may seem obvious, but it is 
worth saying that from 610 to 632, any concept related to Shi’ism had yet to exist since 
the Prophet was the uncontested political and spiritual leader of the religious 
community.82   
However, after the Prophet’s death, immediate questions of political succession 
led to repeated debates over the nature of the caliphate and the spiritual importance of the 
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Prophet’s family.  As with the pious Muslims who have been retrospectively labeled 
Sunna, those with Shi’a sympathies looked to the Prophet and the community he created 
as the ideal human environment.   
Those with Shi’ite sympathies favored building that ideal society around a living 
member of the Prophet’s family.  Although the Qur’an states that Muhammad was a mere 
man, many felt that Muhammad was a special person who possessed unique knowledge 
of the world and God.  Many even claimed that he gave this knowledge to his 
descendants.  The spiritual fervor surrounding the Prophet’s descendants has varied and 
evolved in time and space.  More moderate responses have ranged from political and 
often religious partisanship toward a certain imam, to the use of hadith from certain 
members of the prophet’s family, to the general Islamic recognition that the Prophet was 
somewhat more than human.  More radical responses have involved crediting 
Muhammad’s descendants with divine attributes, including the ability to perform 
miracles.  Many elitist Shi’ite-influenced intellectuals of the eighth and ninth centuries 
even conceived of complex historical treatises and cosmological doctrines that 
incorporated Shi’ite conceptions of the Prophet’s family—these are found most notably 
among the doctrines of the Ismaili Shi’a.  Even though most Muslims in the formative 
periods of Islam rejected the Shi’ite gulat (extremist) tendencies, or the complex 
cosmologies of the Ismaili, moderate Shi’ite sympathy was quite common.83  It was—and 
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still is—considered prestigious for a Muslim—Sunni or Shi’ite—to be related to the 
Prophet, and many popular hadith and intellectual works are credited to the Prophet’s 
family.84  Moreover, most pious Muslims—and especially Shi’a and Khariji—looked to 
the first Islamic community created by Muhammad, his family, and his companions as an 
archetype for an ideal society.85  Therefore, an understanding of the Prophet’s life and the 
foundations of Islam are necessary to understand the foundations of Shi’ism. 
 
The Pre-Islamic Community in Mecca 
The Prophet was born in 570 C.E. in Mecca, a sizeable oasis town in the 
mountains of the Hejaz in western Arabia.86  This region is extremely arid, allowing most 
of its habitants only a pastoralist lifestyle and some an agriculturalist life in the larger 
oases.87  At Mecca, the spring of Zam-Zam provided water for local Bedouins, who 
accounted for most of the population of Western Arabia.   These pastoralists generally 
raised goats for meat, milk, and clothing.  The size of the oases of the Hejaz as well as 
their distance from each other dictated the Bedouin pace of life as well as the nature of 
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tribal relations.88  Bedouin were pastoral, rural, tribal, and Arab people.  They were tribal 
by virtue of their social system.  The Bedouin prided themselves on their egalitarianism 
and their loyalty to their tribe, which was essential for surviving in a harsh landscape. A 
pastoralist depended on his family relations to protect his access to watering holes and his 
grazing lands.  A blood feud, which involved honoring a fellow tribesman who was 
dishonored or killed, was a means of enforcing a tribe’s right over certain lands and 
oases.  Even in a pastoralist environment where centralization of power was rare, some 
tribes managed to exert more influence than others, so status depended on one’s lineage.  
For this reason, and because they were mostly illiterate, shi’r (poetry) became significant 
to the Bedouin, who used oration as a means to relate and propagate their family’s history 
and importance.89  Bedouin were Arab people in that—like their brethren in the city—
they spoke Arabic.  As for the nature of the family, like other pastoral societies, it was 
dominated by males.  Women were generally left out of inheritance and political 
decisions.  Most Bedouin were not wealthy enough to afford more than one wife but 
those who did marry more than one usually did so for political reasons and personal 
status.  Overall, the pace of Bedouin life was slow, and an Arab’s social status depended 
on family relations.   
Muhammad was not a Bedouin; he was born in Mecca into the relatively poor 
Hashemite family, a small clan of the prosperous Quraysh tribe.90  His family was urban, 
but like the Bedouin, he shared in the values of tribe and was, like all in western Arabia, 
Arab by virtue of his native language and cultural orientation. During the early years of 
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his life, Mecca was slowly transforming into a center of trade and moderate prosperity.  
The Umayyad clan, who were also of Quraysh descent, controlled the trade routes that 
stretched from Yemen to Byzantine Syria.  Goods such as gold, slaves, ivory, 
frankincense, gums, and silk were brought from India, the East African Coast, China, 
Dhufar, and southeast Asia to Yemen (Arabia Felix) by sailors who used dhows (two-
masted wooden sail boats) to travel across the Indian Ocean by navigating the monsoon 
winds.91  These goods were brought from Yemen to Syria and Egypt mainly by camel 
caravans on land up the western Arabian trade route.  In the millennium and a half before 
Muhammad’s birth, the domestication of the camel slowly allowed more Bedouin in the 
Hejaz to become independent merchants, and over time, families in the Hejaz were able 
to gain control of the trade routes from families in Yemen.  During the late 5th century 
C.E., the Umayyad family of Mecca became the middlemen in this trade, controlling 
access to the trade routes and protecting camel caravans from being raided by local 
Bedouin.  As a result, Muhammad grew up in a community that was slowly transforming 
itself from an oasis of Bedouin tribes to a small cosmopolitan center; a true city.92  
Further, as a consequence of the region’s increased contacts with the peoples in 
Byzantine, Persian, and Abyssinian (“Ethiopian”) territories, the religious practices of the 
indigenous pagan Arabs of the Hejaz were becoming influenced by Jews, Christians, and 
to a lesser extent, Zoroastrians. 
However, the Hashemite clan had not benefitted as much from that prosperity, 
and Muhammad was further disadvantaged as an orphan, which was a low status in a 
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society that depended so heavily on family relations.93  Both of Muhammad’s parents 
died when he was a small child and so he was adopted by his uncle, Abu Talib.  For a 
period of time, he lived in the same house with his younger cousin, ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib.  
The Prophet eventually married Khadija, the daughter of a well-to-do merchant.  
Muhammad spent much of his adult life working for the camel caravans, guiding people 
through the mountains along the Hejaz trade route.  He became moderately successful 
working for his family’s business, and he and his wife Khadija became well respected in 
Mecca as honest and hard-working individuals.  As a result of good fortune, hard work, 
and the changing economic character of Mecca, Muhammad was able to overcome his 
status as an orphan to earn a respectable living. 
However, Muhammad was troubled by the changes taking place in his 
community.94  Mecca was becoming increasingly corrupt with drinking, gambling, and 
various forms of idolatry.  There was also a growing inequality in the community as the 
Umayyad family continued to become more prosperous.  In addition to these problems, 
the local pagan traditions in Mecca were not spiritually fulfilling for Muhammad, who 
was becoming influenced by Christian and Jewish ideas in his career leading caravans 
along the Hejaz trade routes.  In the latter half of the 6th century, Mecca was not only the 
hub of trade in the region but it was also the regional center of pagan worship.  The 
different Bedouin tribes surrounding the region would travel to Mecca during the Dhu-l-
Hijjah (12th lunar month) in what was a time of peace between tribes.  At the center of 
Mecca lay the Ka’ba, a square building with a black stone (a small meteorite) inside.  The 
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For Muhammad, these pagan rituals did not offer an opportunity for spiritual salvation 
nor did these rituals solve the growing problems of the Meccan community. 
 
The Qur’anic Revelations 
Muhammad frequented the local caves of Mount Hira where he often meditated.  
He had searched for years for answers to solve the ills of his community, taking religious 
advice from anyone in the region.  In 610, Muhammad reportedly claimed to have 
received his first revelation from the “one true God,” which he later reported as being 
told to him through the angel Gabriel.  The message was simple: that there was one God, 
and he was to communicate this message to the rest of Meccan society.  The Qur’an, or 
the “recitation,” is the collection of all of Muhammad’s revelations, which Muslims 
believe he received from 610 to the time of his death in 632.  The most famous of these 
revelations was the so-called night journey, in which Muhammad claimed that his spirit 
traveled first to al-Aqsa (the “farthest point,” later interpreted by Muslims as Jerusalem) 
and then to heaven from the spot of the Dome of Rock while he was asleep.96  Later 
Muslims would help organize these revelations into 114 suras (chapters).97  They did not 
organize these chapters in chronological order but into different sections on basic beliefs, 
social laws, prophetic stories, eschatological history, and descriptions of the afterlife.98 
Generally, there is no correct way of organizing the sura, although there are several 
accepted structures which were developed by later Muslims. The early revelations were 
based generally on statements of faith, visions of the afterlife, and descriptions of the 
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apocalypse.  All those who submitted to God were expected to lead a pious way of life 
and were to be judged by God at the end of time.   
As more Arabs converted to Islam from 610 to 632, the revelations shifted from a 
focus on basic beliefs to social laws.99  Muhammad’s vision offered reform for women, 
who were ensured a percentage of their husband and father’s wealth when they died.  All 
men were also restricted to four wives, and each wife had to be treated equally.  Further, 
infanticide—the killing of female infants—was outlawed.  His vision did not offer 
equality for women but it offered a significant improvement from their earlier status in 
Arabia.  The Qur’an also emphasized charity and piety.  Wine, gambling, and charging 
interest on loans were forbidden, and all Muslims were required to donate a percentage of 
their wealth to the community; otherwise known as zakat (alms).  Every Muslim was 
expected to help those who were less affluent.  More importantly, the Qur’an offered a 
mode of solidarity that transcended petty tribal disputes.  A person’s identity as a Muslim 
was supposed to supersede family relations.100   
The Qur’anic revelations brought not only economic, political, spiritual, and 
social reforms to Meccan society, but they also connected Arabians with the larger world 
of Judeo-Christian traditions. 101  Many suras described the lives and accomplishments of 
various prophets such as Adam, Abraham, Noah, Moses, and Jesus.102  Most of the 
Qur’anic prophets are also found in the Talmud and the Bible.  According to several 
Western historical interpretations, Muhammad’s own sense of Biblical history and Judeo-
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Christian eschatological beliefs formed the basis of his religious reform.103  Of course, 
Muslims reject the above statement but they do believe that Muhammad’s revelation was 
the last of God’s revelations to man; the same God of Jewish and Christian tradition.  
Initially, Muhammad was not trying to make a break with Christianity or Judaism. In the 
Qur’an, Christians and Jews are considered dhimmi (protected), and unlike pagans they 
could not be forcibly converted to Islam.  Further, the first Islamic community prayed 
toward Jerusalem in the same manner as the local Jewish tribes of Arabia.  Through 
revelation, which was based on the style of the Arab poetry of the time but within the 
context of the Judeo-Christian traditions, Muhammad was attempting to institute 
political, economic, and social reforms. 
 
The First Islamic Community 
The first converts to Muhammad’s faith were his wife Khadija and his cousin ‘Ali 
in 610.  Many of the early converts in the Meccan community were people of low social 
class; specifically, people who didn’t belong to an important tribe.  The Qur’an spoke of 
a merchant egalitarianism that rejected the petty tribal rivalries.  More importantly, 
Islamic revelation offered a vision of the afterlife and a chance at salvation.  It gave a 
larger purpose to life beyond that of the pagan system of Mecca.  There were several 
members of prominent clans and several prominent merchants who converted as well, 
such as the merchant Abu Bakr and the Umayyad clan member ‘Uthman ibn Affan, both 
of whom would become future caliphs.  The only requirement for the first converts was 
to reject paganism and accept the unity of God.  These converts would generally meet on 
a daily basis to recite various sura of the Qur’an and to pray in unison.  At first, the 
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Qur’an was not written down for the converts but it was instead memorized by each 
individual.104  The practice of Qur’anic recitation became an act of symbolic unity that 
transcended tribal differences and distinguished the fledgling umma (Islamic community) 
from the rest of Meccan society. 
As the number of Muhammad’s followers grew from 610 to 622, tensions 
between them and Quraysh leaders in Mecca became worse.105  Over time, the umma 
went from being a small private cult to a force dividing the entire town of Mecca.  
Muhammad started calling for all tribes to abandon their cults, making his message a 
significant threat to Mecca’s pagan rituals.  As a result, Muhammad was frequently 
mocked for his beliefs, even by members of his own extended family.  The only thing 
that kept him safe in Mecca was the protection of his uncle Abu-Talib.  In 615, some of 
his followers, led by ‘Uthman ibn-Mazun, even fled to Christian Abyssinia (modern-day 
Ethiopia) to escape persecution by the Umayyad family.   
In 619, the situation became worse for Muhammad.  Two of his biggest 
supporters, his wife Khadija and his uncle Abu Talib, died suddenly.   Muhammad had no 
other option but to look outside of Mecca for protection and support.  He sent 
representatives to various towns to win converts, at first failing in places such as the Red 
Sea coastal town of Taifa.  However, in 620, he had success in gaining converts from the 
Khazraj tribe from the city of Yathrib, which in a short time would become known 
simply as al-Medina (the city).  Medina, an oasis town and Bedouin center located just 
north of Mecca, was plagued by tribal conflict at the time between the Khazraj and the 
Aws.  Many in Medina were impressed with Muhammad’s egalitarian message, which 
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offered a means to resolve the tribal quarrelling.  In 622, Muhammad was offered the 
position of arbitrator by the various tribes of Medina and so he went there, permanently 
vacating Mecca.106   
Muhammad fled secretly from Mecca in the middle of the night with his followers 
to Medina.  This migration, which is known as the hejira, became a symbolic episode in 
which the Islamic community became fully independent of the pagans of Mecca.  
Therefore, 622 C.E. is considered the first year of the Muslim lunar calendar.  In Medina, 
Muhammad attempted to resolve tribal differences through religious, political, and 
economic reform.  Even though there were initial tensions between the muhajirun 
(Muslims from Mecca) and the ansar (Muslim converts from Medina), Muhammad was 
able to successfully negotiate peaceful terms with various tribes while gaining many 
converts. He married several women of the prosperous tribes of Medina to establish 
political unity in the community.   
Muhammad, though, was disappointed by the reaction of the four Jewish tribes in 
and around Medina, which he wrongly figured would readily accept his prophetic 
message.107  Although the Jewish tribes were initially optimistic about the arrival of a 
neutral arbitrator, they considered the Qur’an to be a sloppy rendering of both Jewish 
history and Jewish law, and they grew discontented over Muhammad’s disruption of the 
profitable long-distance trade along the Hejaz as a result of conflict with Mecca.  
Muhammad and his converts initially prayed towards Jerusalem since he saw his 
community as being in harmony with Jewish and Christian eschatological traditions.  
However, with the reluctance of the Jewish tribes to join the Umma, Muslims began 
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praying towards Mecca.  As tensions became worse with Mecca from 622 to 630, 
tensions also became worse with the Jewish tribes, three of which were expelled from the 
city, and one of which, the Qurayza, had their male members executed and their female 
members sold into slavery for secretly negotiating with the Meccan community.  As a 
result of these events, Islam effectively became an entirely separate religion from either 
Judaism or Christianity.  However, even with Jewish refusal to convert, Muhammad was 
able to win the favor of most of the community in Medina, becoming a popular figure in 
relatively short period of time. 
Muhammad proved adept not only as a politician but as a military leader.  He was 
able to gain support for his religious movement in Medina through raiding the camel 
caravans protected by the Umayyad family.  The financial success of various raids from 
622 to 630 led to more and more tribes from Arabia joining Muhammad’s community.  
As a result, tensions arose between Medina and Mecca, leading to several dramatic 
battles.  The first successful raid conducted by Muhammad was at the town of Nakhlah 
near Mecca in 624 during the sacred truce month of Dhu al-Hijja.  The raid was symbolic 
in that Muhammad was forcefully breaking away from the pagan tribal system of Mecca.   
During the next raid, the Muslims failed at stopping the caravan coming from Syria, but 
they defeated a Meccan force twice their size near the well of Badr.  Muhammad’s 
success gave him more power in Medina, being able to expel Jewish and pagan dissidents 
within the city and subdue local Bedouin.  Further, he was able to enforce egalitarian 
aspects of what would become Shari’ah law by outlawing tribal feuds, giving more rights 
to women, and enforcing zakat.  Muhammad’s strength as a military leader allowed him 
to create a new social order based on Shari’ah egalitarian ideals.   
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Even though Muhammad experienced several setbacks at the Battle of Uhud in 
625 and the Battle of the Trench in 627, where the umma was almost destroyed on two 
separate occasions, the Muslims recovered and went on the offensive.  In 630, they 
occupied Mecca, and the Umayyad General Abu Sufyan surrendered to Muhammad and 
converted to Islam, as did most of the Umayyad clan.  In that same year, Muhammad 
marched to Mecca and entered it without much bloodshed and held the first Islamic Hajj.   
He destroyed the pagan symbols in the Ka’ba and declared that the black stone had been 
established at Mecca by Abraham.  The destruction of the pagan idols was symbolic of 
Muhammad’s domination of the city, and the black stone became the ultimate symbol of 
the new monotheism.   
By 632, Muhammad was able to use his political momentum to unite the Arabian 
tribes—from Oman to Yemen to Aqaba—under the banner of Islam.  Many tribes joined 
his movement because conquest proved to be profitable while other Arabs genuinely 
converted to Islam.  Either way, for the first time in the region’s history, the Arabian 
Peninsula was united under a single political entity.   
 
Conclusion 
In 632, Muhammad was getting set to attack Byzantine Syria when he was struck 
with illness and died.  The fragile unity of Arabia brought by conquest did not ensure the 
survival of the new religious faith.  It would be the work of Muhammad’s companions to 
succeed at laying the foundations for the survival of the Islamic faith by conquering the 
Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and codifying the faith.  These conquests 
would involve the complete destruction of the Sassanid Empire of Iran and the conquest 
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of much of the lands of the Byzantine Empire.  The conquest of lands that had deep 
agrarian and cosmopolitan traditions would prove a challenge to the Islamic faith.  The 
Arabs, after all, had little to no experience with taxation or dynastic rule. Muhammad’s 
revelations only offered reform for the tribal society of Mecca—not for a large-scale 
agrarian-based society.  Questions such as who should rule the empire, how to establish 
systems of law and taxation, how to adapt Islam to a more complex society without 
losing the egalitarian spirit of Muhammad’s message, or how to adapt the Irano-Semitic 
and Greek sciences to the Islamic faith caused much inspiration, debate, and conflict.  
These tensions, which arose after Muhammad’s death, would cause friction in the 
community and threaten the continuity of the new faith.   
The expansion of Islam into a more complex world and the various religious, 
political, and economic adaptations that were made following that expansion is where the 
foundations of many aspects of Shi’ism began to develop.  Some individuals would 
develop political or religious sympathies for one of the various descendants of the 
Prophet while other individuals went as far as applying even mystic qualities to 
Muhammad’s family members.  The responses varied drastically throughout the period of 
the rightly-guided caliphs and beyond.  ‘Ali’s status as Muhammad’s closest companion 
and the husband of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima made him a popular religious figure 
among pious Muslims.  Although ‘Ali, Fatima, and their children would become 
important symbolic figures for future Muslims, other relatives of Muhammad would 
become important as well.   
However, none of the participants in the various rebellions and quarrels—in 
particular the civil wars from 656 to 661 and 684 to 692—would know that all of the 
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political tension in this period would later be described as being a mere divide between 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims.  This explanation for conflict in this period does not accurately 
describe the complexity of the Islamic expansion into Byzantine and Sassanid lands, the 
various civil wars following that expansion, and the establishment of a stable Umayyad 
Caliphate by 692.  These civil wars between Muslims reflect a growth in complexity in 
the Islamic community.  Shi’ism, as a retrospective idea for socio-political change, was 
an important element in political conflict during the years following Muhammad’s death.  
However, the conception of a clear Sunni-Shi’a divide had yet to exist.   
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Chapter Four: Islamic Conquest and the Rashidun Caliphs, 632-661 
 
Introduction 
Although the term Shi’ism is a retrospective term emerging from a later era, the 
roots of Shi’ism are found in the period immediately following the death of the Prophet 
and the expansion of Islam into the heartlands of the Middle East: 
The term Shi’a, keeping in view its historical development, must strictly be taken 
throughout this chapter in its literal meaning as followers, party, group, associates, 
partisans, or in a rather looser sense, the “supporters”.  In these meanings the word Shi’a 
occurs a number of times in the Qur’an.  In its applied meaning as a particular 
designation for the followers of ‘Ali and the people of his house, and thereby a distinct 
denomination within Islam against the Sunni, the term Shi’a was a later usage.  In the 
infant years of Islamic history, one cannot speak of the so-called “orthodox” Sunna and 
the “heretical” Shi’a, but rather only of two ill-defined points of view that were 
nevertheless drifting steadily, and finally irreconcilably, further apart.  With this meaning 
of the term Shi’a in mind, our main purpose here is to trace the background of this 
support to ‘Ali and to investigate its origins in the Arabian society of the day in the midst 
of which Islam arose.  Consequently it will be illustrated how this attitude became 
manifest as early as the death of the Prophet Muhammad.108 
 
Although Muhammad’s cousin ‘Ali never referred to himself or his followers as Shi’a, 
many who backed ‘Ali’s bid for power in the civil war of Islam from 657 to 661 did so 
because of his close association with the Prophet.  Further, many saw ‘Ali’s opponent, 
Mu’awiyya, the governor of Syria and an Umayyad, as an illegitimate choice to rule the 
Islamic community.  Many Muslims believed that the important families of Mecca and 
Medina should choose the caliph, while others believed that the next ruler should come 
from the Hashemite family.   
However, these retrospective Shi’ite sympathies do not reflect the total 
complexity of the Mu’awiyya-’Ali civil war.  Many Muslims backed ‘Ali for political or 
economic reasons.  Further, others who favored ‘Ali because of his Shari’ah-mindedness 
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did not do so necessarily because of his genealogy.109  Lastly, the result of the civil war 
was not a clear divide between a Sunni majority and Shi’a minority.  Many ulama who 
grudgingly accepted the necessity of a caliph had Shi’ite sympathies while many non-
Shi’ite political activists—such as those with Khariji sympathies—took up arms against 
the Caliphate.  In one sense, Shi’ism was born out of Muhammad’s death, the expansion 
of Islam, and the establishment of a stable Umayyad Caliphate in 692.  However, 
Shi’ism, as we have come to know it, was a vague and diverse idea that did not even have 
a name in early Islam.  There were various factions that formed following the civil war, 
but not within the retrospective terms that we place on the era.  A more nuanced 
understanding of the Islamic conquests and the various attempts to establish a caliphate 
over all of Islam are required to gain a greater understanding of what could have been 
deemed Shi’ism during the early Islamic period. 
 
Setting the Stage for Islamic Expansion into the Middle East 
On the eve of Islam’s expansion into the lands of the Mediterranean and Near 
Eastern peoples (the area from the Nile to the Oxus River in Central Asia), the 
Byzantines and Sasanids (Persian rulers of an empire stretching from the eastern Iranian 
plateau to the eastern half of Mesopotamia) were engaged in conflict over control of the 
Mesopotamian plain.110  Centuries of war between these two powers had led to the 
destruction of many of the trading towns in Mesopotamia, and agriculture had suffered as 
                                                 
109
 Hodgson, 212-7. 
110
 By Mediterranean and Near Eastern peoples, I am mainly speaking of the people of the two main 
language groups from the Nile to the Oxus River: Indo-European and Semitic.  Indo-European speakers in 
this region consist mainly of Persian speakers on the Iranian Plateau and Armenian speakers in the 
Armenian highlands.  Other groups include Kurdish, Baluchi, Pashto, and Dardic speakers.  Semitic 
speakers included the various Aramaic dialects in Syria and Mesopotamia, as well as Arabic speakers in the 
Arabian peninsula.  In the Maghreb, the pastoralists spoke Berber, which is distantly related to Arabic but it 
is not a Semitic language.  In Egypt, many spoke Coptic, which was a mix of Greek and Egyptian. 
55 
 
irrigation canals in the region had been targets of war.111  Further, years of religious 
oppression by each of the state-supported religions—whose Christian churches and 
Zoroastrian fire temples were highly patronized—as well as constant warfare, drained the 
treasuries of each empire by the early seventh century and generated resentment from the 
Aramaic, Coptic, Iranian, and Arab peoples of the region toward the Sassanid and 
Byzantine monarchs.   
There was consistent warfare in the region between the two powers from the third 
to the early sixth century.   However, in the sixth century, the Sasanid Shah Khosro (ruled 
531-579) and the Byzantine Emperor Justinian (ruled 527-565) brought a period of peace 
and prosperity between the two empires.  Unfortunately, peace would not last much 
beyond their lifetimes.  Warfare over control of the Mesopotamian plain was resurgent 
shortly after Khosro’s death.  In the early seventh century, the armies of both empires had 
laid waste to many towns in Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia in their fight for political 
dominance, leaving the heartland of the Middle East vulnerable to outside attack by the 
vigorous Arabian horseman now imbued with a new sense of purpose. 
It is important to note that Arab history in Mesopotamia did not begin with the 
Islamic conquests that started in 634.  Prior to this period of extensive Arab conquest and 
migration, Arab populations of Kalbite (ancestors of Yemeni settlers) and Qay (Northern 
Arabian and Sinaitic settlers) descent had slowly populated Mesopotamia and Syria over 
the prior millennium, eventually becoming the majority ethnic group among the 
pastoralists in the region by the time of Muhammad.112  In fact, many of the Bedouin 
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tribes in Mesopotamia and Eastern Syria had become clients of either the Sassanid or 
Byzantine monarchs.  During the sixth century, the Byzantines became patrons of the 
petty Arab pastoralist Ghassanid kings in Eastern Syria, while the Sassanids became 
patrons of the petty Arab kingdom of the Lakhmids in the western half of Mesopotamia 
(See Map 1).113   The Bedouin inhabitants of these semi-agricultural client states had 
already converted to Christianity; the Lakhimids were Nestorian Christians and the 
Ghazzanids were Jacobite Christians.  Both these petty states frequently engaged in war 
with one another over political and religious quarrels, making the growth of an agrarian 
or mercantile-based economy in the region nearly impossible.  They served not only as 
buffer states between the two great empires but these Arabs also protected both Syria and 
the Iranian Plateau from attacks by Bedouin from the Arabian Peninsula.114   
However, during the beginning of the seventh century, both the Sassanid and 
Byzantine armies laid waste to the region and their two Arab-client states, the Lakhimids 
and the Ghazzanids, fell apart in the midst of military conflict.  As the vacuum of power 
opened up when the petty Arab kingdoms that had protected the two empires from an 
Arab pastoralist invasion from the south fell apart, the region of today’s central Middle 
East was left open for conquest.  Muhammad’s revelation and his political conquest of 
Arabia corresponded with this political crisis in Mesopotamia.   
The seventh century would be the stage for the development of a new social 
order.  From 634 to 644, the Arabs, under the banner of Islam, would conquer the lands 
of the Sassanid Empire and the Byzantine lands of Syria and Egypt.  The relatively 
unstable political and economic situation in Mesopotamia favored Muhammad’s 
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successors, who utilized the situation to engage in widespread conquest.  Following these 
conquests, the Arabs formed an empire in the region that united the lands from the Nile to 
the Oxus basin based on the conception of a caliphate.  The unity of these lands under a 
single ruler and his bureaucracy generated the long-term growth of trade and irrigation in 
Mesopotamia for the first time in centuries, leading to a new era of political, economic, 
and social prosperity.   
However, the Islamic conquests were not a point of complete discontinuity in the 
lands from the Nile to the Oxus River Basin.  The Arab conquerors would adopt many of 
the political and economic policies of the Sassanid and Byzantine rulers, and many 
bureaucrats during the formative years of Islam were Christian, Jewish, or Mazdean 
(Zoroastrian).115  The “people of the Book”—which sometimes included Mazdeans—
were rarely forced to convert.  Although merchants, bureaucrats, artisans, and soldiers 
converted at a quicker rate since Islam grew quickly in the urban regions from the Nile to 
the Oxus River Basin, the agrarian gentry and the peasants were much slower to adopt 
Islam.  In this region, Islam would not become the religion of the majority until at least 
the tenth century.   Further, many of the scientific, theological, philosophical, and artistic 
inquiries of the Greek, Aramaic, and Iranian peoples in the region influenced the Arab 
conquerors.  In these regards, much was shared in the political, economic, and social 
nature of the pre- and post-Islamic world. 
The nature of the political entity known as the caliphate, which formed during the 
Arab conquests as an attempted imitation of past agrarian-based rulers in the region, 
represents an important political continuity with past rulers.  Initially, from 632 to 661, 
the legitimacy of the caliphs was based on their recognition by the ansar and muhajirun 
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Muslims of Mecca and Medina. That is the why the caliphs Abu Bakr (632-634), ‘Umar 
(634-644), ‘Uthman (644-656), and ‘Ali (656-661) are generally regarded as the 
Rashidun (rightly guided) caliphs.  During the Rashidun period, the Islamic community 
expanded across the entire Middle East and was united under a ruler whose foundations 
were legitimized by the entire umma.  However, following the victory of Mu’awiyya 
over ‘Ali in 661, the caliphate became a dynastic institution whose legitimacy was based 
on political, military, and economic legitimacy—not on a religious basis.   
Many of the pious Islamic ulama and merchants in the Arab garrison towns—
which were established following the Muslim conquests—saw the establishment of the 
Umayyad caliphate as illegitimate according to Shari’ah law.116  Although the late 
Abbasid Caliphs (750-945)—and less so the Umayyad Caliphs (661-683 and 692-750)—
attempted to form an absolutism in the region to unite the agrarian gentry with the 
religious-minded ulama in the urban areas as the Sassanid shahs did before them, the 
caliphs of both regions inevitably failed at establishing an agrarian-based absolutist 
monarchy.  The new Islamic urban ulama and merchants refused to recognize the caliph 
as the head imam.  During the formative years of Islam, there was constant tension 
between the piety-minded Muslims in the urban regions, and the agrarian-minded caliphs 
who were hoping to unite all social, political, and economic aspects of Middle Eastern 
society under their authority, modeled on political forms of past empires.  The split 
between the caliphs, who wanted to impose the norms that reflected older Byzantine and 
Sassanid traditions, and the ulama and merchants, who sought to impose social, 
economic, and political norms reflecting the egalitarian aspects of the Qur’an, can be 
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described as one of the main sources of political tensions and conflicts during the early 
Islamic period.   
During times of political and economic stability, a tense truce held between the 
caliphs and the ulama.  However, during times of economic and political instability, the 
ulama might recognize a possible rebel leader as legitimate usurper and call for rebellion 
against the caliph.  The rise of the Abbasid Caliph in 750—rooted in a descendant of 
Muhammad’s uncle Abbas—serves to highlight our understanding as a successful Shi’ite 
rebellion; perhaps the most successful.117  Shi’ism, a concept that is often used to 
describe retrospectively the kerygmatic sympathies of a variety of individuals and 
political sects who yearned for a Hashemite to rule the umma according to the norms set 
by the Prophet and the early Islamic community, could be used to describe the 
sympathies of many early ulama and those individual Muslims who rebelled at various 
times against the Umayyad caliphs.  Further, Kharijism, a concept that can be used to 
describe those Muslims who yearned for the most qualified Muslim, whether or not he 
was a member of the Prophet’s family, to rule the Islamic community, can also be 
described as an impetus for dissent and rebellion.   
However, from 632 to 692, debates and conflict over the nature of the caliphate 
and its relation to Irano-Semitic society and Islam were not all directly connected with 
these proto-Shi’ite and proto-Kharajite sympathies.  There were other motivations for 
rebellion, such as tribal conflicts, ethnic tensions, theological disputes, and political 
quarrels not involving Shi’ism or Kharijism.  Further, as stated earlier, there were many 
ulama with Shi’ite sympathies who were actually pacifists.118  Marshall Hodgson uses the 
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term jama’i-sunni (those for the unity of the community) to describe ulama who 
begrudgingly accepted the status of the caliphs as a necessary evil for the sake of unity.119  
What makes Hodgson’s analyses so valuable is that he understands that many pacifist 
ulama—those who accepted the caliphs as a necessary political solution for a large-scale 
empire—actually had what later could be called Shi’ite sympathies.  Jafar al-Sadiq, as 
well as many other important Twelver Shi’ite and Sunni historical figures, could also be 
described as “jama’i-sunni” with Shi’ite sympathies.  The nature of political conflict and 
intellectual dissent in the formative years of Islam was complex; a simplistic Sunni-Shi’i 
divide is not a useful structure for explaining the political nature of this early historical 
era.  A deeper understanding of the events following Muhammad’s death is necessary to 
understand the complex socio-political developments of the early Islamic world that 
eventually led to the divide now recognized as so significant. 
 
The Expansion of Islam into the Middle East 
While the Prophet Muhammad was preparing to attack Syria in 632, he died 
suddenly of illness.  His death was a cause of great uncertainty for the early Islamic 
community.  Many tribes across Arabia responded to his death by cutting political ties 
with the Quraysh, and the muhajirun and the ansar came close to warring each other over 
the question of who should rule the Islamic community.  Further, there were several 
“false prophets” who sprang up in Arabia, claiming their own monotheist revelations.120  
In 632, the communities of Mecca and Medina resolved their dispute by having the heads 
of each clan vote for Muhammad’s successor.  Abu Bakr, the wealthy merchant who was 
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one of the first converts to Islam, was chosen as caliph to lead the Umma.  He spent the 
next two years reconsolidating the tribes of Arabia in a series of conflicts known as the 
Wars of the Ridda.121   
According to many later Shi’ite claims and even non-Shi’ite sources, 
Muhammad’s cousin ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib objected to the election of Abu Bakr as did 
many of his closest companions.  Many Hashemites were uneasy about having Abu-Bakr, 
who wasn’t a Hashemite, as their caliph.  Further, the pro-Shi’ite ninth-century historian 
Ya’qubi stated that a member of the ansar did advance the claim of ‘Ali.122  However, 
‘Ali never resorted to rebellion and was passive during Abu-Bakr and ‘Uthman’s 
caliphate.123  According to the modern Sunni perspective, this could mean that ‘Ali never 
saw himself as the only possible usurper to the caliph.124  However, Shi’ite historians 
point out that ‘Ali was politically active during Muhammad’s lifetime; therefore, his 
sudden passiveness in politics and military affairs from 632 to 656 could mean that he 
was symbolically protesting the reigns of Abu-Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman.125  Either way, 
‘Ali stayed out of politics.126  Further, most of the wider Quraysh backed the caliphate of 
Abu-Bakr. 
By 634, Abu-Bakr, backed by the Quraysh tribe, was able to reconsolidate the 
Arabian Peninsula once again under the banner of Islam.  However, like the Prophet 
Muhammad, when Abu Bakr was getting set to attack Syria he was struck with a fatal 
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illness.  On his death bed, he chose ‘Umar—one of Muhammad’s closest companions and 
a member of the Adi clan of the Quraysh tribe—as the successor to the caliphate. 
In 634, the caliph ‘Umar was able to unite the Arabian Peninsula in a wave of 
conquest that would permanently alter the socio-political and economic structures of the 
lands from the Nile to the Oxus River Basin.  The pursuit of wealth and the spread of 
Islam were two of the more important motivations for conquest for the various Arabian 
tribes.127  Furthermore, the political decentralization of the Mesopotamia plain in the 
early seventh century made the conquests of those lands by pastoralist invaders a realistic 
possibility.   By 637, the Arabs drove the Byzantine army and the Greek landlords out of 
Syria.  In 642, the lower Nile—including Alexandria—was conquered and by 643, the 
Aramaic lowlands (the Mesopotamian alluvial plain) were subdued.  On the Euphrates, 
most of the army of Shah Yazidgird III, the last Sassanid king, was destroyed in a series 
of battles that opened the Iranian Plateau for conquest.128  The Arab auxiliaries of Kalbite 
and Qay descent, on which the Sassanid shahs had once depended to protect the roads 
into the Iranian Plateau, switched sides one clan at a time and joined the rest of the Arab 
conquerors.  As a result, Yazidgird III lost control of Mesopotamia, leaving his 
bureaucracy without access to enough agricultural taxes to pay the army.  The Iranian 
urban populations, unwilling to defend the Zoroastrian-based bureaucracy and the Shah’s 
absolutism against the Arab conquerors, surrendered to the Arabs one city at a time.  By 
643, both the Iranian highlands and the Aramaic-speaking lowlands were in Muslim 
hands.  In 651, Yazidgird III was assassinated in Merv, a Central Asian oasis at the 
eastern boundary of the former Sassanid Empire, thereby ending the Sassanid dynasty. 
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siege of the well-fortified city of Constantinople failed.131  The geography of the Anatolia 
highlands as well as their hostile Greek populations made access to the plateau difficult, 
and Constantinople’s various layers of walls and its position on the Bosphorus Strait kept 
the Arabs from conquering the imperial city.  Gaining a foothold in Anatolia was 
therefore extremely difficult for the Arabs, who managed to conquer only the province of 
Cilicia (the southeastern coast of Anatolia).  In the Iranian Plateau, Arab conquest 
reached as far as the city of Merv and the Oxus River in central Asia by the 660s. The 
Baluch desert in southern Iran and the Hindu Kush in modern-day Afghanistan formed 
the rest of the eastern boundary.  In the west, attempted conquests of Abyssinia and the 
Sudan failed, setting the southern African boundaries of Islam in Africa.  The conquests 
during the reign of ‘Umar were impressive, creating perhaps the most drastic point of 
regional political discontinuity since Alexander’s conquest of the ancient Near East in the 
4th century B.C.E. 
  More impressive than ‘Umar’s military conquests were his political and 
economic policies.  In a short period of time, ‘Umar was able to transform a decentralized 
and diverse group of Bedouin tribes and townspeople into an organized army.132  ‘Umar’s 
piety and his abilities as a leader won over most of the Bedouin who then fought for him.  
He was widely referred to as Amir al-Mu’minin (commander of the faithful).  His 
abilities as a leader were especially pertinent since many of the Arabs were motivated by 
the pursuit of booty, which motivated the tribes in the conquests of wealthy cities such as 
Alexandria, Ctesiphon, Damascus, and Antioch.  ‘Umar was able to organize the 
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distribution of the spoils of war through a system known to the Arabs as diwan.133  This 
system required that every Arab register himself with their commanders, allowing for the 
distribution of booty to be organized and efficient.  One fifth of the booty went to the 
caliph’s treasury and the rest was evenly distributed to the soldiers.   
To remain in control of the various provinces of the empire, ‘Umar established 
Arab garrison towns, military bases, in critical regions in each province, usually on the 
outskirts of important towns and cities.  Following the conquest of the Fertile Crescent, 
many Arab families migrated from the Arabian Peninsula and they settled down in or 
near these military bases.134  In a short period of time, these bases would become fully 
functioning towns with merchants, bureaucrats, and unskilled and skilled laborers.  Even 
though these cities initially functioned as military outposts to govern the new empire, 
they would become centers of economic activity and Islamic piety.135   
Establishing Muslim garrisons at the center of pre-existing cities with a long 
agrarian tradition proved difficult since the Arabs were seen as foreigners.136  ‘Umar’s 
failure to settle Arabs successfully in Ctesiphon—the former capital of the Sassanid 
empire—illustrates this problem.  One solution involved establishing new towns in 
strategic regions that would be settled mainly by Arabs.  Basra, Kufa (on the Euphrates 
River), Fustat (the old quarter of what is now Cairo), and Qom (north-central Iran) were 
four of the more important garrison towns established during the first Arab conquests 
(See Map 2).  Other than creating new towns, Muslims also settled in cities that already 
contained significant Arab populations, such as Damascus and Aleppo in Syria.  The 
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Arabs tended to form factions in these cities based on prior tribal relations.  Non-Arab 
peoples—most notably Persian merchants and artisans—would commonly associate 
themselves with one of these “neotribal” groups as mawali (clients).  Over the next 
generation, political and theological disputes within the garrison towns were commonly 
reflected in tribal quarrels and vice-versa.  Despite the political tension in these cities, the 
settlement of Arabs in the former lands of the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires was 
mostly successful, allowing the Muslims to establish a series of relatively unified empires 
across the entire region until the early 10th century. 
One problem the early Muslims faced was developing standards for taxation and 
army regulations.  The Quraysh clans had little experience in these matters.  ‘Umar and 
his successors chose to adapt the policies of the Byzantine and Sassanid rulers, having 
each provincial governor complete the policies of past governors in the region.  This 
involved the incorporation of local peoples (Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians) as clients 
into the bureaucratic system of the Arab empire, and the use of Byzantine coins as the 
main form of currency.137   
Contrary to popular perceptions, non-Muslims were rarely forced to convert 
during the formative years of Islam.138  Even though many caliphs instituted 
discriminatory policies against non-Muslims, the dhimmi were almost always allowed to 
practice their beliefs within the confines of their community.  More importantly, non-
Muslims had important roles in the early Arab intelligentsia and they introduced more 
complex doctrines in philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and other sciences 
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to the Arabs.139  For several centuries, non-Muslims would participate with Muslims in 
the translation of Greek, Pahlavi (middle Persian language), and Syriac documents into 
Arabic.  Through word of mouth and translation, old ideas in the Middle East were given 
new vigor within an Islamic framework.140  Although more significant growth in contacts 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of scientific speculation would take place in 
the eighth century, dhimmi were already participating in the Arab bureaucracies in the 
seventh century.  Conversion of most of the population was a transition that took 
centuries.  Certainly, many non-Arabs converted early on because it was economically 
and politically convenient to join the new faith.  Others found Islam to be spiritually 
fulfilling.  However, despite these reasons for converting, non-Muslims would remain the 
majority of the population until approximately the tenth century, and of course, they 
never died out.141  They played a significant role in ‘Umar’s incorporation of Byzantine 
and Sassanid political and economic policies in the early Arab empire.   
More importantly, ‘Umar and his successors’ political consolidation of 
Mesopotamia allowed for the extensive agricultural development of Iraq for the first time 
in centuries, giving future caliphs the necessary funds to create a foundation for a strong 
central bureaucracy.  Further, political stability by the end of the eighth century would 
foster an increase in trade across Western Asia, leading to an increase in wealth and the 
spread of Islam in urban centers throughout the Middle East.142  ‘Umar’s political and 
economic policies laid the foundations for the establishment of a strong central 
bureaucracy across the Middle East. 
                                                 
139Lapidus, 36. 
140
 ibid, 269-70. 
141
 Esposito, 305-45. 
142
 Hodgson, Volume I, 236-7. 
68 
 
Ironically, ‘Umar’s social policies regarding Islam contradicted his establishment 
of a strong central bureaucracy under the rule of a single caliph.143  He was known for his 
piety and for enforcing norms he felt were expressed in the Qur’an and in the daily 
practices of Muhammad.  In the garrison towns, he enforced penalties for adultery, 
outlawed temporary marriages, and improved the status of slave concubines. Further, 
‘Umar consecrated the lunar calendar with the Hijra as the first year as opposed to the 
more economically useful solar calendar in the tradition of the Sassanid and Byzantine 
empires.   
More importantly, ‘Umar and his commanders funded the building of a masjid 
(place of worship), or mosque, at the center of every garrison town.144  The first mosques 
were rather simple and were used for salat (public worship).   It is during ‘Umar’s era that 
the standard of praying five times a day was established, and every pious Muslim was 
expected to meet at midday on Friday at their mosque for the khutbah (sermon).145  There 
were two parts to each sermon: a scripture reading by the prayer leader and salat.  Prayer 
involved Qur’anic recitation and pre-determined prayer motions that the community 
would perform in unison.  Initially, it was the duty of the garrison commander to lead 
Friday prayer as the imam and to collect zakat (the mosque tax) from the Muslim 
community.  However, as time progressed and these garrison towns became 
cosmopolitan centers of trade within a large empire, the position of the imams would 
become separated from those of the military commanders and the Caliph.  ‘Umar’s 
conquest and establishment of Arab political dominance gave Islam the necessary 
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environment to expand via trade to other cities across the Irano-Semitic world and 
beyond.   
From the beginning of the Muslim conquests, the social norms of Islam and its 
orthoprax traditions were established in urban centers; this was done mainly by 
merchants as opposed to the agrarian-based rulers.  In the cities, Islamic norms would 
come to represent the egalitarian spirit of the merchant class.  From the middle to the late 
seventh century, a rift would develop between future caliphs—caliphs who would 
become highly influenced by Byzantine and Sassanid ideals of a absolute monarchy, 
which was structured on the basis of an agrarian-based bureaucracy—and the piety-
minded ulama of the urban centers.  ‘Umar was able to balance the idea of the caliphate 
with the egalitarian ideals of Islam during his reign.  However, the later Rashidun and the 
Umayyad caliphs would face political and religious opposition from ulama who felt that 
the position of the caliph had no Islamic legitimacy. 
Although the term ulama would not be used until later in Islamic history, there 
were pious Muslims in these early urban centers who spent their lives dedicated to the 
study of the prophetic message.  The term ulama, which came to mean one who is learned 
specifically in the Islamic legal and theological studies, can be used to describe these 
pious Muslims.146 An early ‘alim (singular form of ulama) might have led Friday prayer 
as an imam; taught history, geography, and the Arabic language; and speculated on ways 
to adapt the Qur’anic message to the everyday lives of Muslims.   
Zakat, which came to be known to us as the mosque tax, allowed these ulama to 
set up schools in their towns.  The local mosque was more than a center of prayer—it was 
also a center of religious learning. The earliest schools during ‘Umar’s era established a 
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foundation for Shari’ah and the basic beliefs and practices for all Muslims.147  Shahada, 
salat, and zakat have already been discussed in the context of early Islam.  The fourth 
pillar of Islam, fasting, takes place during the ninth Muslim month of Ramadan, when 
Muslims refrain from eating from sunrise to sunset in order to become closer to God.  
Fasting may have been a tradition adopted from the local Jewish tribes in the Hejaz and 
adapted to the Islamic faith.  The fifth pillar pilgrimage, or Hajj, was adapted from the 
Meccan pagan tradition of pilgrimage to the Ka’ba.  All Muslims were to travel to Mecca 
during the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar at least once during their lifetimes and 
perform a set of rituals that was mainly focused on the Ka’ba.  The concept of Jihad—
another possible pillar—emphasizes that Muslims are to convert the “people of the book” 
peacefully only through word of mouth and by setting a pious example, and are to engage 
in violence only if it is felt that the Muslim community is physically threatened by an 
outside force.148  Shari’ah ethic also discouraged the charging of interest on loans, 
maltreatment of slaves, and consumption of alcohol.  These basic tenets developed out of 
an historical interpretation of Muhammad’s community, and they served as unifying 
practices for all Muslims.  These traditions and beliefs distinguished the Muslim Umma 
from Christian and Jewish communities.   
However, the Qur’an and the Sunna failed to answer many of the complex 
political, economic, and social questions accompanying the expansion of Islam and the 
rise of the caliphate.  Future ulama would use the hadith of Muhammad’s family and 
companions—as well as reasoning and interpretation—to create a system of fiqh that 
would adapt Islam to a more complex world.  It was as early as ‘Umar’s reign that the 
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foundations for the study of fiqh were laid out. 149  Later generations would collect hadith 
attributed to the important historical figures of this era to create more complex systems of 
religious law later known as madhahib. 
Despite lacking a permanent economic, political, or a religious legitimacy as a 
ruler, ‘Umar was able to keep the early community united by establishing wise military, 
political, and economic policies.  ‘Umar had neither a connection to an important landed 
gentry like the Byzantine and Sassanid rulers, nor had he connections to rich merchants 
like the Umayyad family.  What he did have was the backing of the Arab pastoralist 
tribes who trusted his military and political judgment as well as his genuine piety in 
regards to the Islamic faith.  From 634 to 644, ‘Umar was able to take advantage of this 
temporary Arab political unity to engage in conquest that would alter the political, social, 
and economic makeup of the Middle East and North Africa.  In 644, ‘Umar died, leaving 
the empire to his successor ‘Uthman. 
His two successors, ‘Uthman (644-656) and ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib (656-661), though 
not without many successes of their own, failed in many regards to imitate ‘Umar’s 
policies.  In all fairness, the constant territorial expansion would start to wane slowly 
after 644, meaning that Uthman and ‘Ali both faced the difficult task of settling Arab 
soldiers, transforming the Arab garrison towns from military outposts to bureaucratic 
centers of a large empire, and standardizing the Qur’an.150  All of this was attempted 
from their seat of power in Medina, a city with a relatively weak geographic position in 
the Middle East.  Compared to Damascus, Ctesiphon, Isfahan, or Kufa, Medina was not 
suitable as a center for governing a large empire.  Its resources were thin and it was 
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marginal to the new enlarged geography of Islam.  Further, ‘Ali was a member of the 
Hashemite clan, a family whose religious importance failed to match the economic and 
political connections of the Umayyad clan in Syria.  The Umayyads, for centuries before 
the Arab conquests, had significant trade contacts and political relationships with Arab 
tribes of Syria.151  Therefore, it is not surprising that Mu’awiyya, a member of the 
Umayyad clan and the governor of Damascus, was able to seize power in 661.   
The period from 644 to 661 held the seeds and the reality of the first important 
civil war in Islamic history and an end to the unified political conquest by a single 
Islamic community.  However, it does not represent a watershed moment in the creation 
of a divide between Sunni and Shi’i Muslims.  The true narrative of this tumultuous 
period has been highly disputed by Muslims since the eighth century, and it is one of the 
main sources of religious tension among Twelver Shi’i and Sunni ulama in the modern 
era.  The tenth-century Persian historian al-Tabari wrote a treatise that compared the 
numerous historical accounts of Uthman’s assassination and the ensuing war between 
‘Ali and ‘Uthman’s cousin Mu’awiyya for the caliphate, analyzing which accounts were 
more accurate than others.152  There are many accounts that place ‘Uthman as a pious 
ruler who was betrayed by ‘Ali, while other accounts state that ‘Uthman was a corrupt 
ruler who deserved his fate. The Twelver Shi’i ulama of the much later Saffavid era 
praised the attributes of ‘Ali while cursing the names of the caliphs Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, 
and ‘Uthman, whom they claimed were not the rightful successors to Muhammad.153  On 
the other hand, the Sunni ulama of the Ottoman Empire praised the reigns of all four 
Rashidun Caliphs.  Many of the disagreements between the Sunni and Shi’a ulama from 
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the sixteenth century to the modern era dealt with the interpretation of this historical 
era—or in other words, with the interpretation of the caliphate and its relationship to the 
Islamic community.  It is perhaps for this reason many modern scholars in the West and 
some within the Islamic world have wrongly interpreted 661 as the date that signifies the 
split of the Islamic community into two distinct sects: Sunni and Shi’a.  By articulating 
the actual narrative of events, I hope to disprove these claims and show how no such 
orthodox divide was created by this civil war. 
 
‘Uthman’s Caliphate: A Progression to Civil War 
In 644, ‘Umar died without leaving a successor.  A council of important 
individuals from the Quraysh family met in Medina to decide who would be the next 
caliph.  In a controversial decision, the council chose ‘Uthman, a member of the 
Umayyad family.  ‘Ali, who was a member of the council, took offense to the choice of 
‘Uthman because of his lack of piousness and his connections with the Umayyad 
family.154  Throughout ‘Uthman’s twelve years in power, there was constant political 
tension between the Umayyads, whose power base would become further entrenched in 
Syria, and the Hashemites, whose support became stronger in the Hejaz and Kufa.  The 
old rivalries between Syria and Iraq during the Byzantine-Sassanid era resurfaced among 
the Arabs in the form of a Hashemite-Umayyad conflict.  ‘Ali, at least for most of 
‘Uthman’s reign, never took up arms against the new caliph but he objected openly to the 
council’s decision to have selected ‘Uthman.155  Even though ‘Uthman was a weaker 
politician and less intelligent then ‘Umar, his economic and political policies were 
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somewhat similar to those of his predecessor.  The modern Shi’a view of ‘Uthman’s 
caliphate as corrupt and incompetent—though not completely false—is often over 
exaggerated.  However, there were key political, military, social, and economic 
developments during ‘Uthman’s reign which would eventually lead to his assassination in 
656.   
During ‘Uthman’s caliphate, the military conquests began to wane.  Conquest did 
not stop altogether since Fars (southwest Iran) was occupied in 650 and Khurasan 
(northeast Iran) was occupied in 651.156  The Damascus governor Mu’awiyya was able to 
destroy most of the Byzantine navy in 655, giving Muslims control of the Mediterranean 
trade routes.  However, the amount of booty being brought to garrison towns such as 
Medina, Kufa, Fustat, and Basra began to wane throughout the 650s.  The lack of funds 
and the pacification of the empire meant that many Arab soldiers would have to find new 
professions and settle down with the local population.  The makeshift garrisons were 
beginning to transform into settled towns.  This transition was a cause for political strife 
among many of the Arab soldiery, especially for those of Hashemite descent.  The 
opportunities for individual Arabs to obtain wealth during the conquests gave way to a 
process of political centralization and the Umayyad accumulation of wealth.  Arab 
soldiers in Kufa and Fustat grew restless during this transition, and many vented their 
frustrations at ‘Uthman. 
Another source of contention during this time period was ‘Uthman’s nepotism.157  
He let family loyalty override political or spiritual qualifications for various bureaucratic 
and military positions, placing members of the Umayyad family as governors of each 
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province.  Although ‘Uthman’s cousin Mu’awiyya proved himself as a capable governor 
in Damascus (he was actually assigned the position by ‘Umar), his governors in Fustat 
and Kufa, who were also his cousins, proved to be incompetent.158  Further, ‘Uthman 
gave large tracts of valuable land in the fertile regions of Mesopotamia and the Jazirah 
(eastern Syria) to members of his own family.  Even though the Umayyad family’s 
consolidation of land began during ‘Umar’s reign, the process became evident by 
‘Uthman’s caliphate.  The increased production of the alluvial plain would eventually 
become the financial foundation for the centralized bureaucracies of the Umayyad and 
Abbasid empires.  For ‘Uthman, however, the development of the Mesopotamian plain 
under a single ruling class proved initially to be politically divisive.  Although the 
Umayyads, along with their Kalbite and Qay allies in Syria, benefitted from controlling 
the revenues of the alluvial plain, the Arabs in Kufa and Medina, especially those of 
Hashemite descent, resented the Umayyad centralization of power.  A political divide 
was developing between those of Hashemite and Umayyad descent, as well as between 
Syria and Iraq.   
Lastly, ‘Uthman’s attempted standardization and distribution of the Qur’an upset 
many pious Muslims, especially in Kufa, where ulama had developed their own traditions 
of Qur’anic recitation.159  Early Qur’anic schools of recitation and interpretation were 
unique to each garrison town, and many pious Muslims took pride in their interpretations 
of Muhammad’s revelation. Ibn-Mas’ud of Kufa, a highly influential imam, was a 
leading voice of discontent.  Religious speculation in the Islamic world was in its infancy, 
and ‘Uthman and his Umayyad constituents sought to consolidate the religious 
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interpretations in each garrison town by standardizing the Qur’an.  Many pious Muslims 
resented ‘Uthman’s attempt to control Qur’anic interpretation, especially since the 
caliph’s use of older Byzantine and Sassanid taxation policies was not in line with the 
egalitarian spirit of the Shari’ah.  To make matters worse for the pious ulama, ‘Uthman 
had loosened the enforcement of Shari’ah ethics within the towns.160  Further, the 
increasing influence of the Umayyads within the political, economic, and social spheres 
of Islamic world upset those of Hashemite descent, who were beginning to look for a new 
caliph.  It is during ‘Uthman’s caliphate that ‘Ali began to draw support from those who 
were politically and religiously discontented, especially from Muslims in Medina and 
Kufa. 
In 656, the situation became worse for ‘Uthman.  The religious and tribal leaders 
of Kufa were ready to declare their independence from ‘Uthman, whose position in 
Medina was becoming unstable.  However, his assassins would not come from Kufa.  
Instead, they would come from a group of discontented soldiers from Fustat.161  These 
soldiers were protesting their governor’s corrupt policies and his consolidation of wealth.  
They confronted ‘Uthman in Medina, where they eventually came to an agreement to 
share power with the governor in Fustat.  However, ‘Uthman had the leadership of the 
protest party in Fustat secretly killed before the envoy of soldiers returned to Egypt.  
Somehow, the soldiers got word of the executions, and they returned to Medina where 
they killed the caliph in his own house.  The Medinans, neutral to the situation, did 
nothing to stop the execution.  Most Muslims in Medina and Kufa declared their 
allegiance to ‘Ali immediately.  With the support of Muslims in the Hejaz and 
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Mesopotamia (which meant control of agricultural revenue and the Iranian Plateau), it 
seemed as if ‘Ali was destined to control the Islamic world.   
 There was still political dissent in the Islamic community.  In Damascus, the 
Umayyad governor, Mu’awiyya, claimed that ‘Ali had a hand in ‘Uthman’s assassination 
and he declared the caliphate for himself.162  Mu’awiyya had the support of not only the 
important families of Damascus but of all of the former governors under ‘Uthman who 
were of Umayyad descent.  Their future political careers and wealth depended on the 
political supremacy of the Umayyad family.  Although ‘Ali was initially accepted as 
caliph by most of the Islamic community, his refusal to sacrifice Shari’ah ideals for the 
sake of political necessity led to a withdrawal of support from many wealthy families.163  
The early wave of support for his caliphate began to wane when he began enforcing an 
egalitarian financial taxing system strictly, thereby isolating many of his supporters.   
Lastly, there was still dissent in Medina and Basra.  Two of the Prophet’s 
companions, Zubayr and Talhah, as well as one of Muhammad’s wives, A’isha, feared 
that ‘Ali’s youth and their relative old age meant they lost their last chance for control of 
the caliphate.  With supporters from the tribes of Basra who were angry over ‘Uthman’s 
assassination, they fought ‘Ali’s forces in a conflict known as the Battle of the Camel. 164 
‘Ali proved himself a brilliant general in defeating the rebels and establishing control of 
the alluvial plain.  Following the victory, ‘Ali moved the capital from Medina to Kufa for 
military and economic purposes.  The stage was set for a confrontation with Mu’awiyya’s 
forces in Damascus. 
 
                                                 
162
 Tabari, Volume XVII, 1-6. 
163
 Jafri, 88-97. 
164
 Esposito, 15. 
78 
 
The First Civil War: The Battle of Siffin 
 The battle of Siffin may well symbolize the birth of Shi’ism—at least in 
retrospect.  Historical interpretations of this event and the characters involved laid the 
foundations for many forms of Shi’ite piety.  The term Shi’ite was originally used to 
describe a partisan group in this affair.  For example, ‘Ali’s supporters were sometimes 
known as Shi’at ‘Ali (“Partisans of ‘Ali”) and Mu’awiyya’s supporters were sometimes 
known as Shi’at Mu’awiyya.165  Only later, in the eighth century, would the term be used 
to describe religious and political ‘Alid (‘Ali-based) sympathizers since many rebellions 
in the late seventh and eighth century took place in the name of a descendant of ‘Ali.  
One can conclude that the first civil war was not a battle between Sunna and Shi’a 
sympathizers.  To the contrary, the reasons behind the first Islamic civil war were 
underlined with complex religious, political, social, geographical, and economic 
undertones.     
In a manner similar to ‘Umar, ‘Ali was known by his followers as the Amir al-
Mu’minin, and his supporters were known as Shi’at ‘Ali.166  His supporters came from 
towns where the Hashemites were affluent, such as Mecca, Medina, and Kufa.  
Additional support came from the religiously discontent, especially in Kufa.  Many piety-
minded Muslims in Kufa viewed the Umayyad standardization of Muhammad’s 
revelations as a threat to their traditions of Qur’anic recitation and the Shari’ah 
egalitarian ideal.  The important spiritual leader of Kufa, Ibn-Mas’ud, supported ‘Ali for 
his shari’ah-mindedness, and he rallied support in the town around ‘Ali’s cause.  In 
addition, ‘Ali’s status as a close companion, cousin, and son-in-law of the Prophet gave 
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him a genealogical legitimacy that Mu’awiyya lacked.  Lastly, ‘Ali had the support of 
many soldiers outside of Syria who were discontented over the wane in conquest and the 
centralization of Umayyad wealth and power.  This strong base of support initially gave 
‘Ali a military advantage over the Umayyads.  In 656, he was able to establish his own 
governors in Medina, Kufa, Basra, Yemen, and Qom.167  He placed the following three 
prominent Hashemites in power: in Taif and Mecca, Qutham ibn al-Abbas; in Basra, 
Abd-Allah al-Abbas; and in Bahrain and Yemen, Ubayd-Allah ibn al-Abbas. 
As for Mu’awiyya, he was able to establish political control in Fustat and 
Damascus with the help of former Umayyad governors and their military forces in Syria 
and Egypt.  In Syria, Mu’awiyya had the support of Arabs of Umayyad, Kalbite, and Qay 
descent.168  In particular, he had the support of affluent Christian families in the region.  
While Mu’awiyya lacked ‘Ali’s piousness, genealogy, and strong military leadership, he 
was an intelligent politician.  In Damascus, he united dissident tribal factions under his 
authority and established economic policies beneficial to affluent families in Syria.  
Lastly, unlike ‘Ali, Mu’awiyya was better at knowing when to use force and when to 
compromise for the sake of peace.  In other words, while ‘Ali was driven by Shari’ah-
minded ideals, Mu’awiyya was willing to compromise those same ideals to remain in 
power.   
In July of 657, Mu’awiyya’s forces started marching from Damascus to Kufa. 
‘Ali’s forces met him at Siffin on the upper Euphrates.169  The battle itself was drawn out 
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and lasted for months.  When it seemed ‘Ali was coming close to leading his army to 
victory, Mu’awiyya had his soldiers on horseback attach a page of the Qur’an to the end 
of each of their spears and ride toward ‘Ali’s forces.170  The point of this gesture was to 
call for a truce and an arbitration to decide the next caliph.  They came to an agreement in 
which each side would choose one neutral representative to negotiate a settlement.  
Whereas Mu’awiyya chose a loyal political ally, ‘Amr ibn al-As, ‘Ali chose the governor 
of Kufa, Abu Musa al-Ash’ari, who was popular in Kufa but did not have a close 
relationship with ‘Ali.  The Kufans had placed al-Ash’ari in power during ‘Uthman’s 
reign in defiance of the later caliph.  The negotiations dragged out for years as neither 
side could not come to an agreement.   
This situation benefited Mu’awiyya, who was able to use his skills as a statesman 
to hold together his political alliance, but on the other hand, ‘Ali began losing control of 
his supporters.  In Khurasan (Eastern Persia), the Arab garrisons lost control of the region 
to local landholders.  In Kufa, ‘Ali’s alliance broke into quarrelling factions.  The 
Shurat—known in retrospect as the first of the Kharijite sects—became a faction in Kufa 
which denounced ‘Ali for his decision to accept arbitration.171  Many of ‘Ali’s religious 
supporters in Kufa wanted a caliph who was infallible in the eyes of God.  By accepting 
arbitration, ‘Ali unwittingly lost many of his religious supporters in Kufa.  In 661, after 
four years of political controversy, Mu’awiyya was awarded the position of caliph, and 
immediately, ‘Ali denounced the decision.  ‘Ali was not able to hold together his alliance 
in Kufa, which broke into factional war in the same year.  Even though ‘Ali put down in 
the rebellion, he lost many of his supporters.  
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Shortly after the Kufan rebellion, the Shurat assassin Abd-Rahman ibn-Muljam 
stabbed ‘Ali while he was praying in a mosque in Kufa.172  ‘Ali died two days later and is 
believed to have been buried in nearby Najaf, where a shrine was erected in his name 
during the Abbasid era.173   
After ‘Ali’s assassination, many of his political supporters turned to his eldest 
son, Hasan, as his political successor.  After six more months of fighting, the situation 
became worse for the Shi’iat ‘Ali.  Aware of the bleak situation, Hasan made a political 
deal with Mu’awiyya in the former Sassanid capital of Ctesiphon.174  In return for 
accepting Mu’awiyya’s caliphate, Hasan was named his official successor.  After 
denouncing his right to the caliphate in Kufa, Hasan moved back to Medina where he 
would spend the rest of his life away from politics.  After 661, Mu’awiyya became the 
caliph and Damascus became the center of a new Arab Empire, known in history as the 
Umayyad.   
 
The Archetypes of ‘Ali ibn Abu-Talib and Hasan 
Despite ‘Ali’s unexpected death and the defeat of his supporters, his legacy has a 
lasting impact on the world of Islam.  ‘Ali’s legacy was originally an inspiration for a 
diversity of Shari’ah-minded protests—peaceful or violent.  But as Shi’ite theological 
doctrines matured and consolidated into a few schools of law by the end of the formative 
era, an entire canon of hadith concerning ‘Ali began circulating in Muslim circles across 
the Islamic World.  By the middle period of Islamic history (i.e., after 945), what 
separated a Sunni from a Shi’ite was the acceptance of an imamate; a belief that was 
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dependent on seperatist interpretation over ‘Ali’s life and his relationship with 
Muhammad.  What divides Sunna and Shi’a Muslims is an historical debate; it is not a 
legal debate.  Today, most Sunni Muslims believe ‘Ali was a pious Muslim and a great 
warrior.  Further, the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates are looked upon negatively for 
their lack of Shari’ah-mindedness.  However, Sunni Muslims do consider ‘Ali to be the 
only rightful successor to the Prophet.  In order to defend their theology, over time, Shi’a 
have organized and defended a canon of hadith that defends ‘Ali’s status as the only true 
successor to the Prophet. 
The tenth century historian al-Tabari wrote an historical account of the 
controversial debates over the question of succession, using hadith from several 
contradictory sources and analyzing the validity of historical Shi’ite claims.  Further, he 
used hadith attributed to the historical characters themselves, including ‘Ali.  The 
following ‘Ali hadith is from a passage in al-Tabari’s historical work Ta’rikh al-Rassul 
(“History of the Messenger”), which was a transcription of Muhammad’s speech to forty 
of his closest followers in 613: 
Then the Apostle of God addressed them saying: ‘O family of ‘Abdu’l-Muttalib, by God, 
I do not know of anyone among the Arabs who has brought his people anything better 
than what I have brought you.  I have brought you the best of this world and the next.  
God Almighty has ordered me to call you to Him.  And which of you will assist me in 
this Cause and become my brother, my trustee and my successor among you.’  And they 
all held back from this while I [‘Ali], although I was the youngest of them in age, the 
most diseased in eyesight, the most corpulent in body and thinnest in the legs, said: ‘I, O 
Prophet of God, will be your helper in this matter.’ And he put his arm around my neck 
and said: ‘This is my brother, my trustee and my successor among you, so listen to him 
and obey.’ And so the people arose and they were joking, saying to Abu Talib [‘Ali’s 
father]: ‘He has ordered you to listen to your son and obey him.’175 
 
Of course, the validity of the quote was contested by many Muslims.  Some have denied 
the authenticity of the hadith whereas others have a different interpretation of its overall 
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message.176  Al-Tabari analyzed other early historical controversies, such as the reign and 
assassination of ‘Uthman and the arbitration between ‘Ali and Mu’awiyya.  One set of 
historical interpretations asserts that ‘Uthman was a corrupt caliph who was assassinated 
for his impiety and that ‘Ali was betrayed by his fellow Muslims.177  On the other hand, 
other interpretations assert that ‘Uthman was a good caliph who was assassinated by 
impious rebels.  Al-Tabari does not offer clear answers to this debate but instead presents 
several points of view from various sources, allowing the reader to decide the issue for 
himself.   
Another contested hadith details Muhammad’s farewell pilgrimage in 632, where 
he supposedly made ‘Ali his successor.  According to the hadith, during Muhammad’s 
pilgrimage, he stopped for midday prayer at Ghadir Khumm.  There, he held ‘Ali’s hand 
and claimed that whoever opposes ‘Ali opposes God.178  Most Sunni ulama accept this 
hadith, but they have a different interpretation from the Shi’a.  They believe Muhammad 
was merely praising ‘Ali for his piousness, not awarding him the position of caliph.  
Further, those who have opposed Shi’ite piety throughout Islamic history reject the 
notion that this hadith proves that the imams, the line of ‘Ali, have somehow acquired 
Muhammad’s ‘ilm, or knowledge.  On the other hand, for Shi’a, this proves that 
Muhammad intended for ‘Ali to become his successor, and that ‘Ali’s interpretation of 
Shari’ah was sanctioned by God.    
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The latter hadith are only two of hundreds of Shi’ite historical sources that 
examine the relationship between Muhammad and ‘Ali.  Another example is a popular 
hadith that details Muhammad’s escape to Medina from Mecca in the middle of the night 
in 622.179   During the famed escape, ‘Ali is believed to have slept in Muhammad’s bed 
to fool the Prophet’s enemies into thinking that he was still in Mecca.  The hadith 
emphasizes the dramatic bond between ‘Ali and Muhammad.  Many hadith attributed to 
‘Ali and the other companions of Muhammad are a point of focus in Shi’a studies 
emphasizing the family connection.  One hadith in particular states that during 
Muhammad’s first year in Medina (622), he declared that all Muslims should have a 
fellow Islamic “brother.”180  The purpose of this declaration was to create unity in the 
early Islamic community.  According to this hadith, Muhammad chose ‘Ali as his 
brother.  Since Muhammad had no sons, the Shi’a claim that his closest family member 
and the husband of his daughter was his only natural successor.   
 Constructing an accurate account of ‘Ali’s life and his relationship to Muhammad 
is a difficult task.  At first glance, there seems to be an abundance of hadith that could be 
used to piece his life together.  However, most of these hadith are attributed to a later era, 
they are contradictory at times, and they are grouped together with Shi’a mystical 
accounts that are probably additions from a later era.181  For example, the Twelver Shi’ite 
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doctrine of ma’sum, which states that the imams were sinless and infallible guides to 
religious truth, most likely did not come about until the late 9th century.182  Other 
accounts from Shi’a in the ninth century state that ‘Ali, not ‘Uthman, was responsible for 
the collection of the Qur’an, and that ‘Ali was responsible for introducing the 
grammatical sciences, such as lexicography, to the Arabs.183   In addition, many of his 
other hadith are attributed to the Nahj al-Balagha (Peak of Eloquence) a tenth-century 
compilation of his sayings and teachings.  The Najh al-Balagha is the second most 
important Twelver Shi’ite religious book behind the Qur’an, and it is a very popular book 
among Sufi Sunni Muslims.184  However, even though certain hadith are obviously of a 
later era and can be dismissed as forgeries, other hadith cannot be dismissed so easily.  
This is why there have been many contradictory accounts from both Muslim and Western 
sources over specific details. 
The same can be said for constructing an accurate account of the Prophet’s life or 
much of the history of the formative era, for that matter.  It would be unfair to discount 
all hadith since later Muslims made honorable attempts to identify reliable writers and 
translators and to understand the concepts of philology, lexicography, and etymology for 
the purposes of translation.  Moreover, during the late eighth and ninth century, in order 
to verify the historical accuracy of a hadith, ulama constructed isnad, or a “chain of 
transmission,” with a list of narrators dating back to the days of the Prophet.185  Of 
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course, the system had its flaws, and it is difficult for historians to separate the hadith that 
are genuine from the hadith that are forgeries.   
 It is also difficult to accurately construct the life of ‘Ali’s son Hasan, as well as 
his death, and his motivations for ceding the caliphate to Mu’awiyya.  First, establishing 
his date of birth is difficult.  It may have been around 625 C.E but historians differ in 
their dating by several years.  There is also the problem of verifying controversial hadith 
that credit Muhammad as stating the Hasan and Husayn were divinely guided.  There are 
also numerous accounts crediting Hasan and Husayn with miracles alongside accounts of 
their teachings in Medina.  Therefore, verifying what they taught is difficult to determine.  
It is also difficult to determine why Hasan ceded the caliphate to Mu’awiyya.  The 
Princeton scholar Phillip Hitti argues that Hasan did so for money and was saving his 
own life.186  However, from a Shi’a perspective, Hasan was aware of his losing cause and 
was saving the lives of his supporters.187  From the latter perspective, we would ironically 
label Hasan a jama’i-sunni, a term used by Marshall Hodgson to describe Muslims who 
accepted the rule of the Umayyad caliphs for the sake of unity.188   Lastly, it is difficult to 
know when and how he died.  Accounts range from 669 to 680, and Shi’a accounts claim 
that Mu’awiyya had him poisoned because the caliph wanted his son, Yazid, to succeed 
him.189  Even though the Shi’a account of Hasan’s death seems plausible, it is difficult to 
verify due to contradictory sources.  Further, later Shi’ite accounts affirm that all twelve 
imams were martyred, so the Shi’a hadith related to Hasan’s death are questionable. 
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 It should be noted that the Shi’a-Sunni historical debates over ‘Ali and Hasan are 
of a later era and do not reflect the complexity of this early period in Islamic history.  
During the life-times of ‘Ali and Hasan, the concepts of Sunna and Shi’ite had yet to 
emerge.  The complexity of the historical narrative is sharply contrasted with the 
dichotomous debate between later Muslims.  Even though ‘Ali was a more pious Muslim 
than Mu’awiyya it is probable that his supporters did not consider him infallible.  
Moreover, ‘Ali’s supporters consisted of a diversity of people who supported him for 
various reasons.  The archetypes of both ‘Ali and Hasan are different from what the 
historical narrative suggests. 
  
Conclusion 
The seventh century saw the establishment of the foundations for Shi’ite piety.  In 
680, following the martyrdom of Hasan’s brother Husayn at the hands of Mu’awiyya’s 
son Yazid, many of the religious and political reactions of Muslims in Iraq and the Hejaz 
began to reflect Shi’ite piety.  Concepts such as the imamate, occultation, and martyrdom 
became associated with the family of ‘Ali.  It is also possible that religious concepts such 
as chiliastic hope and a priestly hierarchy were a result of sustained contact with 
Christians in Iraq.  
 Those reactions led to the formation of a variety of religious doctrines and 
political sects.  Following nineteen years of political stability under Mu’awiyya, the 
Islamic community would be torn apart by warring factions with different visions for the 
caliphate and Islamic society.  From 684 to 692, no one political sect dominated Islam.  
During this time period, early forms of Shi’ite piety would manifest itself in a variety of 
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doctrines but no clear conception of Shi’ism had yet to exist.  We can label the sects that 
emerge in this period as “proto-Shi’ite” since they had yet to call themselves as such.  
Concepts such as the imamate would only be articulated by Muslim scholars such as Jafar 
al-Sadiq in the middle of the eighth century.  Further, the term Shi’a would not be used to 
describe Alid sympathizers until the late Umayyad and early Abbasid eras.  A closer look 
at the period from 661 to 692 is required to understand the foundations of early Shi’ite 
doctrines. 
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cultural force as the Arabs established garrison towns across the Levant, Mesopotamia, 
and into Egypt.  As long as the Arab-Islamic conquerors allowed existing communities in 
the Middle East to continue their economic and cultural traditions, the conquered peoples 
would not rebel.   However, conquest eventually slowed down by the time of the 
caliphate of ‘Uthman, leading, thereby, to less revenue from booty.191  As the impetus for 
conquest waned, new institutions arose to centralize the new Arab empire.  Arab 
garrisons became fully functioning towns and many Arab soldiers settled down with their 
families.  ‘Uthman became concerned with improving irrigation in Iraq and Syria, and 
under him, new sources of wealth became centralized under the Umayyad family.  The 
Umayyad family and their constituents in Damascus grew wealthy from the increased 
revenues.  Conquest had first brought unity to the various Arab tribes, but the Umayyad 
family’s rise to power caused tribal, regional, and cultural frictions between Syria and 
Iraq, especially in Kufa, where piety-minded Muslims were discontented over the 
perceived political corruption and religious impiety of the Umayyad family.   
‘Ali’s rise to power in 656 reflected the discontent of many of these Muslims in 
Iraq and the Hejaz.  However, his egalitarian taxation policies alienated many of his 
supporters, and moreover, his decision to accept arbitration at Siffin isolated many of his 
religious supporters, costing him his control of the caliphate and his own life in 661.   
Following Mu’awiyya’s victory, the caliphate became based on the political and 
economic legitimacy of the Umayyad family in Damascus.  More specifically, the Sufyan 
branch of the Umayyad family, named after Mu’awiyya’s father Abu Sufyan.192  The 
caliphate became a dynastic position and its legitimacy depended on the caliph’s ability 
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to negotiate peace between the various Arab tribes, consolidate agricultural revenues, and 
maintain control of the military.193  Piety-minded Muslims were willing to accept 
Mu’awiyya’s reign for the sake of peace.  Under his rule, a single tax policy was enacted 
over the whole empire and the army was centrally controlled from Syria.  Mu’awiyya, 
who was an excellent statesman, was able to keep the peace for nineteen years by 
reinventing the nature of the caliphate. 
However, underneath the stability of his rule, many of the same tribal, political, 
ethnic, and religious friction remained.  Mu’awiyya’s successor, his son Yazid, had 
difficulties maintaining the stability that had characterized his father’s reign.  In the 
family of ‘Ali, the failed rebellion of Hasan’s brother Husayn in 680 reflected the 
tensions that still existed between the piety-minded Muslims in Medina and Kufa and the 
Umayyad caliphate.  Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala served only to ignite political and 
religious tensions between the community in Iraq and that in Syria.194  The failed 
Tawwabun rebellion by Husayn’s Kufa supporters in 684 further intensified the divide 
between Iraq and Syria, and Mu’awiyya’s conception of the caliphate was put into 
question.195   
Following Yazid’s death in 683, his son, Mu’awiyya II, briefly came to power 
before dying in 684.196  Without a legitimate successor to the caliphate, the entire Islamic 
world decentralized into warring factions.  In Mecca and Medina, ‘Abd-Allah ibn al-
Zubayr, a Hashemite and the son of one of Muhammad’s companions, came to power.  
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He sought to rule on the principles of the Rashidun caliphs who came before him.197  In 
Kufa in 685, the Persian Muslim, Mukhtar ibn Abu Ubayd, led a revolt to establish a 
caliphate based on the values of Shari’ah egalitarianism.  During Mu’awiyya’s reign, 
Persian Muslims were taxed more than Arab Muslims, leading to much discontent among 
Mawali (Persian clients of Arab tribes) in southern Iraq; therefore, Mawali in Kufa 
supported Mukhtar’s rebellion. The symbolic spiritual leader of this rebellion was the 
Medinan imam Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, the illegitimate son of ‘Ali and a slave 
woman.  In Syria, factions of Kalbite and Qay descent fought over the succession to the 
caliphate.198  Lastly, various Arab rebellions—later labeled as Kharijite dissent—took 
place in various parts of Arabia, the northern Euphrates valley, and Iran.  From 684 to 
692, the Islamic World was thus torn apart by several warring factions. 
In 685, the Kalbite faction established control in Syria, placing Marwan—an 
Umayyad from a different blood line—in power.  Marwan died shortly afterwards but his 
son, Abd al-Malik, was able to gain control of the military in Syria.  Over the next seven 
years, he was able to reassert Umayyad control over most of the Islamic World by 
force.199  By 692, Mu’awiyya’s ideal caliphate was reestablished but only through an 
even stronger Syrian military presence across the Levant, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the 
Iranian highlands.   
It was during this same time, from 680 to 692, that many beliefs and political 
ideals later associated with Shi’ism were born in Kufa and Medina.  Ideals of martyrdom, 
chiliastic hope, imamism, and occultation developed during this period as responses to 
the political and religious shortcomings of the Umayyad caliphs.  These beliefs were 
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especially popular among Mawali in southern Iraq and Iran, who looked to the Shari’ah 
egalitarian ideal as hope for political change.  The martyred figures of Husayn’s 
rebellion, as well as the Tawwabun and Mawali revolts, were remembered by many pious 
Muslims from the late seventh century and beyond.  Many of the descendants of these 
figures would become highly regarded as the true spiritual leaders of the Muslim 
Community and distinct from the Umayyad political establishment.  A closer analysis of 
the early Umayyad period (661-692) reveals a diversity of proto-Shi’ite ideas and 
movements that arose out of this period of early Islamic political instability. 
 
The Reign of Mu’awiyya 
Following Mu’awiyya’s victory over ‘Ali’s supporters in 661, a complex political 
divide developed between believers in Syria and Iraq.  Many pious Muslims in Kufa, 
Medina, and Mecca begrudgingly accepted Mu’awiyya’s caliphate in the hope that he 
would fulfill his promises of placing Hasan in power following his death.  Others, 
especially in Basra and Damascus, accepted Mu’awiyya for the sake of unity, even if they 
did not consider him a rightfully guided ruler.  Hodgson refers to these Muslims as the 
Jama’i-Sunni—not Sunni Muslims.200  Whether they were Hodgson’s Jama’i-Sunni or 
Sunni Muslims in the modern sense, tensioned remained and grew between those of 
Hashemite and Umayyad descent, which were reflected by tribal divisions within 
garrison towns across the Middle East.  Those of Hashemite descent were more prone to 
political proto-Shi’a sympathies, whereas those of southern Yemen and non-Hashemite 
northern tribal descent were less prone to the same political ideals.  Tensions also 
developed between Persian and Arab Muslims, Shari’ah-minded Muslims and half-
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hearted believers, and the various tribal groupings.  Despite these fractures, Mu’awiyya, 
who was an able politician, was able to maintain political stability during his reign. 
 Even though Mu’awiyya continued many of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman’s political and 
economic policies, his power base was in Syria. Therefore, his caliphate was not 
legitimized by a base among the Meccan and Medinan communities.  Mu’awiyya had to 
create a new political basis for the caliphate: 
Upon coming to power, Mu’awiyya (661-680) began a new cycle of efforts to reconstruct 
both the authority and the power of the Caliphate, and to deal with factionalism within 
the ruling elite.  Mu’awiyya began to change a coalition of Arab tribes into a centralized 
monarchy.  He expanded the military and administrative powers of the state, and devised 
new moral and political grounds for loyalty to the Caliphate…Further, he sought to build 
up the revenues from private incomes, from confiscated Byzantine and Sassanian crown 
lands, and from investments in reclamation and irrigation.  He also emphasized the 
patriarchal aspects of the caliphate; his growing police and financial powers were cloaked 
by the traditional Arab virtues of conciliation, consultation, generosity, and respect for 
the forms of tribal tradition.201 
 
Mu’awiyya’s base of power now depended on his ability to command the allegiance of 
the Syrian military and to maximize tax revenues from agricultural lands.  While 
strengthening his own power, he had to create an image of himself as a tribal patriarch as 
opposed to an absolute ruler.   His role thus became that of an arbitrator between the Arab 
tribes.   
The court culture during Mu’awiyya’s reign reflected a mix of Byzantine and pre-
Islamic Arabian values. Although Islam was already becoming a powerful cultural force 
in the Middle East, the Arabs in the garrison towns at this time still identified themselves 
with a tribe.  Even new Islamic converts of non-Arabian descent had to affiliate 
themselves with a tribe as mawali.  Shi’r, or “poetry” continued to be used by Arabs in 
these cities as a way to propagate their family’s history.  Mu’awiyya became a patron of 
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Arabian poets.202  The quality of a poet depended on his ability to manipulate the Arabic 
language and his ability to entertain his audience.  The Arab poets in Mu’awiyya’s court 
would praise his attributes, comparing him to great Bedouin heroes of Arabic lore.  
Poetry, however, was not the only aspect of pre-Islamic Bedouin culture which survived 
in the court culture of the Umayyads.  Mu’awiyya frequently visited the Bedouin and 
merchant oasis of Palmyra where his family would spend time with Bedouin tribes in the 
desert.  The caliph made sure the younger males in the family understood Bedouin 
traditions and took part in them.  Pre-Islamic Arabian values played an important role in 
shaping the court culture of the Umayyad caliphate.  
It was important for Mu’awiyya to emphasize his family’s Bedouin roots.  
Mu’awiyya’s ability to make himself appear as an arbitrator between tribes and keep 
peace within the Empire was arguably his greatest strength as a ruler.203  Although 
Mu’awiyya appointed governors from his family to collect taxes and keep order in each 
province, he still depended on the cooperation of the Ashraf (tribal leaders) to keep 
security.204  He used force only against those who openly denounced his rule and did not 
act harshly to most criticism.  Although later Shi’a sources have cited Mu’awiyya’s use 
of force in suppressing Alid sympathizers as proof of his brutality, his execution of Hujr 
ibn ‘Adi, an imam in Kufa who was a partisan of ‘Ali, was not a common event.205  
Mu’awiyya emphasized the concept of Jama’ah, or unity of the Community, and 
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appeared in the community as a first among equals.  This involved taking criticism from 
tribal leaders and taking part in older Bedouin traditions to appease his supporters. 
Byzantine and Sassanian notions of empire continued to have a great influence on 
the caliph’s court, bureaucracy, and military.  Under Mu’awiyya, the conquest of non-
Muslim lands continued, but during his reign, military campaigns were more centrally 
organized.206  Soldiers were paid a monthly salary through tax revenue, not through 
profits from conquest.  Military campaigns were centrally controlled through Damascus, 
not by multiple tribal leaders.  As a result of Umayyad military activity, Khurasan (East 
Persia) was conquered again and garrisons at Merv and Bukhara were strengthened with 
more troops.   The Armenian highlands were also subdued.  In North Africa, the 
Umayyad armies were able to establish the garrison town of Qayrawan in Tunisia after a 
twenty-year battle with the Byzantines.  Lastly, the Muslims attempted another siege of 
Constantinople.  This siege lasted four years and ended in failure.  Despite the failures of 
the siege, Mu’awiyya was able to create a centrally controlled army from his seat in 
Damascus and secure the borders of the empire.  The relative successes of most of his 
military campaigns temporally quelled much dissidence against Umayyad rule. 
Mu’awiyya’s justification for his usurpation of the caliphate was based on the 
necessity for unity, which was reflected not only in his organization of the military under 
Syrian rule but in his economic policies as well.  Like the Rashidun caliphs, Mu’awiyya 
continued using Byzantine coins as currency and he also invested in irrigation works in 
the Mesopotamian alluvial plain.  The tax revenue from this region continued to be the 
most important source of agricultural revenue in the Empire, and Mu’awiyya relied 
heavily on Christian and Mazdean bureaucrats.  Unlike the Rashidun caliphs, however, 
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Mu’awiyya established a central taxation system throughout the Empire.207  Previous 
treaties made with Sassanian landlords in the Iranian highlands and the Aramaic speaking 
lowlands were readjusted to establish one fiscal policy, which taxed individuals based on 
their earnings from the prior year.  Mu’awiyya based this system on the Byzantine poll 
tax that was used at the time of the Arab conquests in Syria. 
Not all of Mu’awiyya’s policies were conducive toward Muslim unity.  First, non-
Arab Muslims had to pay a higher tax than their Arab-Muslim counterparts.  In southern 
Iraq and Iran, Mawali of Persian dissent grew restless over the uneven taxing policy.  
This economic policy contradicted the egalitarian ideal of the Shari’ah, in which all 
Muslims were treated on an equal basis despite tribe or race.  Mu’awiyya, like ‘Uthman 
before him, did not strictly enforce the Shari’ah-minded ideals put in place by ‘Umar.   
Moreover, he ordered the cursing of ‘Ali’s name from the mosque in Damascus.208  Many 
Shari’ah-minded Muslims resented this symbolic act, and ‘Ali’s name would become 
more synonymous with rebellion and Shari’ah-minded piety.   Lastly, during the final 
years of his reign, he named his son Yazid as his successor.  Even though his choice of 
Yazid satisfied his supporters in Syria, many in Kufa and Medina resented the choice of 
his son as the next caliph.209  Many felt that Mu’awiyya was obligated to choose a 
Hashemite as his successor.  Behind the politically stability of Mu’awiyya’s reign, much 
tension remained among factions in the new realm of Islam. 
 Despite the underlining potential for rebellion, political stability and economic 
prosperity characterized Mu’awiyya’s caliphate. As long as the caliph was able to quell 
tribal feuds among Arabs within the garrison towns and secure the borders of the Empire, 
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most of the Community was willing to tolerate a caliph who was not sanctioned by the 
Medinan and Meccan communities.  However, with his death in 680 and the rise of his 
impious son Yazid to power, many of the same divisive forces that had driven the Islamic 
world to its first fitnah (civil war) at Siffin would rise to the surface again, forcing Yazid 
to put down several rebellions across the Middle East. 
 
Husayn’s martyrdom vs. Zayn al-Abidin’s imamate 
 When Yazid came to power in 680, Hasan’s brother Husayn—the third imam in 
Twelver Shi’ism—immediately denounced the decision.  To this Medinan-born grandson 
of the Prophet, Yazid’s reign symbolized the beginnings of a caliphate based on dynastic 
succession, and many pious Muslims felt Yazid was a half hearted Muslim as evidenced 
by his callousness towards Shari’ah-minded ethics.210  Lastly, Mu’awiyya’s failed 
promise to declare a Hashemite of Alid descent to power upset many in Iraq and the 
Hejaz, and so, following Yazid’s accession to the throne, Husayn engaged in 
correspondence with his supporters in Kufa, whom he agreed to join in rebellion against 
the new caliph.  Husayn then marched with a small group of family members and 
political supporters towards Kufa.211  Like ‘Umar, Husayn’s supporters referred to him as 
the Amir al-Mu’minin.212  Husayn hoped to capitalize on the strong feelings in Kufa 
against the Umayyad family. 
However, Yazid somehow got wind of Husayn’s plans and sent one of his 
generals, ‘Ubayd-Allah, to put down the emerging rebellion.213  Husayn’s Kufan 
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supporters, aware that ‘Ali’s forces were in danger, did not come to reinforce Husayn’s 
party, an event that later Shi’a would refer to as the great betrayal.  The Umayyad forces 
met Husayn’s small advancing party at Karbala on the Euphrates River.  Husayn, who 
was greatly outnumbered, marched into battle against the much larger Umayyad force, 
and most of his party was killed and Husayn lost his own life.  The few that survived 
were some women and children who did not fight directly in the battle but were in 
Husayn’s camp.   
The family members who were spared were marched to Damascus as prisoners; 
Husayn’s head was carried with them.  The prisoners were publicly pardoned and sent 
back to Medina several years later.  Yazid was hoping that by parading his defeated 
family around future rebellions would be discouraged.   Instead, Husayn’s martyrdom 
became an inspiration for future resistance to the Umayyad caliphs, and his shrine in 
Karbala eventually became a place of Shi’ite pilgrimage and mourning.  After his death, 
many members of the House of ‘Ali became associated with protest against the caliphate.  
Even though ‘Ali’s right to the caliphate became the intellectual justification for 
Shi’ite dogma and theology, Husayn’s martyrdom remains the main source of spiritual 
fervor in Shi’a communities today.214  Twelver Shi’a take part in rituals of self 
flagellation during the tenth day, Ashura, of the first Islamic lunar month, Muharram.215  
These rites are known as the Ashura ritual, which later became very popular during the 
Saffavid era in Iran.216 Many Twelver Shi’a since that era have mourned Husayn’s 
martyrdom through self flagellation, pilgrimage to his tomb, and reenactments of the 
fateful day at Karbala.  These rituals, as well as pilgrimages to the tombs of other Shi’ite 
                                                 
214
 Jafri, 222. 
215
 Halm, 78-85.  
216
 Momen, 118-119. 
100 
 
martyrs, have played a crucial role in making Shi’ite piety distinct from the rest of the 
Islamic community.   
The first known manifestation of Shi’ite piety may have been in 680, when a 
group of Husayn’s former supporters in Kufa gathered in Kufa to discuss how they 
should atone for their sins; that is, their failure to support ‘Ali during his rebellion.  They 
eventually became known as the tawwabun, or the penitents.217  The group elected 
Sulayman ibn Surad as their leader, and he later become known as Shaykhu’sh-Shi’a, or 
“leader of the partisans,” since they refused to recognize the legitimacy of the caliph 
Yazid.  Sulayman ibn Surad was a long time supporter of the house of ‘Ali, and fought 
with ‘Ali at the battle of Siffin.  In Kufa, after the death of Husayn, he frequently held 
meetings at his home with fellow supporters.  The group stayed underground for four 
years until 684, when 3,000 of the Tawwabun marched toward Syria against an Umayyad 
force consisting of 30,000 soldiers.  All 3,000 Tawwabun members were martyred. 
Unfortunately, the religious beliefs of this sect are not well known.  It is arguable 
that they martyred themselves in the name of Husayn and should be considered the first 
proto-Shi’a sect, but it is not known whether or not they died for Husayn’s cause—which 
was to overthrow the Umayyad caliphate—or if they martyred themselves out of guilt for 
Husayn’s execution at the hands of Yazid.218  The latter has deeper religious implications 
since it implies that this group may have believed that Husayn and his father ‘Ali were 
divinely guided imams, and by being martyred in their names, they would find salvation 
in the next life.  Either way, we can view the actions of this political sect as laying the 
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foundations for the development of Shi’ite religious piety.  The bayt al-‘Ali (literally 
“house of ‘Ali”) had become a symbol of martyrdom and chiliastic hope. 
In contrast to many other descendants of ‘Ali, Husayn’s eldest son and the fourth 
Twelver Shi’ite imam, ‘Ali ibn Husayn Zaynu al-Abadin, stayed out of politics.219  
Instead, he spent his time in Medina thinking about nothing but God.   His pacifism was 
perhaps rooted in his failure to fight at Karbala with his father and two brothers, where he 
was ill and unable to perform in battle.  ‘Ali ibn Husayn stayed back with the women and 
the children, with whom he was eventually taken prisoner along with the rest of his 
family and force-marched to Damascus.   Eventually, he was sent back to Medina, where 
he spent the rest of his life mourning over the martyrdom of his father and his two 
brothers, and regretting his inability to die by their sides.  ‘Ali’s nickname, Zayn al-
Abadin, means “the ornament of the worshippers,” and his other nickname, al-Sajjad, 
means “one who prostrates himself.”220  Husyan’s eldest son expressed his guilt through 
inflicting physical pain on himself as a reminder of the fateful day at Karbala.  He would 
spend the rest of his life studying the Qur’an, teaching the basic tenets of Islamic law to 
students in Medina, and shunning politics.   
In contrast to Husayn, who was remembered for his martyrdom in battle, ‘Ali ibn 
Husayn was known for his teachings of the revelation and hadith, and he was respected 
by many other Islamic jurists of the time, such al-Zuhri and Sa’id ibn al-Mussayib, for his 
extensive knowledge.221  The first scholar, Al-Zuhri, studied under ‘Ali ibn Husayn and 
narrated the hadith of his son Muhammad al-Baqir.  The famous legalists Malik (716-
795) and Abu Hanifa (700-767) used the hadith that was transmitted by Al-Zuhiri, and to 
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a lesser extent Muhammad al-Baqir, in their formation of more complex schools of law.  
The later scholar, Sa’id ibn al-Mussayib, was a prominent legalist in Medina and was a 
contemporary of Muhammad al-Baqir.  It is worth noting that the four famous Sunni 
legalists, Malik, Abu Hanifa, Ibn-Hanbal, and Shaf’i use some of the hadith that was 
transmitted through ‘Ali ibn Husayn, his students, and his descendants.  From ‘Ali bin 
Husayn’s generation to the fall of the Umayyad caliphate, Medina, Kufa, and Basra 
became centers for legal and theological speculation.  Despite ‘Ali ibn Husayn’s 
association with Twelver Shi’ite dogma, he was a highly regarded legalist by many 
important figures who were later known as Sunni. 
Furthermore, the later tenth-century Twelver Shi’ite claims that the fourth Imam 
was killed in 613 by the Umayyad caliph al-Walid is probably a forgery.  There is no 
plausible reason to explain why the caliph al-Walid secretly killed ‘Ali ibn Husayn since 
he posed no threat to the caliph.   Judging from the hadith associated with this imam, he 
was a pacifist and felt that the unity of the Community was more important than restoring 
the family of ‘Ali to power.  In one hadith, ‘Ali ibn Husayn turned down Mukhtar—the 
leader of the Mawali in Kufa—who was searching for an imam from the bayt al-‘Ali to 
legitimize his revolt against the Umayyad caliph.222  ‘Ali ibn Husayn’s reputation and 
writings are sharply contrasted by the retrospective conception of a divide between the 
followers of the twelve imams and the rest of the Islamic community.  The same can be 
said of ‘Ali ibn Husayn’s son, Muhammad al-Baqir, and his grandson, Jafar al-Sadiq.   
Unfortunately, the exact details of ‘Ali ibn Husayn’s life and death are muddled 
by contradictory hadith.   In his work Early Shi’i Thought, the historian Arzina Lalani 
believes there is enough evidence to state the ‘Ali ibn Husayn was an important early 
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Islamic scholar who helped lay the foundation for Islamic law.  The compilation of hadith 
associated with him, Sahifa al-Sajjadiyya (The Page of the Worshippers,) is considered 
the third holiest book in Twelver Shi’ite Islam.223  However, it is doubtful that ‘Ali ibn 
Husayn had a group of followers who believed he was a divinely guided imam and the 
true successor to the Prophet Muhammad.  Judging from the majority of existing hadith, 
he lived a quiet life of prayer, mourning, charity, hard work, and religious study.  He died 
in 713 in Medina.  His son, Muhammad al-Baqir, and his grandson, Jafar al-Sadiq, would 
play greater roles in the development of schools of fiqh and kalam.   
 
The Second Civil War 
During the 680s, other descendants of ‘Ali would become associated with protest 
movements that destabilized the Middle East until 692.  Caliph Yazid was able to keep 
the umma united—at least temporarily—following Husayn’s rebellion in 680 by focusing 
military attention on Islam’s new border with Byzantium.224  However, signs of internal 
protest were becoming more evident.  In the Maghreb, Yazid’s failure to suppress a 
Berber revolt near Qayrawan in Ifriqiyya (modern Tunisia) led many Muslims to doubt 
his abilities as caliph.  In Mecca, a revolt took place in 683 that was led by ‘Abd-Allah 
ibn al-Zubayr, an important son of one of Muhammad’s companions who sought the 
caliphate.  Yazid was close to crushing the revolt when he suddenly died.  His son and 
successor, Mu’awiyya II, was caliph for only a few months before abdicating the 
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caliphate for controversial reasons and then dying shortly thereafter.225  Following his 
death, the Middle East fragmented into several factions who fought for the caliphate.  
The fragmentation of the Middle East into warring factions was caused both by 
tribal violence in Syria and by the general discontent with the Umayyads among many in 
Mesopotamia, the Levant, Arabia, and Ifriqiyya.  What arose out of this period of 
instability were many religious and political ideals that would later become associated 
with Shi’ism.  The concepts of imamate, ghayba (hiding), and raj’a (return), all 
fundamental aspects of Shi’ite dogma, were incorporated into Islam during this time 
period.  The emergence of these beliefs, underpin within an Islamic framework, a young 
Islamic community trying to define the place of Muhammad’s family and revelations in 
society.  Many felt that only an imam from the bayt al-‘Ali could replicate Muhammad’s 
ideal Medinan community.  Many observers have speculated that these ideas—
specifically, the need for a priestly hierarchy and the belief in the coming of a Mahdi at 
the end of time—were influenced by the Christian and Mazdean beliefs of many of the 
peoples in Mesopotamia and Iran.226   These ideas manifested themselves in a variety of 
ways among supporters of the bayt al-‘Ali during and after the second civil war. 
 In Syria, the Yemeni Kalbite factions, whose roots in Syria date to the Pre-Islamic 
era, and northern Arabian Qay factions, who were recent immigrants accompanying the 
Arab conquests, fought for control of the caliphate following the death of Mu’awiyya 
II.227  The Kalbite faction supported Marwan, who was ‘Uthman’s cousin and governor 
of Medina during his reign.  Before rising to power in Damascus, Marwan had spent 
many years serving the caliphs.  After being removed from office by ‘Ali in 656 after the 
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death of ‘Uthman, Marwan became governor of Medina again under Mu’awiyya.  
However, in 683 during ‘Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr’s revolt in Medina, he was forced to 
leave Medina for Damascus again.   In Damascus in 685, he gained the support of Kalbite 
factions who were able to place him in power.   As a result, the power in the Umayyad 
branch shifted from the Sufyan branch to the Marwanid branch of leadership.  After less 
than a year in power, Marwan died, leaving his son, ‘Abd al-Malik, as his successor. 
The Marwanid caliphate came to power during a time of great political instability.  
In 683, Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr, with the support of the Meccan and Medinan 
communities, declared the caliphate for himself.228   By 684, he established governors in 
the Hejaz, Kufa, and Basra, and even controlled Egypt for a short period of time.   
Meanwhile, in Kufa, a different rebellion broke out in 685 under the leadership of 
Mukhtar ibn Abu ‘Ubayd.229  He claimed to have represented Muhammad ibn al-
Hanafiyya, the illegitimate son of ‘Ali and a slave woman of Hanafi descent.  Mukhtar 
had the support of the Mawali in Kufa, who felt the injustice of unequal taxation, as well 
as other Muslims who felt that the Umayyads had unfairly usurped power.  Unlike the 
Tawwabun rebellion in 684, which was a rebellion of Husayn’s former Arab supporters 
in Kufa, Mukhtar was also able to mobilize the support of Persians.230  The followers of 
the rebellion were called the Kaysaniyya, who were named after Kaysan, the leader of the 
Mawali at the time.  In 685, then, twenty four years after the Rashidun Caliphate, the 
Islamic world was split mainly between three leaders: Abd al-Malik, Mukhtar, and Abd-
Allah ibn al-Zubayr. 
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More trouble was still on the horizon.  Several rebellions broke out in Arabia, 
Iraq, and Iran that are retrospectively known as Kharijite rebellions.  Although it is 
incorrect to group these various movements of the second civil war together under one 
heading, these rebellions have several things common.231  First, they tended to receive 
support from peasants in the towns and villages of the countryside, not from the urban 
populations.  Although several of these sects controlled large expanses of territory, none 
of them took control of a garrison town.  Second, the rebels consisted of Arabs who 
rejected the caliphs’ policies of tolerance toward Dhimmi peoples.  They, the Arabs, 
considered themselves the only true Muslims, and saw the rest of the Islamic community 
as half-hearted worshippers.  They preached egalitarianism in the Islamic community, 
and a strict adherence to Shari’ah law.  Smoking, drinking, and music were strictly 
forbidden.  Lastly, they all used guerilla warfare tactics, fighting their enemies in 
geographically inaccessible regions.  However, many of them differed in their political 
and religious tones; some were willing to use extreme means to obtain their political 
objectives while others were more passive.   
Two of these sects briefly controlled a large expanse of territory.  In the Najd in 
Arabia in 684, a rebellion broke out under the leadership of Najdah ibn ‘Amir.232  From 
687 to 691, Najdah succeeded in controlling most of Arabia with the exception of the 
Hejaz.   A more radical rebellion broke out under the leadership of Nafi ibn al-Azraq in 
Persia, and the movement spread to the Jazirah in Syria.  This group ordered the killing of 
all “half-hearted Muslims,” demanding a puritanical following of Shari’ah law.  Al-
Azraq’s group posed problems for the Umayyads, and they were not defeated by Syrian 
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forces until 699.  Although Kharajite movements had many commonalities, such as their 
demand for the most qualified Muslim to lead the Islamic community, they all differed 
according to their geographical origins, their political methods, and their spiritual 
propaganda. 
Although these various “Kharijite” sects controlled large stretches of territory in 
the lands of Islam, it was the Marwanid ‘Abd al-Malik in Damascus, ‘Abd-Allah ibn al-
Zubayr in Mecca, and Mukhtar in Kufa who controlled the important garrison towns in 
the middle of the 680s.  In 687, ‘Abd-Allah ibn al Zubayr’s brother, the general of Basra, 
Mus’ab ibn al-Zubayr, crushed Mukhtar’s rebellion and established control of Kufa.233  
This event followed five years of fighting between supporters of Abd al-Malik and ‘Abd-
Allah ibn al-Zubayr.  Then, in 691, Mus’ab’s army was defeated by the Syrians and ‘Abd 
al-Malik reestablished control of Mesopotamia.   In 692, the Marwanid general al-Hajjaj 
laid siege to Mecca, eventually defeating ‘Abd-Allah’s forces and taking Mecca by force.  
In the process, ‘Abd-Allah lost his life and the Marwanid family became rulers of the 
Middle East. 
Since the Marwanid family came out victorious in the civil war, many scholars 
have made the mistake of calling ‘Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr a rebel and ‘Abd al-Malik the 
only caliph from 685 to 692: 
Marwan is usually regarded as the legitimate caliph and ibn al-Zubayr as an ‘anti-caliph’ 
because in the end the Marwanids won.  At the time, however, there was no question of 
legitimacy, and ibn al-Zubayr was in fact the nearest to an effective successor to Yazid’s 
power, or at least to his status.  Ignoring this fact has caused some authors to misevaluate 
the meaning of ‘Abd al-Malik’s victory, which can appear merely as suppression of 
rebellion.  The error results from projecting backward, without warrant, an alien notion of 
dynastic legitimacy.234 
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The Marwanids did not come to power because the majority of the Islamic community 
saw them as the only legitimate usurper to the caliphate; they came to power by force.  
Their legitimacy was based on the power of the Syrian military.  Further, piety-minded 
Muslims in Kufa, Basra, and Medina did not view the Umayyad family as the spiritual 
leaders of the community.  After 692, several imams—mostly descendants of ‘Ali—
would claim their right to the imamate.  The most notable movement was that of the 
Kaysaniyya, led by Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, the illegitimate son of ‘Ali. 
  
The Kaysaniyya Movement 
  Although Mukhtar’s rebellion was crushed, the Kaysaniyya movement continued 
as a religious movement, even after Mukhtar’s death in Kufa in 687.  The famous 
Cordovan historian and heresiographer ibn Hazm had difficulties labeling the Kaysaniyya 
movement, and the religious sects that were born out of the rebellion’s failure, as either 
Sunna or Shi’a.235  Mukhtar was the first leader to use the name of a spiritual leader as 
propaganda for support among the Muslim populations in a rebellion.  As the spiritual 
leader of the movement, Muhammad al-Hanafiyya gave religious sanction to the 
Kaysaniyya.  Many of Mukhtar’s followers believed Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya 
was the only true leader of the Islamic community, and that God favored those who 
fought for him in battle.  Further, Mukhtar claimed that his movement was an extension 
of Husayn’s rebellion since Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya was his half brother.  However, 
unlike the Shi’a in the time of ibn Hazm in the tenth century, they did not denounce the 
reigns of Abu-Bakr and ‘Umar.   Further, many supporters of the rebellion were 
motivated by Mukhtar’s egalitarian rhetoric, not by the religious sanctioning of his 
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movement by Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya.  For these reasons, ibn Hazm had difficulties 
labeling the Kaysaniyya movement as a Shi’ite or Sunni Sect.   
As opposed to trying to fit the Kaysaniyya movement into one of two 
retrospective definitions—Shi’ite and Sunni—it would be more prudent to understand the 
nature of this rebellion from the perspective of Muslims in Kufa in 684.  As discussed 
earlier, there were many tribal, religious, political, and ethnic tensions among Arabs in 
Iraq and Syria.  These tensions culminated in the first civil war from 657 to 661.  During 
Mu’awiyya’s reign, Mawali, who formed a substantial portion of Muslims in Kufa, were 
taxed disproportionately from their fellow Arab Muslims.  Power and wealth were 
becoming centralized by the Umayyad family in Syria to the dismay of Arabs and 
Mawali in the Hejaz and Iraq.  The rise of Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca after 
Mu’awiyya’s death reflects the discontent of Muslims in the Hejaz with the Syrian 
caliphate.  Lastly, the Umayyad family was not considered to be the spiritual leaders of 
the Islamic community by most Muslims, and they were looked upon negatively for their 
usurpation of power from the Hashemites.  Husayn’s rebellion in 680 and the Tawwabun 
rebellion in 684 also reflected the political and religious discontent with the Umayyad 
family.  It is under these conditions that the Kaysaniyya movement, led by Mukhtar and 
backed by Mawali and Husayn’s former supporters in Kufa, rose in rebellion against the 
Umayyad caliphate.   
Despite the failure of Mukhtar’s rebellion, the Kaysaniyya movement continued 
after 687, even after Mukhtar’s death that same year.  Initially, Mukhtar claimed that God 
had decreed the inevitable victory of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya and his supporters.  
However, when the rebellion failed, Mukhtar changed his propaganda, claiming that God 
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had changed his mind.  This is why Mukhtar is associated with the doctrine of bada (the 
changeability of God’s will).236  Many early Muslims with Shi’ite sympathies justified 
the existence of an imamate—which is not mentioned in the Qur’an—with this doctrine.   
After Mukhtar’s death, there were many in Mesopotamia and the Hejaz who still 
believed that Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya was the true spiritual leader of the Islamic 
community, even after the imam had made a compromise with the caliph Abd al-Malik to 
refrain from supporting rebellions against the Marwanids.  According to ibn-Hazm, after 
ibn al-Hanafiyya’s death in 700, the Kaysaniyya sect split up into several different 
movements.237   One sect, the Hashimiyya, believed that al-Hanafiyya taught all of his 
knowledge to his son, Abu Hashim, which thereby legitimized him as the succeeding 
imam.  Abu Hashim had followers for seventeen years.  After Abu-Hashim’s death in 
717, a group known as the Mukhtariyya believed he passed the imamate to his brother, 
‘Ali.  Another and more important group, the Abbasiyya, believed that Abu-Hashim had 
passed the imamate to Muhammad ibn ‘Ali, the great grandson of Abbas, who was the 
Prophet’s uncle.238  This movement eventually spread to Khurasan, where it gained a 
large following among Persian Muslims.  From 734 to 746, there were several failed 
rebellions in the region against Umayyad rule.  In 745, Ibrahim, the son of Muhammad 
ibn ‘Ali, sent ‘Abu Muslim to Khurasan to raise a revolt.  By 748, the Abbasiyya or 
Abbasid movement gained wide support in the region, leading to the creation of a large 
Khurasani army under ‘Abu Muslim’s control.  By 750, the Abbasids conquered 
Damascus and deposed the Umayyad caliphate.  Ironically, the family most associated 
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with the development of Sunnism came to power as a proto-Shi’ite rebellion that had its 
roots in the Kaysaniyya movement of the late seventh century.    
These above sects associated with the Kaysaniyya movement from the late 
seventh century to the Abbasid revolution were politically active; therefore, the 
development of the concept of an imamate became associated with religious and political 
protest in the name of a Hashemite against the Umayyad caliphs.  However, there were 
other proto-Shi’ite movements associated with the Kaysaniyya after Muhammad ibn al-
Hanafiyya’s death in 700 that were politically passive.  One sect known as the Bayaniyya 
believed that ‘Ali, Hasan, Husayn, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, and Abu Hashim were 
all incarnations of God.239  The group, led by Bayan ibn Sam’an al-Tamimi in Kufa, 
believed that God had anthropomorphic attributes and was divinely guiding the 
descendants of ‘Ali.   Bayan was put to death by the Marwanid caliph Hisham around 
730 for his ghulat (radical) beliefs.  After 700, another passive movement was led by a 
preacher from Kufa named Abu-Karib al-Darir.240  He believed that ibn al-Hanafiyya did 
not die but was concealed (ghayba) and would return (raj’a) at the end of time as the 
Mahdi.  The followers of this movement were known as the Karibiyya.  Most likely 
influenced by Christian eschatological beliefs, this was the first of many Islamic sects to 
believe in the occultation of an imam.   The beliefs of this sect died out in a few 
generations.   
However, the belief in an imamate, ghayba and raj’a would become associated 
with many different religious movements from the early eighth century and beyond.  The 
Kaysaniyya movement and the various religious beliefs that emanated from it laid the 
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foundation for many of the beliefs that would become associated with Twelver Shi’ism.  
Later generations of Muslims would elaborate on the concept of the imamate and its 
relation to the Qur’an, Muhammad, and other past prophets.   As a result, many different 
theological doctrines and beliefs associated with the concept of the imamate would come 
to fruition in the eighth century; most notably, Muhammad al-Baqir’s doctrine of Nass 
and Jafar al-Sadiq’s doctrine of Taqiyya. 
 
Conclusion  
 In the middle of the seventh century, the Islamic community was initially united 
under the banner of a new faith and the promise of wealth from conquest.  However, once 
an empire was established, several problems caused divisiveness in the Islamic 
community, and these lead to two civil wars.  The problem of succession to the Prophet 
Muhammad caused conflicts among the various Arab tribes; more specifically, between 
the Hashemite and the Umayyad families.  There was also conflict over how the caliph 
should incorporate Byzantine, Sassanian, and pre-Islamic Arabian norms within an 
Islamic milieu.  Many of the pre-Islamic norms contradicted the Shari’ah egalitarian 
ideal.  In particular, the law forcing Mawali to pay higher taxes upset many Persian 
converts in the empire, leading to the Kaysaniyya rebellion in the 680s.  During the early 
formative era, ethnic, tribal, political, geographical, and religious disputes were sources 
of divisiveness. 
Many who were discontented with the Umayyads looked to a descendant of the 
Prophet—usually from the bayt ‘Ali—to protest their hold on the caliphate.  The concept 
of an imam, a spiritual leader who opposed the “half-hearted” Islamic practices of the 
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ruling Umayyad family, became the center of these opposition movements.  An imam 
justified his position as a spiritual leader through his genealogy and his knowledge of the 
Qur’an.  In the eyes of his followers, the imam was the intermediary between God and 
the Islamic community, and the true successor to caliphate.  These movements can be 
defined as kerygmatic, since they sought to recreate Muhammad’s ideal community of 
Medina. 
 We cannot, however, structure this early formative era around a Sunna-Shi’a 
divide.   First, the concept of Sunnism had yet to exist, and Islamic law and theology 
were still in their infancy.  Second, few Muslims recognized the Umayyads as religious 
leaders of the Muslim community.  Lastly, by the early eighth century, many different 
religious ideas and political movements associated with various ‘Alid candidates 
developed that varied drastically.   These movements differed in their political and 
religious tones, contradicting the idea of a Twelver Shi’ite minority fighting against a 
Sunni majority. 
 Following the second civil war, the Marwanid branch was able to bring a period 
of prolonged political stability to the Islamic world, which brought about an era of 
economic prosperity that would last beyond the fall of the Umayyad caliphate to the 
Abbasid revolution in 750.  During this era of economic prosperity, many pious Muslims 
in the urban centers dedicated their lives to Islamic legal and theological speculation.  It 
is during this era that the ideas articulated in the four Sunni schools of law and the Jafari 
School of law began to take shape.  Further, the first Shi’ite theological doctrines would 
be articulated by scholars such as Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq.    These we 
shall explore next. 
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Chapter Six: The Umayyad Caliphate and the Islamic Opposition, 692-750 
 
Introduction 
Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq, recognized as the fifth and sixth imams 
of Shi’a Islam, along with other pious Muslim scholars of their day, spent their entire 
lives applying the Qur’anic message to the lives of their fellow Muslims by studying and 
interpreting hadith.  During the Saffavid era, Iranian mystics, philosophers, and mujtahid 
exaggerated the intellectual achievements of Muhammad al-Baqir and his son Jafar al-
Sadiq.241  On the other hand, Sunni ulama and Western scholars have minimized 
Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq’s contributions to fiqh and kalam.242  In reality, it 
is only appropriate to study their lives within the context of the Marwanid era (692 to 
750), when Shari’ah-minded scholars were laying the foundations for the formation of 
more complex schools of fiqh and kalam.   
Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq’s contributions to Islamic fiqh, such as 
their life’s work collecting and interpreting hadith, are overshadowed by their 
associations with Twelver Shi’ite theology.  Some aspects of their lives, such as their 
disdain of the court culture of the caliphs or their religious doctrines concerning the 
imamate, have become well known, but only within the context of Twelver Shi’ite 
dogma.243  Furthermore, Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq are perceived by both 
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the Sunni and the Shi’a as leaders of a partisan “Shi’ite” community whose doctrines 
developed independently of the “Sunni” community.  It is clear, however, that during the 
Marwanid era, the concepts of Sunnism and Shi’ism were still not yet defined, and 
Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq both learned from and taught Muslims who were 
later labeled as “Sunni” legalists.  More focus should be placed on understanding these 
Shi’a scholars from the context of their times, not on assumptions based on ahistorical 
labels.   
While there is no doubt that both Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq 
disdained the court culture of the Marwanid caliphs, the same can be said for most piety-
minded Muslims who were later associated with the development of Sunni fiqh, such as 
Abu Hanifa, Ibn-Ishaq, and al-Maliki.244  During the Marwanid era, most pious Muslims 
were critical of the Umayyad caliphs.   In the mosque, many ulama, such as Hasan al-
Basri, preached widely and repeatedly on the importance of charity, sobriety, prayer, 
sacrifice, hard work, and faith.245  For these pious Muslims, salvation could not be found 
in material wealth.  The Marwanid caliphs were seen by most ulama as half-hearted 
Muslims, and many of the ulama of the day looked back on Muhammad’s community in 
Medina as an archetype for social change.  The collection and interpretation of 
Muhammad’s hadith led to more complex schools of fiqh that, in turn, were applied ever 
more thoroughly to the lives of Muslims at home and in the market place.  This was still 
an act in process during the lives of Muhammad al Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq.  Both of 
these famous Shi’ite figures studied hadith alongside other ulama who are retrospectively 
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known as Sunni.  The students of both imams did not form a partisan sect separate from 
the rest of the Islamic community; they were instead part of the same piety-minded 
opposition to the court culture of the Marwanid caliphs. 
I do not wish, however, to imply that Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq did 
not play key roles in articulating the concepts of imamate and taqiyya.  To the contrary, 
both scholars began the development of what would become the intellectual basis of the 
Twelver and Ismaili Shi’ite imamate, and many of their hadith would be used by later 
Twelver and Ismaili Shi’a as the intellectual foundation for their respective dogma.  
According to Muhammad al-Baqir’s doctrine of Nass (succession), Muhammad’s ‘ilm, or 
his special knowledge, was passed to his descendants, uncorrupted, from ‘Ali to Hasan to 
Husayn to ‘Ali ibn Husayn and then to himself.246  According to the same doctrine, the 
spiritual leader (imam) of the community was determined by the Muslim who had the 
greatest knowledge of the Qur’an and the Sunna.  Both Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-
Sadiq thus believed that the ‘Alid line of imams were the true spiritual leaders of the 
community, and their hadith represented the greatest authority in the religious sciences of 
fiqh and kalam.   
Many Sunni and Western scholars have interpreted the doctrine of Nass as the 
intellectual basis for the formation of a partisan Shi’ite community. However, neither 
Muhammad al-Baqir nor Jafar al-Sadiq claimed that the divine ‘ilm was exclusive to the 
‘Alid line of imams, nor did they separate themselves from the rest of the Islamic 
community.  Jafar al-Sadiq’s doctrine of taqiyya emphasizes that all Muslims can obtain 
divine ‘ilm through study and prayer, and they in turn can apply the Qur’an and the 
Sunna to their own lives through rational interpretation.  On several occasions, Jafar al-
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Sadiq stated that all ulama were successors to the prophet.  The doctrine of Nass does not 
state that divine ‘ilm was exclusive to the family of ‘Ali, but rather that the knowledge of 
the ‘Alid imams was the least corrupted.   The doctrine of Nass is therefore not a partisan 
Shi’ite doctrine. 
Several Western scholars also have wrongly labeled Jafar al-Sadiq and 
Muhammad al-Baqir as ghulat, or extremist thinkers, since the Shi’ite imams are 
frequently associated with performing miracles.247  However, the miracles associated 
with Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq are likely to have been beliefs that were 
formulated in the tenth century, when Twelver Shi’ite ulama began associating all twelve 
imams with miracles, and with scientific achievements that were from beyond their 
era.248  It is more likely that both Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq rejected ghulat 
or extremist beliefs during their lifetime.249  Although many scholars of the Marwanid era 
disagreed with the doctrines of Nass and taqiyya, including some of Jafar al-Sadiq’s own 
students, neither imam was shunned by the rest of the Islamic community.  To the 
contrary, both Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq were highly respected for their 
knowledge and piety by the entire Islamic community, and many of the ulama who were 
later associated with the development of Sunni fiqh were also students in their schools.  
Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq were part of the same piety-minded community 
that rejected the political ideology of the Marwanid caliphate, and they stayed out of 
politics. 
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However, it is during the late Marwanid era that the term Shi’ism would become 
more associated with rebellions in the name of the bayt al-‘Ali.  Unlike Muhammad al-
Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq, other members of the bayt al-‘Ali were more aggressive in 
asserting their claims to the imamate.  For example, Muhammad al-Baqir’s half brother 
Zayd led a failed rebellion against the Umayyad caliph Hashim in 740.250  Perphaps the 
most successful Shi’ite rebellion was the Abbasid rebellion itself, which succeeded in 
ending the Marwanid caliphate in 750.  From the eighth to the ninth century, many 
different ulama from various branches of ‘Ali’s family declared that they were the true 
imam.  Some of these movements were passive while others were more aggressive in 
asserting their political claims.   Moreover, mystical ideas associated with various ‘Alid 
imams, alive or deceased, began circulating in Muslim circles from Khurasan to the 
Maghreb.  Shi’ism is a term that could be applied to a great diversity of political and 
religious movements during the late Marwanid and early Abbasid era. 
During the Marwanid era, the concepts of Sunnism and Shi’ism as we know them 
today were still in their formative period of development.  Although many of the ideas of 
the various schools of theology of the period would later become the ideological 
foundations for the Sunna and Shi’a schools of fiqh, this conceptual divide had yet to 
exist.  The complexities of the Kaysaniyya movement have already been discussed.  The 
Abbasid religious movement, which developed out of the Kaysaniyya movement, also 
cannot be neatly labeled as a Shi’ite rebellion.  A closer of analysis of the Marwanid era 
will show that there was a great diversity of political, spiritual, and theological 
movements that cannot be grouped under the headings of either Sunna or Shi’a.   
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As the descendants of the Muslim-Arab conquerors started to integrate with the 
Aramaic, Coptic, Greek, and Persian populations, the ulama had to deal with far more 
complex theological questions. They were now confronted by older Christian, Mazdean, 
Manichaean, Jewish, and Pagan traditions.251  As a result, ulama developed complex 
answers to questions concerning the nature of God and His relationship to Muslim and 
non-Muslim populations.  These ulama struggled to define what requirements made a 
human being a true Muslim, and what actions constituted a sin.  These questions had 
deep political and theological implications, especially concerning Muslim attitudes 
toward the Marwanid caliphs.  Many ulama looked back on the Prophet’s life to find 
answers to these questions, and as a result, many early schools of fiqh and kalam 
developed and competed with each other in each garrison town during the Marwanid era, 
usually along neo-tribal lines.252   The result was a vast variety of religious movements 
that we cannot group into two vague definitions, Sunna and Shi’a.   
 
The Height of the Umayyad Caliphate 
 In 692, ‘Abd al-Malik (ruled 692-705) came to power as the head of the Umayyad 
caliphate through the use of uncompromising force.  Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, his general of 
the eastern half of the empire, pacified Mesopotamia by suppressing opposition in Kufa.   
After crushing a Kufan rebellion led by ibn al-Ash’ath of the Kinda faction (another tribe 
of Yemen descent) in 701, al-Hajjaj settled Syrian Arabs in the Iraqi town of Wasit, 
                                                 
251
 Bertold Spuler, “Iran: the Persistent Heritage,” Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, Gustave E. 
Von Grunebaum Ed. (Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University Press, 1976): 167-82, and Hodgson, Volume I, 
235. 
252
 Momen, 256-67. 
120 
 
located west of the Tigris and between Basra and Kufa.253  Wasit replaced Kufa as the 
administrative and economic capital of Mesopotamia.  Moreover, Kharajite rebellions 
were crushed in Syria and Iran, and the Umayyads regained control of the Oxus River 
basin and North Africa through military force.   For the next fifty years, from 692 to 744, 
the Middle East was firmly controlled by the Marwanid branch of the Umayyad family. 
 The stability created by the Marwanid family had several positive consequences.  
In the early eighth century, trade from the Nile River to the Oxus River Basin increased 
substantially.  At the same time, the wealth and security of this trade was also aided by 
the centralization of power in China under the Tang dynasty.254 The relative political 
stability in the lands of Islam and East Asia also allowed trade to flourish in the Indian 
Ocean and overland along the Khurasan spice route.  With the increased tax revenues the 
Marwanid family was able to invest in irrigation projects in Mesopotamia.  Al-Hajjaj 
invested his resources to increase agricultural production in the region.255  Although 
Mesopotamia was stripped of its political power during the Marwanid era, the region 
surpassed Syria as the most important economic center of the empire.  During the first 
half of the eighth century, the Marwanids were able to invest heavily in the military, 
building projects, and irrigation works.  Increased Mesopotamian revenues allowed the 
Marwanids to establish an autocratic regime independent of the legitimacy accorded by 
the Muslim communities and dependent on their control of the military from their base in 
Syria.   
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With the empire secure, the Marwanids began a second wave of Islamic 
expansion.  Although the Marwanids took little interest in religious studies, they 
considered themselves the protectors of the Islamic community, and they used 
considerable resources to expand the domains of Islam.256  Yearly raids were made into 
Byzantine territory, culminating in Caliph Sulayman’s (ruled 715-717) failed attempt to 
conquer Constantinople in 716-717.  In the Maghreb, the Muslims were finally able to 
destroy the remaining Byzantine strongholds in the late seventh and early eighth century, 
including Carthage in 698 and Ceuta, the last, in 710.  By the end of al-Walid’s reign 
(705-715), the Muslims had conquered all of the Maghreb, and with the help of converted 
Berber tribes, they had conquered most of Visigothic Spain.257  The military conquests in 
Europe continued until 732, when the Muslims were stopped near Tours in west-central 
France by the leader of the Franks, Charles Martel.  In the East, the caliph al-Walid 
conquered the regions of Sind (southern Pakistan) and Transoxania (the Oxus river 
basin).  From 692 to 717, the Marwanid caliphs Abd al-Malik, Al-Walid, and Sulayman 
substantially expanded the domains of Islam into the Maghreb, Spain, Central Asia, and 
North West India. 
Abd al-Malik also made several military, bureaucratic and economic reforms 
during his thirteen-year reign.  The languages used by the bureaucracy, Greek and 
Pahlavi, were replaced by Arabic.258  The Byzantine coins, known as denarius or denar, 
were replaced by coins with Arabic script and no images of a ruler.259  Symbolic images 
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such as crowns were used to display power since the use of human images was 
considered sacrilegious.  Although the Arabic language played a greater role in ‘Abd al-
Malik’s court and bureaucracy, Byzantine and Sassanid court culture continued to shape 
Umayyad military and bureaucratic organization.  The same was true of Umayyad 
architecture, which frequently used Greek and Persian motifs.260  In the caliph’s court, 
tribal leaders no longer gave daily council to the caliph.261  The members of the caliph’s 
court and bureaucracy now consisted of professional bureaucrats who placed the 
Marwanid state above tribal politics.  ‘Abd al-Malik and his sons dealt harshly with 
internal protest and they refused to give equal political or economic status to non-Arab 
Muslims.  Power in the Marwanid family did not depend on the legitimacy of the 
Medinan and Meccan communities.  Instead, their power emanated from their control of 
the Syrian military, which was garrisoned in all corners of the empire.   From Abd al-
Malik through the reigns of his sons al-Walid and Sulayman, the position of the caliph 
became increasingly autocratic.   
During the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik, the Umayyad family flaunted their wealth and 
military power, creating an image of an absolute monarchy.  The wealth and prestige of 
the caliph’s court culture was contrasted sharply with the life style of the ulama in the 
urban centers.  The Marwanid caliphs justified their luxurious lifestyle by claiming that 
the unity of the Islamic community could only be maintained by a strong caliphate.262  
The caliph could prevent rebellion only by creating an appropriate image of an absolute 
ruler.  Although most ulama did not buy into this propaganda, some of the ulama in 
                                                 
260
 Richard Ettinghausen, “Interaction and Integration in Islamic Art,” Unity and Variety in Muslim 
Civilization, Gustave E. Von Grunebaum Ed. (Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University Press, 1976): 107-125. 
261
 Lapidus, 50. 
262
 Hawting, 61-66. 
123 
 
Damascus, most notably al-Awza’i (died 774), claimed that the Marwanid caliphate was 
necessary to ensure the unity of the Islamic community.263  Al-Awza’i claimed that 
Muslims could not be judged by their actions, but by faith alone.  Therefore, the 
Umayyad caliphs could not be judged as good or bad Muslims based on their political or 
economic policies, they had to be judged on their religious quality.  In Damascus, al-
Awza’i was associated with the Jama’i movement, which emphasized the unity of the 
Islamic community by accepting the Marwanids uncritically.  Today, many Western 
historians and professors of religion, such as John Esposito, have labeled the Jama’i 
movement in Damascus and Khurasan, along with the Qadariyya movement in Damascus 
and the Murji’ah movement in Kufa as proto-Sunni sects.264  However, these movements 
differed in their political and religious tones, and only the Jama’i accepted the Marwanids 
uncritically.  Further, most Sunna and all Shi’a Muslim historians today are highly 
critical of the Umayyad caliphs. 
It is difficult for a pious Muslim to argue that the Marwanid caliphs were 
Shari’ah-minded Muslims based on their actions since most of them took little interest in 
becoming patrons of science or religious studies.265  Religious inquiry was left to the 
qadis or judges in urban centers who ensured the enforcement of Shari’ah law, and 
private experts in cities such as Damascus, Basra, Kufa, and Medina.  Although the 
Marwanids funded building projects such as Abd al-Malik’s construction of the Dome of 
the Rock in Jerusalem or the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, the Marwanid caliphs, with 
the exception of ‘Umar II (ruled 717-720), were usually indifferent toward legal and 
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theological developments from among the ulama.266  In one episode, the Marwanid caliph 
al-Walid funded the building of irrigation canals in Mecca to replace the spring of Zam-
Zam as the main source of water.267   Al-Walid was than excoriated by the ulama of 
Mecca for degrading one of Islam’s holiest landmarks.  Although the Marwanid caliphs 
made many attempts to appease the ulama by expanding the domains of Islam and 
funding the building of mosques, they were not regarded as the spiritual leaders of Islam 
by most of the community.  The early Marwanid caliphs continued the cursing of ‘Ali’s 
name during the Khutbah, to the dismay of many pious Muslims.  Moreover, the Persian 
Muslim population, which grew substantially during the Marwanid era, was disgruntled 
with Marwanid taxation policies.   
Marwanid political policies also led to feuds among the tribal leaders (ashraf) in 
the urban centers.  ‘Abd al-Malik and his sons Al-Walid and Sulayman, like Marwan, 
were supported by the Kalbite tribes in Syria.268  Many Arabs of Kalbite descent 
benefited immensely from the rise of the Marwanid family to power.  To the dismay of 
Muslims of Hashemite and Qay descent, Kalbite tribal leaders were rewarded with 
ownership of valuable land in Syria and Iraq.  Throughout the Marwanid era, tensions 
would grow among tribes in the urban centers across the Middle East that were reflected 
in theological and political disputes. 
Reforms, however, were made between 717 and 720 with the ascent of a 
successor to Sulayman.   In 717, on his death bed, Sulayman was convinced by some of 
the ulama of Damascus to place his cousin, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Aziz or ‘Umar II (ruled 717-
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720) in power.269  ‘Umar II had studied under the ulama in Medina and was considered a 
pious Muslim by many ulama in Medina, Fustat, Kufa, and Damascus; his reign 
represented a drastic break from other Marwanid rulers.  Unlike ‘Abd al-Malik, Umar II 
implemented economic and political policies that emphasized Muslim—not Arab—unity.  
During his reign, Persian Muslims paid the same taxes as Arab Muslims, and some were 
given better positions in the Caliph’s bureaucracy.  To appease piety-minded Muslims, 
‘Umar II stopped the cursing of ‘Ali’s name in the khutbah and the Hashemite family was 
returned some of their lands in the Hejaz that had been confiscated by the Marwanids in 
the second civil war.   Further, along with the poll tax, wealthy land owning Muslims 
were now required to pay a larger land tax.  ‘Umar sought to reverse the process of land 
consolidation by the Umayyad family and their constituents.   Moreover, he passed laws 
that were discriminatory against Dhimmi peoples.  Christians and Jews were forced to 
pay even higher taxes, and they had to wear clothing that distinguished themselves from 
the rest of the Muslim population.  It is arguable that these harsh policies were meant to 
encourage conversion to Islam.270  ‘Umar II also stopped the expansionist policies of the 
prior caliphs, and instead, focused on consolidating the power of the caliphate in the 
lands from the Nile to the Oxus River Basin.  Lastly, he was the only Marwanid caliph to 
patronize scholars for translating Greek, Syriac, and Pahlavi scientific, philosophical, and 
religious text into Arabic.  Like a forerunner to the policies of the Abbasid caliphs, ‘Umar 
II took great interest in the development of Islamic law.  For a brief period, tribal feuds 
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were quelled; most pious Muslims were satisfied with the policies of ‘Umar II.  Today, 
both Shi’a and Sunni Muslims have a high regard for ‘Umar II.271 
His reign, however, did not last long.  He died in 720 at the age of thirty nine, and 
was succeeded by his brother Yazid II (ruled 720-724), who was supported by the Qay 
tribal factions, to the dismay of Yemeni and Hashemite tribal factions in Basra, 
Damascus, Kufa, and Medina.272  Although many of ‘Umar II’s reforms were carried on 
during Yazid II’s reign, this caliph was known for his callousness toward Shari’ah law 
and his favoritism toward the Qay factions.    In coming to power, Yazid II crushed a 
Kalbite rebellion in Basra, whose leaders preached the egalitarian principles of Shar’iah.  
Under his rule and the rule of his brother Hisham (ruled 724-743), Qay factions were 
favored in political disputes.  Even though ‘Umar II’s fiscal policies continued under 
Caliph Hisham, Hisham’s bureaucracy quickly became associated with corruption.273  
Hisham’s governors frequently abused their power, using the revenues from taxes for 
their own personnel use.  From 724 to 743, opposition to Umayyad power became 
widespread in the lands of Islam, culminating in the third civil war, from 744 to 750.   
 
The Third Civil War 
By the end of Hashim’s reign, several rebellions, many of which are known 
retrospectively as Shi’ite and Kharajite rebellions, led to the decentralization of power in 
the Middle East.  One of the most important rebellions was led by Zayd, who was 
Muhammad al-Baqir’s half brother.  Zayd claimed that any qualified Hashemite, not just 
the most qualified, could claim their right to the imamate with the sword if other imams 
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remain passive.   This doctrine is known as the “Imamate al-Mafdul.”274  Many historians 
believe Zayd to have been one of the first of the Mutazalite theorists.  This school of 
kalam is often credited to Wasil ibn ‘Ata of Basra, a student of Hasan al-Basri.   
Mutazalite theorists were rationalists; they believed human beings had free will and were 
given the choice, by God, to make rational interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunna.  
Many Mutazalite theorists also believed that it was the responsibility of pious Muslims to 
ensure strict adherence to Shari’ah law in their community.275  Any Muslim who was a 
sinner was to be treated harshly, and Muslims who were sinners were not guaranteed 
salvation.  Mutazalite theorists tended to be political activists, and they were frequently 
associated with Shi’ite sympathizers.  In 740, Zayd raised a revolt in Kufa against the 
Hisham caliphate on the charge that the caliph was a corrupt and half-hearted Muslim.  
The rebellion failed and Zayd was killed.276  His son, Yahya, escaped to Khurasan where 
he led another failed rebellion in 743.  He was also martyred. 
Zayd’s Mutazalite leanings and his political doctrine, the Imamate al-Mafdul, 
became associated with various rebellions in the lands of Islam during the late eighth and 
ninth centuries.277  Imams descended from the line of Hasan and Husayn would use this 
new doctrine as justification to rise in revolt against the caliphs.  Most of these rebellions 
failed.  However, in regions that are not as geographically accessible, such as Tabaristan 
on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, the Asir mountains of Yemen, and the Atlas 
mountains of modern day Morocco, several “Zaydi” rebellions succeeded in gaining 
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independence from the caliphs.278  These Zaydi states, however, were usually nothing 
more than revolts among tribal confederations led by an imam of Hasanid or Husaynid 
descent.   The numerous Zaydi rebellions also differed in their religious and political 
rhetoric.  For example, some Zaydi imams denounced the caliphates of Abu Bakr and 
‘Umar while others did not.279  Either way, Zayd—half brother of the man later 
recognized as the fifth imam—and his martyrdom were the ideological justification for 
further Hasanid and Husaynid rebellions in the eighth century. 
From 736 to 743, Caliph Hashim was faced with anti-Syrian rebellions from 
Shi’ite and Kharajite sympathizers.  Although he was able to quell the rebellions, his 
successor and nephew, al-Walid II (ruled 743-744), was an incompetent ruler who, like 
his father Yazid II, was biased toward the Qay factions.  In 744, a Kalbite rebellion broke 
out in Syria that led to al-Walid II’s death.  The Kalbite factions took power and made 
Yazid III, the son of al-Walid, caliph.  He was supported by both the Kalbite factions and 
by many piety-minded Muslims in Syria.  However, his promising rule as caliph was 
never realized.   He died unexpectedly in 644.  His brother Ibrahim replaced him briefly 
but was ousted by the Marwanid general, Marwan II, who was the leader of the Northern 
Syrian Army along the borders of Byzantium.  The Umayyad political system had 
collapsed, and from 744 to 750, the Islamic community broke out into a third civil war. 
From 744 to 750, numerous Kharajite and Shi’ite rebellions took place in the 
Maghreb, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Iran.280   In 744, a proto-Shi’ite revolt broke out in 
Kufa under the leadership of ‘Abd-Allah ibn Mu’awiyya, a descendant of ‘Ali’s brother 
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Ja’far ibn Abu Talib.281  He denounced the reigns of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman, and 
claimed that the imams from ‘Ali to Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya to Abu Hisham to 
himself were incarnations of God.  The rebellion was defeated by Marwan II, but ‘Abd-
Allah Mu’awiyya and many of his supports escaped to Fars, where he ruled the province 
until 750, when he was defeated by the Abbasids.   
By 745, Marwan II’s army was only one of many factions vying for the caliphate 
as the Middle East became fragmented.  In Oman, a moderate Kharajite sect known as 
the Ibadis broke out in rebellion and eventually controlled south-east Arabia.282   This 
sect was previously a quiescent and moderate Kharajite school that had been founded by 
Ibn Ibad in the late seventh century.  Their political expansion was stopped at Medina by 
Marwan II in 748.  A more radical Kharajite rebellion took place in Kufa in 745 under the 
leadership of Dahhaq ibn Qays.283  They were known as the Shaybanis, and they 
controlled much of Mesopotamia from 745 to 747.  Although Marwan II was able to 
crush both Kharajite rebellions, he was not able to pacify the Iranian highlands, nor was 
he able to control all of Iraq and Syria. 
The political void was filled when the leader of a relatively small, peasant-based 
Khurasani army, Abu Muslim, conquered the Middle East in the name of the Abbasid 
descendant, Abu al-Abbas al-Saffah.284  Abu Muslim hunted down and killed all most 
every prominent member of the Umayyad family, and placed al-Saffah in power in 750.  
After coming to power, the Abbasids purged any Abbasid supporters who preached 
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proto-Shi’ite views, and they executed any Muslim who publicly denounced their 
authority. 
Many of the rebellions from 744 to 750, including the rebellion that brought the 
Abbasids to power, were supported by the piety-minded opposition in urban centers 
across the Middle East.   In their long tenure, from 692 to 750, the Marwanid caliphs had 
failed to convince most piety-minded Muslims that they were the true leaders of the 
Islamic community.  Moreover, the Marwanids had made the mistake of taking little 
interest in the scholarly debates among Shari’ah-minded Muslims in the urban centers. 
 
The Piety-Minded Opposition 
The wealth and prestige of the Marwanid court culture contrasted with the 
ordinary lives of the ulama in cities such as Medina, Kufa, and Basra.  Many pious ulama 
began preaching the importance of living an ascetic lifestyle, and they rejected the 
materialism of Umayyad court culture.  During this era, many ulama emphasized the 
importance of charity, honesty, and hard work.  These pious Muslims saw Islam as a 
lifestyle that embodied every aspect of life.  One of the most important ulama of the 
period was Hasan al-Basri (d. 728), who was raised in Medina and lived in Basra 
throughout his adult years.285  Sufi Muslims of a later era commonly referred to Hasan al-
Basri as one of the first Sufi Muslims since he shunned politics and lived an ascetic 
lifestyle.  He was not, however, the equivalent of Buddhist or Christian Monks living in 
isolation.  He never spent time in isolation and he preached to large crowds in the cities.  
Like a monk, though, he led a highly disciplined lifestyle that involved intense prayer and 
meditation on a daily basis.  He became celebrated among the people in Basra for his 
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charity and his weekly sermons.  Although Hasan al-Basri never preached against the 
Marwanid caliphate, he led a lifestyle that was in sharp contrast to that of the Marwanid 
caliphs.  He became associated with the Qadariyya movement, which emphasized that 
humans had free will and it was their responsibility to do good works.286  Even though he 
refrained from politics, many of al-Basri’s followers, some of whom were from the 
Kalbite tribal faction, would rise in protest against the later Marwanid caliphs.  For most 
pious Muslims, the Marwanid caliphs were not considered spiritual leaders of their 
communities.  Those seeking for social change would look back in history to 
Muhammad’s community as a source for social change.  Others would look to a 
descendant of ‘Ali for spiritual guidance. 
Prior to the Marwanid era, pious Muslims focused on reciting the Qur’an and 
teaching students the basic principles of the Islamic faith that were established during the 
reign of ‘Umar.  Initially, these ulama focused on codifying Arabic grammar to ensure 
the correct recitation of the Qur’an.287  However, by the Marwanid era, ulama in the 
garrison towns began confronting greater legal and theological challenges as the Arab 
populations began integrating with the rest of the people in the lands from the Maghreb to 
the Oxus River Basin.   
 For this reason, many among the ulama during the Marwanid era became 
increasingly interested in history; more specifically, the history of the Prophet and the 
early Islamic community.288   Muslims looked back on Muhammad’s community in 
Medina with longing and nostalgia, and they sought to develop a system of fiqh based on 
Muhammad’s original community. The compilation of the writings on the life and career 
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of the Prophet are known as the Sira, and the writings pertaining to Muhammad’s 
conflicts in Arabia are known as the Maghazi.289 Together, both compilations form the 
Sunna, which is the collection of writings and sayings of the Prophet.  The most notable 
historians of the late seventh and early eighth centuries of Sira and Maghazi were Sa’id 
ibn al-Musayyib (d. 712), ‘Ali ibn Husayn (d. 713) Hasan al-Basri (d. 724), Muhammad 
al-Baqir (d. 737) Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (671-742), ‘Abd-Allah ibn Abu Bakr (679-747), 
Jafar al-Sadiq (d. 765), Abu Hanifa (d. 765), and Malik ibn Annas (715-796), all of 
whom lived in Medina at one point in their lives.290   
These historians, over several generations, collected and authenticated the 
writings on the Prophet and the first Islamic community.  One of the most notable 
historians of this era was Muhammad Ibn Ishaq (704-768), who wrote the earliest 
surviving biography of the Prophet.291  Ibn Ishaq’s work is derived from his knowledge 
of the earliest Medinan Islamic scholars, as evidenced by the fact that he cites them 
frequently.  During the Marwanid era, several generations of ulama, including ‘Ali ibn 
Husayn, Muhammad al-Baqir, and Jafar al-Sadiq, spent much of their time collecting, 
transmitting, and interpreting the Prophet’s writings.   
 Piety-minded Muslims, however, were not united in their interpretation of the 
Qur’an and the Sunna.  Different and new theological factions emerged in the early 
eighth-century political environment along neo-tribal factions in garrison towns from 
Egypt to Khurasan.   Moreover, debates over the nature of God, the Qur’an, faith, and sin 
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had important political implications for the Marwanid caliphs who made the mistake of 
not taking interest in these debates. 
In a general sense, historians have noted that each garrison town was divided 
between traditionalist Muslims who believed that human acts were determined mainly by 
God and that a Muslim could not be judged by his acts but by his faith alone, and 
rationalist Muslims who believed that human beings were given free will by God and so a 
Muslim was judged not only by his faith but by his acts.292   Many traditionalists accepted 
the Marwanids for the sake of unity, even if they were critical of the caliphs, and 
traditionalists also leaned toward literal interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna, and they 
usually refrained from using analogy and interpretation.  Those who leaned towards 
rationalism were usually more critical of the Marwanid caliphs, which is why many 
rationalist Muslims, especially in Kufa and Qom, looked to a descendant of ‘Ali for 
spiritual guidance.  Rationalist Muslims were also more inclined to use analogy and 
esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
In Mecca and Medina, ulama from the school of Ibn Abbas concentrated on 
collecting hadith on the Prophet Muhammad.293  These ulama traced their hadith to the 
Prophet’s cousin ‘Abd-Allah Ibn-‘Abbas and their work culminated with Ibn Ishaq’s 
biography of the Prophet and his history of monotheism.  Muslims of this school were 
critical of the Marwanid caliphs, and they focused their efforts on creating a history that 
honored the Ansar, Muhammad’s associates in Medina, and criticized the Umayyad 
family, who converted to Islam in a later period.  Muslims from this school of thought 
were also sympathetic to the bayt al-‘Ali.  They were mainly of Hashemite or Persian 
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descent.  Zayn al-Abidin, Muhammad al-Baqir, and Jafar al-Sadiq were frequently 
associated with scholars of this school.  The opposition group in Medina was the school 
of Ibn ‘Umar, who accepted the Marwanids for the sake of unity, but they were still 
critical of their policies.  Like the school of Ibn ‘Abbas, Muslims of this school spent 
much time collecting hadith reports, but they believed that human acts were determined 
by God. 
Similar divisions between rationalist and traditionalist schools were found in other 
cities during the Marwanid era.  In Syria, the Qadariyyah ulama emphasized human free 
will and were critical of the very Umayyad caliphs in their midst.294  The Qadariyya were 
represented by ulama of Kalbite descent following the reign of Umar II.   They were 
called the Qadariyya because they debated the concept of predestination, or qadar in 
Arabic.  The same school was represented in Basra, but there it was not as politically 
active as the Syrian group.  In Syria, the Qadariyya were rivaled by Jama’is, or those for 
unity, whose ulama, such as al-Awza’i, accepted the Umayyad caliphs uncritically.295  
They were represented by Muslims of Qay and Umayyad descent.  In Khurasan, the two 
schools were the Jama’i, which was similar to the school of the same name in Syria, and 
the Jahmiyyah, a school that was highly critical of the Marwanids.   In Kufa, there was a 
similar division between rationalist and traditionalist schools.  In Kufa, the traditionalists 
were known as the Muri’jiyya and the rationalists were associated with several different 
proto-Shi’ite and proto-Kharajite sects.296 
Western scholars such as John Esposito and Malise Ruthven have overtly 
structured theological debates between rationalists and traditionalists around a Sunna-
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Shi’a divide.297  Although it is true that rationalists were more prone to Shi’ite 
sympathies, there were many rationalists who did not follow a descendant of ‘Ali.  For 
example, Hasan al-Basri, who is associated with the rationalist Qadariyya movement in 
Basra, was not an ‘Alid sympathizer.  On the other hand, the famous “Sunni” legalist Abu 
Hanifa was a student of Jafar al-Sadiq in Medina for a while, and he fought in Zayd’s 
rebellion in 740.298   He was not killed in the conflict and he continued studying hadith 
until 765, when he died in prison for publicly denouncing the Abbasid caliphs.  How is it 
that one of the most famous Sunni legalists studied under an imam who was supposedly 
the leader of the “partisan” community, and then risked his life fighting in Zayd’s 
rebellion?  Although the legal and theological debates of this period laid the foundations 
for the development of the Sunni and Shi’a schools of law, we cannot structure the 
theological and legal disputes of the Marwanid era around a Sunna-Shi’a divide, nor can 
we clearly label many of the historical figures of this era as Shi’a or Sunna.   
Political and religious debates during the Marwanid era were far more complex, 
especially concerning the imamate.  For example, sects that debated the nature of the 
imamate, such as the various branches of the Kaysaniyya movement or the Abbasid 
movement, differed in their political and religious rhetoric.299  Some sects of the 
Kaysaniyya attributed divine qualities to their imams while others did not.  According to 
Jacob Lassner, an Abbasid historian, scholars have debated over whether or not the 
various sects associated with the Abbasid movement were actually Shi’ite.300   Once 
again, some followers of the Abbasid imamate have been labeled as ghulat or extremist, 
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meaning Shi’a, while others did not attribute divine qualities to the Abbasid imams.   
Moreover, some rebels labeled as Shi’ite, such as those of the Zaydi rebellion in 740, did 
not attribute any divine qualities to their imam or denounce the caliphates of Abu Bakr or 
Umar.301  The Marwanid era was replete with different interpretations of the imamate and 
the role it should play in politics.   
During the Marwanid era, piety-minded Muslims were highly critical of the 
Umayyad caliphs and their attitudes toward the enforcement of Shari’ah law.  Muslims 
during the Marwanid era looked back on the Prophet’s community in Medina in the 
hopes of replicating it in their own time.  Many other Muslims also looked to descendants 
of the Prophet—usually from the bayt al-‘Ali—for spiritual and political guidance.  We 
cannot, however, simply divide the various factions during this era around a Sunna-Shi’a 
divide.  There were far more complex political and theological developments during this 
period.   
 
Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq 
The two famous Shi’a scholars, the fifth imam Muhammad al-Baqir and the sixth 
imam Jafar al-Sadiq, are prime examples of why we cannot clearly split the Muslim 
community into two factions, Sunni and Shi’a, during the Marwanid era.  Both scholars 
learned from and taught Muslims who were later labeled as Sunni, and they did not call 
for rebellion against the Umayyad caliphs because they believed that the unity of the 
umma, the Muslim community, was of greater importance.302  However, both scholars are 
considered key legalists in Shi’ite dogma.  A closer analysis of their lives shows that 
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these were complex human beings who lived in a world that had yet to define the political 
and religious boundaries between Sunna and Shi’a. 
Muhammad al-Baqir was born in Medina in 677, and he grew up during the 
second Islamic civil war.303  His full nickname, al-Baqir al-‘ilm, means “he who splits 
open knowledge.”304  He earned this name after a lifetime of studying the Islamic legal 
sciences.  Like his father, ‘Ali ibn Husayn Zayn al-Abidin, he spent his life transmitting 
hadith and debating theological issues with other Muslims.  He lived a pious life of 
charity, study, and prayer in Medina, and he refrained from politics in the same manner 
as his father.  Muhammad al-Baqir made a living as a school teacher and an Islamic 
scholar.  His family was supported through zakat, or the Mosque tax as it is commonly 
known, and he taught thousands of students at his school in Medina.305 
During Muhammad al-Baqir’s lifetime, many descendants of ‘Ali began claiming 
the title of imam, or spiritual leader of the community.306  His generation was the fourth 
after ‘Ali, so the number of descendants was already very large.  Muhammad al-
Hanafiyya, as well as his sons Abu Hashim and ‘Ali, claimed the same title, as did 
Muhammad ibn ‘Ali, the great grandson of Abbas.   Muhammad al-Baqir own half-
brother Zayd also claimed the title.  Although Muhammad al-Baqir made his own claim 
to the imamate, he did so without calling for rebellion against the Marwanid caliphs.  
Muhammad al-Baqir’s doctrine of Nass was developed during a time when many 
different theories about the Prophet’s spiritual successors were circulating among the 
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Islamic community.307  The doctrine of Nass was apolitical.  The spiritual leader of the 
community was to spend his time submitting himself to God, studying the Qur’an, and 
spreading the world of God.  Muhammad al-Baqir claimed that he was given divine 
knowledge that was passed down, uncorrupted, from generation to generation.  
Therefore, he believed his interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunna were the most 
accurate. 
Sunna historians have cited the doctrine of Nass, as well as later hadith that 
associate Muhammad al-Baqir with miracles, as evidence that Muhammad al-Baqir and 
his students were religious extremists.  Although it is true that Shi’a authors today 
attribute Muhammad al-Baqir with miracles and over-exaggerate his achievements as an 
Islamic legalist, as evidenced by Shareef al-Qurashi’s work, The Life of Imam 
Muhammad al-Baqir, most hadith that attribute Muhammad al-Baqir with the ability to 
perform miracles are forgeries from the late ninth century and later.308  During his 
lifetime, al-Baqir criticized ghulat thinkers claiming that he was anything more than a 
human being and many of his students were later labeled as Sunni legalists.309  
 Muhammad al-Baqir played an important role in propagating what would 
become the Twelver Shi’ite intellectual basis for the imamate with his doctrine of Nass.  
However, the mystical views concerning his life and death are forgeries of a later era.  He 
is believed to have died around 730.310  Of course, later Shi’a claimed that he was 
poisoned by the Caliph Hashim out of jealousy but that is doubtful.  
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Muhammad al-Baqir’s eldest son, Jafar al-Sadiq, would play an even more 
important role in the field of the Islamic legal sciences.  Jafar’s honorary title al-Sadiq 
means “the truthful.”311  This name comes as a result of a lifetime of piety, teaching, and 
scholarly work involving the study of the Qur’an, hadith, theology, astronomy, chemistry, 
medicine, and other natural sciences in Medina and Kufa.  He was born in Medina in 702 
to a moderately well-off family whose prestige emanated from being descendants of the 
Prophet Muhammad, Jafar’s great-great-great-grand father.312  His parents, Muhammad 
al-Baqir and Umma Farwa, were well educated and were supported with zakat (Mosque 
tax) by the Medinese community.   Jafar al-Sadiq spent a good part of his life learning 
from his father and other scholars in Medina, eventually becoming a man who spent his 
entire life thinking about nothing but God. 
Although Twelver Shi’a commonly refer to their fiqh as the Jafari School of Law, 
Jafar al-Sadiq actually played a significant role, along with many other scholars, in the 
development of what would become the four Sunni schools of law.313   Jafar, like other 
scholars of his day, attempted to make use of the Qur’an, the Sunna, hadith, and ra’y 
(opinion) as a body of knowledge to apply to Islamic fiqh to guide Muslims throughout 
their daily lives.  The Qur’anic revelation did not lay out guidelines for every possible 
legal scenario, so the written traditions of Muhammad and his companions, as well as the 
use of reasoning, analogy, and consensus in the Muslim community, could be used as 
legal guides.  Jafar relied heavily on the hadith from the Prophet Muhammad and the 
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bayt-‘Ali, and so, like his father, he would spend much of his time collecting and 
authenticating hadith.314 
Jafar had a disdain for the high courtly culture of the Umayyad house.  He and 
many of his students were not alone in their distrust of the Umayyad Caliphs.   Most of 
the early Shari’ah-minded scholars during Jafar’s life time were critical of the Marwanid 
family.  There are exceptions of course, such as al Awza’i (d. 774) and other Jama’i 
scholars from Damascus, but even Hasan al-Basri, who was apolitical, felt the need to 
question the political and economic policies of the Umayyad house at various times.315  
Jafar al-Sadiq, like other pious Muslims, believed that in charity, piousness, and study 
would lead to salvation.  Jafar, who rejected luxuries in favor of piousness and self 
reliance, was not in the minority among Shari’ah-minded scholars.   
The book, The Lantern of the Path, a collection of Jafar al-Sadiq’s hadith, serves 
as guide for Muslims on how to live one’s life.316  Although some hadith are most likely 
forgeries of a later era, many of the hadith reflect the rhetoric of Shar’iah-minded 
Muslims of the eighth century.  Jafar al-Sadiq gave advice on many aspects of life 
including how to properly greet guests in one’s home, or how to eat, pray, or sleep.  It is 
clear from these hadith that Jafar al-Sadiq saw Islam as a lifestyle that embodied every 
aspect of life.  Salvation required more than believing in God; it required a life time of 
discipline and charity.   
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Jafar was interested in not only studying Islamic law and theology.  He was also 
interested in the natural sciences.317  During the reign of ‘Umar II, the Arabs were 
beginning to study philosophy, chemistry, metallurgy, and astronomy.  Although the 
Umayyad caliphs—with the exception of ‘Umar II—were not engaged in much 
translation of foreign works, individual scholars traveled from place to place studying 
and discussing the scientific works of the Greeks and Persians.  During Jafar’s era, 
Medina had become a cosmopolitan center as merchants, scholars, and Muslims going on 
Hajj converged on the city.  Jafar came into contact with pagan Sabians from Haran, 
Christian Copts from Egypt, Zoroastrians from the Iranian Highlands, Jews from various 
parts of Arabia, as well as fellow Muslims from many areas.318  Jafar spent his life 
learning, studying, and debating with a wide variety of individuals over various social, 
spiritual, and scientific matters.   
Jafar al-Sadiq was most likely involved with the study of metallurgy, and may 
have studied other sciences, including astronomy, chemistry, and geology.  According to 
Jafar al-Sadiq, understanding the natural sciences led to understanding God’s rationale 
behind his creation of the world.319  Like Aristotle, he believed that the world functioned 
on the basis of rational principles.  Jafar was mainly interested in applying his study of 
the natural world to Shari’ah law and Islamic revelation.  In one hadith, he converted an 
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atheist to Islam by pointing out the divine rationale behind the rising and setting of the 
Sun, the changing seasons, and the makeup of the human body.  Jafar, in his doctrine of 
taqiyya, emphasizes the importance of knowledge and faith; a true Muslim should not 
have political aspirations. 
However, it is difficult to trust many of the hadith concerning Jafar al-Sadiq’s 
accomplishments in the natural sciences.  In the 19th century, several French historians, 
part of the Research Committee of Strasbourg, wrote the thesis Imam Jafar ibn 
Mohammed As-Sadiq: the Great Muslim Scientist and Philosopher.320  The purpose of 
the thesis was to connect the beginnings of Islamic philosophical, scientific, and 
theological speculation to Muhammad al-Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq.  However, the work 
relies heavily on biased Twelver Shi’ite sources which over-exaggerate the intellectual 
achievements of these two figures, as well as one of Jafar’s students, the famous 
alchemist Jabir: 
Shias believe that Jafar al-Sadiq had the knowledge of those sciences because he had Ilm-
e-Ladunni or God-given knowledge.  They explain that a man’s sub-conscious mind is 
quite different from his conscious mind.  If the treasure house of knowledge of mankind 
and the world.  Modern science lends support to the theory.  Biological studies have 
gradually proved that every group of cells in human body knows whatever is knowable 
from the beginning of the world till today.321 
 
One obvious forgery credits Jafar with discovering that the earth revolves around the 
Sun.322  Modern Twelver Shi’a believe that Jafar al-Sadiq, like Muhammad, Fatima, and 
the other eleven imams, had access to divine knowledge regarding the natural sciences, 
and that their imams were infallible.  Although Jafar al-Sadiq most likely studied the 
natural sciences, it doubtful that he, or his alchemist student Jabir, were responsible for 
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most of the philosophical, metaphysical, and scientific discoveries accredited to them by 
modern Shi’a.   
Although the details of Jafar’s life and studies are muddled by contradictory 
hadith, Jafar al-Sadiq was an important teacher of Islamic law and theology.  Many 
contemporary Muslims regarded him as one of the most important hadith collectors of his 
era, and two of his students were Abu Hanifah and Maliki, founders of two of the four 
Sunni schools of law.  Therefore, Sadiq was not the leader of a partisan Shi’ite 
community but was widely respected teacher of Islamic law and theology: 
The Imam took advantage of the occasion to propagate the religious sciences until the 
very end of his imamate, which was contemporary with the end of the Umayyad and the 
beginning of the Abbasid caliphates.  He instructed many scholars in different fields of 
the intellectual and transmitted sciences, such as Zararah, Muhammad ibn Muslim, 
Mu’min Taq, Hisham ibn Hakam, Aban ibn Taghlib, Hisham ibn Salim, Hurayz, Hisham 
Kalbi Nassabah, and Habir ibn Hayyan, the alchemist.  Even some important Sunni 
scholars such as Sufyan Thawri, Abu Hanifah, the founder of the Hanafi School of law, 
Qadi Sukuni, Qadi Abu’l-Bakhtari, and others, had the honor of being his students.  It is 
said that his classes and sessions of instruction produced four thousand scholars of hadith 
and other sciences.323 
 
Jafar dedicated himself to teaching and studying during the last twenty five years 
of his life, a period defined by one of the most important transitions in Islamic history: 
the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate. When they came to power, the Abbasids brutally 
murdered every member of the Umayyad family and they suppressed any protest to their 
absolutism including those Muslims with radical Shi’ite beliefs.324  Further, they offered 
positions in their bureaucracy to many highly regarded ulama, including Jafar al-Sadiq, as 
a way to appease the piety-minded Muslims, and they harassed ulama who openly refuted 
the legitimacy of their rule.  After refusing a position of power within the Abbasid 
hierarchy, Jafar was harassed by the Abbasid caliphates, and sent to prison on numerous 
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occasions.  He died in 765 C.E., most likely at the hand of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur, 
who feared a possible uprising in his name.  Even under political threats, Jafar continued 
teaching and studying the Islamic sciences until the very end of his life.   
Jafar al-Sadiq, living most of his life in Medina, grew up in what was actually a 
cosmopolitan society at that time in history, and was influenced by a variety of ideas 
from a broad spectrum of religious, social, and political perspectives.  He was a 
distinguished scholar among many other contemporaries who helped lay the foundations 
for the development of the four Sunni schools of law as well as the incorporation of the 
Greek, Pahlavi, Hindi, and Syrian sciences into Islamic thought.  The majority of existing 
hadith attributed to Jafar al-Sadiq emphasize that he was a Shari’ah-minded scholar and a 
cosmographer, and that despite his biases towards the hadith of his own lineage, he stated 
many times that all ulama who were pious and knowledgeable were successors to 
Muhammad.  Only a small minority of hadith, many of which can be proven as later 
forgeries, credit Jafar with outrageous scientific achievements and physical miracles.  He 
never attributed any miracles to his own person and he rejected radical Muslims who 
claimed that he was anything more than an enlightened human being.325  The same is true 
of his father, Muhammad al-Baqir.  The actual narrative of the lives of Muhammad al-
Baqir and Jafar al-Sadiq differs drastically with the generalizations made by many 
Western scholars who place them as leaders of a sectarian religious sect. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the two centuries following the Abbasid revolution, Islamic legal and 
theological schools consolidated into the schools of law that we are familiar with today: 
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Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Jafari.  It was not until approximately the thirteenth 
century that four of these schools would be recognized as Sunni.  Moreover, not until the 
Saffavid era, when the Persians were converted to Twelver Shi’ism, would the Sunna-
Shi’a divide that we are familiar with today come into being.326  Sunna and Shi’a 
historians since this era have over structured the formative era of Islam around a 
retrospective Sunna-Shi’a divide that reaches too deep, is too simple, and ignores well-
known histories of Islamic movements and individuals.  
 Even though it is true that the origins of Shi’ite legal doctrines and beliefs are 
found in the early Islamic community, there was no clear divide between a Sunna and a 
Shi’a community.  The socio-political developments of the formative era of Islam were 
more complex.  The lives of the first six imams, when placed into the context of the 
seventh and eighth century, contradict the notion that there was Shi’a community that 
was permanently divided from the Sunni community after the death of ‘Ali in 661.  There 
were also many political sects and religious beliefs in this period that blurred the line 
dividing Sunnism and Shi’ism.  Individuals and groups associated with Shi’ism—and 
especially with Kharajism—were more likely to engage in rebellion or abstract 
interpretations of Islamic dogma.  However, the early Islamic community cannot be so 
easily divided between two communities. 
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Epilogue 
 
 The idea that there has been a strict Sunni-Shi’a divide after 661 was propagated 
by Sunni and Shi’a Muslims during the Saffavid era.  The consolidation of most of the 
Islamic world into two main branches, Sunni and Twelver Shi’a, was a process that took 
almost a thousand years.  Many legal and theological ideas associated with both Islamic 
sects are found in the formative period of Islam (610-945).  However, there are other 
Shi’a sects throughout the Islamic world today.  More importantly, the differences that 
distinguish Twelver Shi’ism and Sunnism took centuries to develop following the 
collapse of the Umayyad caliphate.  I will briefly summarize the major legal and 
theological developments in Islam from the Abbasid caliphate to the Saffavid era, and I 
will discuss the origins of several important Shi’ite sects. 
By the end of the height of the Abbasid caliphate (750-945), the five schools of 
law—Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Jafari—had emerged into complex systems of 
fiqh and kalam.  Legal speculation and kerygmatic piety slowly gave way to strict 
adherence to principles found in the schools of law.  As the Middle East became 
decentralized as the Abbasid caliphate declined, spiritual fervor became localized in 
Sufism, a form of piety that demanded inward purification and generally rejected 
kerygmatic piety.   Despite the tendencies for political decentralization and Turkic 
military rule during the middle period of Islamic history (945-1500), trade, in large part, 
flourished from North Africa to India.  Moreover, Islam had created a cultural unity in a 
world that had become politically decentralized.  By the middle period of Islamic history, 
Islam became the faith of the majority throughout this vast region, and by the early Gun-
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Powder era (1500-1750), Islam had spread as far as Western China, Indonesia, West 
Africa, the East African coast, and Anatolia.  Islam had been adopted by each successive 
wave of Turks migrating from Central Asia, and by peoples in the West African Savanna.  
All of these people helped spread the faith deeper into Africa and Asia.  From the Gun 
Powder era to the present day, the five schools of law were followed by almost all 
Muslims from North Africa to Indonesia.   
 Only four of these schools, however, were recognized as Sunni.  Initially, during 
the middle periods, each school of law competed with the others, sometimes violently, in 
the cities from North Africa to India.  Only with the rise of the Ottoman Turks, who 
succeeded in conquering the remainder of the Byzantine Empire (Western Anatolia and 
the Balkans), Syria, the Hejaz, Egypt, and most of North Africa by the early sixteenth 
century, would the four schools be mutually accepted as the Sunni schools.  For the sake 
of unity, they accepted their differences. 
 Shi’ism, on the other hand, became confined mainly to three schools of thought 
by the end of the Abbasid era.  These were mainly the Ismaili, the Zaydi, and the al-Ithna 
‘Ashariyya (the Twelvers).   And in turn, the Ismaili, or Seveners, evolved into two 
further branches plus the Druze; the Zaydi branch, or so-called Fiver Shi’ites, remained 
focused in Yemen; and the Twelvers became attached, over time, to Persia, the Southern 
Levant, and Mesopotamia. 
First in Tunisia and then in Egypt, Shi’ism was propagated by the Fatimid Ismaili 
caliphs (909-1171) during the middle period.327  The imam al-Mahdi, who claimed to be 
the descendant of Jafar al-Sadiq’s grandson Muhammad ibn Ismail and the hidden imam 
of the Qaramatian movement in Arabia and eastern Syria, led a revolt in North Africa and 
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conquered Tunisia in 909.  After several failed attempts, his grandson conquered Egypt in 
961, built the city of Cairo just outside Fustat, and established a Shi’ite dynasty that 
lasted until 1171.  From 909 to 1171, the Fatimid caliphs sent missionaries to all corners 
of the Islamic world to spread their chiliastic beliefs and their complex esoteric 
interpretations of the Qur’an revelations.  In the late ninth century, the Fatimids 
conquered the Hejaz, Yemen, and Syria, and they controlled many of the trade routes in 
the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.   The Fatimid caliphate, however, started to 
decline in the eleventh century as a result of poor leadership, bad harvests in Egypt, and 
Turkic military pressures from outside the country and from within their own military.  
By 1171, the last Fatimid imam was killed when the dynasty was overthrown by the 
Kurdish conqueror Salah al-Din, who was leading the advancing Turkic army southward 
from the Levant. 
Although Ismaili Shi’ism died out in Egypt, several different branches of the faith 
survived in Syria, Yemen, East African and Indian coasts, and in Central Asia.  The 
Druze community in Syria, an entirely new religion that split from the Fatimid Ismaili 
movement in the early eleventh century, believed that the sixth Fatimid imam, Hakim, 
was God.  This group has survived in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel to the present day.  
Unlike Muslims, the Druze believe that the old and new testaments are as important as 
the Qur’an.  Furthermore, they don’t use mosques and they don’t pray towards Mecca.  
Like many Shi’a, however, their leaders practice taqiyya.  In other words, Druze 
followers rarely share their religious beliefs with outsiders.   
Another sect that split from the Fatimid movement was the Nizari Ismaili.  During 
a dispute of succession after the death of the seventh Fatimid caliph, the Turkish military 
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leaders placed his son al-Musta’li in power and sent his other son Nizari into exile.   
Nizari was later killed in a rebellion against the new Fatimid caliph, but his descendants 
would continue to lead Nizari Ismaili communities in Persia.  The missionary Ismaili 
communities in Iran and Central Asia only recognized Nizari as the true imam.  During 
the late eleventh century, the Nizari Ismaili began taking control of mountain fortresses in 
remote places in Northern Iran such as Alamut.   They became known as the infamous 
hashiyya, or “assassins,” since they were responsible for killing many important Turkish 
bureaucrats and amirs. The movement eventually spread to Syria.  The Nizari Ismaili 
continued causing problems for Turkish sultans until the Mongol’s destroyed the political 
movement in the late thirteenth century.  However, as a religious sect, the Nizari 
movement continued to exist in Northern and Eastern Persia, and they were led by 
descendants of Nizari.  Most Nizari Shi’a eventually migrated to north-west India and the 
Indian west coast region of Gujarat, where they are now known as the Khoja.   Today, 
they are led by the Aga Khan, their living imam.    
The last sect to split from the Fatimid movement was the Tayyibiyya.  During the 
early twelfth century, many believed that Tayyib, the eldest son of the Fatimid Imam al-
Amir, did not die but went into occultation and would return at the end of time as the 
Mahdi.  This belief became popular among Ismaili in Yemen, especially among 
merchants who are known as Bohras in India.  The Tayyibiyya, otherwise known as the 
Bohras, are located on the coast of western India, Yemen, and the East African coast.  
The Fatimid movement died in 1171 following Salah al-Din’s conquest of Egypt, but the 
Tayyibiyya and Nizari Ismaili movements survived to the present day. 
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 Both schools of Ismaili Shi’ism, Nizariyya and Tayyibiyya, adhere to a system of 
fiqh that is very similar to the Jafari School of law despite the obvious theological 
differences with the Twelvers.   Like the Jafari School of law, both sects have constructed 
their fiqh on a canon of hadith from Muhammad, Fatima, and the first six imams.  
However, each school also recognizes hadith from different branches of the bayt-‘Ali.  
The Zaydi Shi’a, or fivers, in Yemen also adhere to a school of law similar to the 
Twelvers.  However, the Zaydi rely heavily on the hadith of Muhammad, ‘Ali, Hasan, 
Husayn, and ‘Ali ibn Husayn—they don’t recognize the imamates of Muhammad al-
Baqir or Jafar al-Sadiq.   
 The Twelvers, on the other hand, recognize the imamate of twelve descendants 
of the Prophet.328  In the late ninth century, the belief in the occultation of the Twelfth 
imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, became popular in several cities in Iran, Mesopotamia, and 
Syria; most notably, the city of Qom in Iran, the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Hilla in 
Southern Iraq, and the city of Aleppo in Northern Syria.  Tenth-century Shi’ite scholars 
such as al-Kulayni constructed and propagated Twelver Shi’ite dogma and the Jafari 
School of law.  Twelver fiqh relied on the hadith from Muhammad, Fatima, and the 
Twelver imams.  Moreover, Twelver Shi’ite ulama, from the tenth to the thirteenth 
century, were increasingly associated with the rationalist beliefs of the Mutazalite.  By 
the end of the middle period, Twelver Shi’ism became the most popular form of Shi’ism 
in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.  The imams associated with Twelver Shi’ism were regarded 
as saints by many Sufi-Sunni Muslims in the middle period.  Shi’a, and many Sunni 
Muslims, made pilgrimages to the tombs of the imams, and many of their descendants 
were highly respected.   
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 In the late fifteenth century, Ismail, who was the leader of a Sunni-Sufi sect in 
Azerbaijan, converted to Twelver Shi’ism, as did his troops, who were known as the 
Quizilbash.   In the early sixteenth century, Ismail conquered Iran and Southern Iraq, and 
he forcefully converted most of the population to Twelver Shi’ism.  From the sixteenth to 
the eighteenth century, philosophic and religious currents among the Shi’i ulama in Iran 
became more restrictive and Twelver Shi’ism evolved into a religious sect based on 
strict-dogmatic orthodoxy.329  Sufism and philosophical speculation were marginalized.  
Moreover, during the Saffavid era, Shi’a ulama slowly formed a complex priestly 
hierarchy that was led by the Ayatollahs.  Conflict between the Saffavid shahs and the 
Ottoman sultans over control of Iraq also led to a war of words between Sunni and Shi’i 
ulama, creating a political and religious quarrel between what were increasingly seen as 
the two “orthodox” sects.330   
It is from this political divide that the modern historical conception of a strict 
Sunni-Shi’i divide originated.  Since this time period, Sunni and Shi’a ulama traced the 
strict divide to the events surrounding the first civil war in 661; thereby, distorting the 
history of early Shi’ism. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
329
 Cleveland, 51-6. 
330
 Deringil, 45-62. 
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